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ARTICLE
WATCHDOG OR DEMAGOGUE? THE MEDIA IN THE
CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM
Benjamin L. Liebman*
Over the past decade, the Chinese media have emerged as among the
most influentialactors in the Chinese legal system. As media commercialization and increased editorialdiscretion have combined with growing attention
to social and legal problems, the media have gained incentives to expand
their traditional mouthpiece roles in new directions. As a result, the media
have emerged as one of the most effective and important avenues of citizen
redress. Their role in the legal system, however, has also brought them increasingly into conflict with China's courts.
This Article examines the implications of the media's roles in the Chinese legal system for China's legal development. It shows how media commercialization has resulted in incentives for the media to expand the scope of
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critical reporting, to challenge propagandadepartment content regulations,
and to influence court decisionmaking. This Article details four distinct
mechanisms by which the media influence China's courts, demonstrating
that the media's effectiveness and influence stem from a combination of their
continued position as an arm of the Party-state and their ability to reflect
and create public opinion.
Media commercialization may be reinforcing traditional norms of
Party-state interference in the courts, while at the same time media scrutiny
increasingly highlightsproblems in the Chinesejustice system. Despite significant reforms and increasing caseloads, the authority of China's courts remains limited. Yet the media's ability to enjoy significant autonomy within
the confines of Party supervision also suggests that a similarmodel of autonomy may be possible, and is perhaps already emerging, for China's courts.
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INTRODUCTION

"Ten years of complaints are not as good as one wave of interviews."
-Popular saying in China'
"Over the past year ... we have given special emphasis to working
closely and communicating with the news media, doing an enormous
amount of work to control and reduce negative exposes that harm the
image of courts and judges. Looking at the entire province's courts over
the past year, there have basically not appeared any major negative exposes, and the number of negative articles has clearly decreased ...."
-Propaganda and Education Department, Shaanxi
Province High People's Court, November 20022
Sui Xiang had China's most powerful legal authority on her side. In
1988, when she was seven, Sui lost both arms when she came into contact
with an electric transformer that the local electric bureau had installed
on her family's vegetable patch in violation of national safety standards.
Nine years of complaints and lawsuits failed to bring compensation.
Then, on March 25, 1998, fiaodian Fangtan, or Focus, a nightly news and
commentary program on China Central Television ("CCTV"), aired a report on her case titled, "A Case That Cannot Be Understood After Ten
1. Zhang Ying, Yulun Jiandu Yu Xinwen Gongzuozhe De Falti Yishi [Popular Opinion
Supervision and the Legal Consciousness of News Workers], 2001 Xinwen Zhanxian [News
Frontline]
No. 10, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper79/4505/
505080.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
2. Shaanxi Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan [Shaanxi Province High People's Court], Wei
"Gongzheng Yu Xiaolti" Yinhang Gaoge-2002 Nian Quansheng Fayuan Sixiang
Xuanchuan Gongzuo Quede Xin De Chengji [Singing Out Lustily for "Fairness and
Efficiency"-The Entire Province's Courts Achieve New Accomplishments in Thought
Propaganda Work in 2002] (Nov. 10, 2002) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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Years."'3 The program asked how such a straightforward case could take
so long to resolve. On the very next day the Yichun Intermediate People's Court awarded Sui 1.16 million yuan in damages, at the time the
4
largest award for bodily harm in Chinese history.
For Du Shugui, the deputy chief of a local police station, media coverage had a far different outcome: a death sentence. On June 4, 2000,
Du shot dead another driver during a traffic dispute. Du originally
claimed that his gun had gone off by mistake and that he had acted in
self-defense. 5 Friends and family of the deceased, however, contended
that Du intentionally shot the victim because he was angry that the victim
failed to yield and allow Du onto a highway. Four days after the accident,
the victim's mother contacted a number of media outlets in Beijing to
protest her son's killing and its handling by local authorities who backed
Du's account. 6 One of the earliest reports on the case was in the Beijing

3. Fang Hua, Cangtian You Yan-Sifa Fubai Minyuan Fei Teng [There Are Eyes in
Heaven-The People Are Boiling with Resentment atJudicial Corruption] ch. 3, at http://
www.shuku.net:8080/novels/baogaowenxue/sfhbctyymyft/ctyy03.html (last visited July 2,
2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The case first came to national attention a
month earlier, in February 1998, when the Legal Daily newspaper carried a report on Sui's
plight, resulting in attention from top officials at the Supreme People's Court. Id.; see also
Xue Lian, Xi "Jizhe Bi Faguan Guanyong" Xianxiang [Analyzing the Phenomenon of
"Reporters Are More Useful Than Judges"], Guangming Ribao [Guangming Daily], Sept.
16, 1998 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing the case); Zhang Shidi, "Jizhe
Bi Faguan Youyong" Xianxiang Zhi WoJian [On the Phenomenon of "A journalist Is More
Useful than aJudge"], 2000 Xiandai Faxue [Modern Legal Studies] No. 2, at 142, 142 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Zhang, Phenomenon] (discussing case and
role of media).
4. 1998 Nian Shida Fazhi Xinwen [The Ten Biggest Legal News Items in 1998], Fazhi
Ribao [Legal Daily], Dec. 31, 1998, available at http://www.people.com.cn/item/
98huimou/newfiles/alllO.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The Supreme
People's Court had apparently instructed the court to resolve the case immediately and to
guarantee that Sui received adequate compensation. Fang, supra note 3. The television
report may have been coordinated with the court decision, but the knowledge that the
program was investigating the case appears to have pressured the court to act. For a
critical discussion of the case, suggesting that the court manufactured new legal concepts
in response to media pressure, see "Tianping" Zai Qingxie-Jieguan Nongdian Zichan
Mianlin De Fahi Wenti Diaocha Yu Sikao ["The Scales" Are Slanted-An Investigation and
Thoughts on the Legal Problems Encountered by Taking Over Rural Electric Assets], 2002
Zhongguo Dianye [China Electric Industry] No. 1, available at http://www.zdxw.com.cn/
zgdy200201/ndtd/200201250111.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
5. Guoqu Tufei Zai Shenshan, Gongchan Tufei Zai Gongan [In the Past Bandits Were
in the Mountains, Communist Bandits Are Now in the Police Bureau] (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Bandits Are in the Police Bureau].
6. Id.; Wu Zhaohui & Zhang Jun, Qi Xia Bazhou: "'Bazhou Qiangji An' Zhuizong
Baodao" Caifang Shouji [Seven Visits to Bazhou: Written Notes on the Writing of a "Series
of Reports on 'The Murder with a Gun Case in Bazhou'"], Renmin Ribao Wangluoban
[People's Daily Internet Edition], Aug. 21, 2000 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
She claimed that local authorities had accepted Du's version of events, and that the local
police report on the incident said that Du had acted heroically to protect public security.
Bandits Are in the Police Bureau, supra note 5.
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Evening News, whose headline declared, "If You Don't Yield to Me When
7
Told, I Will Kill You with One Shot."
Nationwide media repeated the story, resulting in "strong reaction"
from "readers all over the nation."" Nine days after the incident came to
light, senior officials of the Ministry of Public Security gave interviews in
which they referred to Du as "cruel" and "terrible." 9 Du, they stated,
must be "quickly dealt with in a serious way" so as to teach a lesson to all
police nationwide.' 0 Municipal and provincial officials also issued written
instructions to local authorities regarding the handling of the case. 1 '
The following week, on June 30, the Lanfang Intermediate Court in
Hebei Province convicted Du and sentenced him to death. 12 More than
one hundred journalists attended the trial, resulting in an atmosphere in
which, according to one critic of the trial, the court was unable to control
the proceedings and both Du and his lawyer were barely permitted to

7. Xin Hong, Jiao Ni Bu Rang Lu Yi Qiang Da Si: Hebei Bazhou Fasheng Paichusuo
Fusuozhang Dang Jie Kaiqiang Sha Ren Exing Shijian [If You Don't Yield to Me When
Told, I Will Kill You with One Shot: Malignant Incident in Bazhou, Hebei as Deputy Chief
of Police Station Opens Fire and Kills Man on the Street], Yang Cheng Wanbao [Yang
Cheng Evening News], June 12, 2000, available at http://www.ycwb.com/history/gb/
2000/06/12/ycwb/gnxw/2.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Xin,
If You Don't Yield to Me When Told] (reprinting original Beijing Evening News story); see
also Sun Baoye, Dui Anjian Xinwen Baodao Zhong Yulun Daoxiang Wenti De Sikao
[Thoughts on the Question of the Direction of Public Opinion in News Reports on Cases],
Guangzhou Jindun Wang [Guangzhou Public Security Bureau Network], Nov. 13, 2001
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Sun, Thoughts] (criticizing the media's
role in the case). According to media reports, the dispute began after Du forced the other
vehicle, a truck belonging to the local electric bureau, to stop. Xin, If You Don't Yield to
Me When Told, supra; see also Du Shugui Yi Shen Bei Pan Sixing: Du De Erzi Bei Pan 7
Nian Tuxing, Du De Qizi Bei Pan 5 Nian Tuxing [Du Shugui Sentenced to the Death
Penalty in First Instance Trial: Son Gets 7 Years in Prison, Wife Gets 5], Beijing Wanbao
[Beijing Evening News], July 1, 2000 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
Du Shugui Sentenced to the Death Penalty].
8. Du Shugui Sentenced to the Death Penalty, supra note 7; see also Du Shugui Yu
2000.6.19 Ri Bei Tiqi Gongsu [Public Prosecution Commenced Against Du Shugui on June
19, 2000], at http://past.hongen.com/proedu/flxy/zjft/zhuizong/bazhou/jc62404.htm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that case resulted
in widespread attention).
9. Gonganbu Lingdao Zhishi Chedi Qingchu Hai Qun Zhi Ma Du Shugui [Public
Security Bureau Leaders Order Thorough Elimination of Rotten Apple Du Shuguil,
Shenghuo Shibao [Shenghuo Times], July 1, 2000 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
The interviewed officials were the Vice Minister and the Deputy Head of Communist Party
Discipline of the Ministry of Public Security. Id.
10. Id.
11. Public Prosecution Commenced Against Du Shugui on June 19, 2000, supra note
8; Bandits Are in the Police Bureau, supra note 5; see also Wu & Zhang, supra note 6
(stating that case attracted concern of high-ranking national officials).
12. Du Shugui Sentenced to the Death Penalty, supra note 7. Du's wife and son, who
had been with him at the time of the incident, were sentenced to five and seven years'
imprisonment for assisting Du in attempting to conceal his crime. See id.
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speak.' 3 Five weeks later, on August 1, Du was executed after the Hebei
14
Province High People's Court rejected his appeal.
Sui and Du are not alone in benefiting, or suffering, from media
scrutiny of their cases: In numerous other cases, media coverage has had
a significant effect on outcomes. More importantly, these decisions illustrate the complex relationships that exist among Party officials, the
courts, and the media in contemporary China. To understand such relationships, it is crucial to recognize that both China's media and the
courts have long played roles as arms of the Chinese Party-state.1 5 Yet
their roles have been very different: The media have played a vital role,
serving as both a mouthpiece and an information gatherer. In China, the
term "media" refers to organizations that engage in a range of activity
that is broader than their Western counterparts-notjust preparing public articles and programs, but also writing confidential reports for Partystate leaders, vetting citizen complaints, and referring such complaints to
other Party or government departments. In contrast to the important
role of the media, China's courts have long been weak institutions, subject to extensive external influence and lacking in both authority and
competence.
Over the past decade, media commercialization and increased media
editorial discretion have combined with a rising attention to social and
legal problems. This results in powerful incentives for the media to expand their traditional roles. China's media have become increasingly
critical in their news coverage, exposing alleged wrongdoing, criticizing
officials for failure to address injustice, and influencing both the outcome
of individual disputes and the interpretation of existing legislation. Concurrently, a dramatic growth in litigation and state emphasis on strengthening the courts have begun to increase the importance of China's
courts. The judiciary continues to suffer from numerous weaknesses,
however, including both lack of autonomy and lack of public confidence.
Courts have thus been ill prepared to resist expanded media pressure.

13. Sun, Thoughts, supra note 7.
14. Lu Guoqing, Xinhua, Bazhou Qiangji An Zhufan Du Shugui Bei Zhixing Sixing
[Du Shugui, Prime Culprit of the Case of Murder with a Gun in Bazhou, Is Executed]
(Aug. 1, 2000) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Du Shugui Sixing Xianchang Muji
Shilu [An On-the-Spot Report of the Execution of Du Shugui], Zhongguo Sixing Guancha
[China Death Penalty Watch] (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
15. I use the term "Party-state" in this Article to refer to both the Communist Party
and the various levels of the Chinese government. There are at times significant
differences in interests between the Party and the government, and the Party itself is far
from unified in its views. In the context of the media, as in many other areas, the Partystate is often viewed as acting as one. In particular, at the provincial and municipal level,
journalists and editors comment that there is little difference between Party and
government actors and actions that oversee the media.
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Many in China insist that the media are the single most important
and effective avenue for citizen redress.' 6 Lawyers comment that having
the media on one's side is often crucial to winning a case.' 7 Others note,
only partly in jest, the importance of "hiring a journalist," rather than a
lawyer, in order to influence the outcome of cases.18 Commentators
speak of Focus, the program that came to Sui Xiang's assistance, as
"China's most authoritative court."' 9
But the media's increasing role in exposing malfeasance or injustice,
or in pressuring courts to decide cases in a particular way, does not necessarily come as an unalloyed good. Judges bemoan media influence, arguing that, far from being a force for fairness, the media often act on behalf
of one party to a case and that journalists are frequently ignorant of the
law. 20 Legal academics contend that the media are interested in popular
morality, not in ensuring impartial application of legal standards. 2 1 And
both journalists and observers alike complain of the restricted sphere of
"media supervision," or oversight, noting that the media's critical reporting rarely extends to wrongdoing above the county or municipal level of
22
the Party-state: They "hit flies, not tigers."
This Article examines the media's role in the Chinese legal system
and the implications of media influence for China's legal development,
in particular for the development of China's courts. Media roles are varied, ranging from carrying out state legal education campaigns, to exposing official wrongdoing or inaction, to demanding that alleged criminals
be arrested or punished harshly, to writing confidential internal reports
on unfairly decided cases to Party-state leaders, to referring popular complaints to government actors. As this Article shows, one theme increasingly links these varied roles: A loosening of state control over the media
has facilitated the media's ability to engage in problem solving and to
influence dispute resolution. As this Article also demonstrates, the effectiveness of the media in these roles still stems primarily from the media's
16. See, e.g., Li Jinsheng, Baoguang De Quanwei (The Authority in Exposure],
Jiancha Ribao [Procuratorate Daily], Oct. 10, 1998, at http://www.jcrb.com/zyw/n127/
ca70064.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that media can "collect the
public's opinions, express the public's thoughts, and offer comments and criticisms of
social phenomena").
17. See, e.g., Interview 2003-108.
18. Interview 2003-46.
19. See, e.g., Xu Xun, Zhongguo Meiti Yu Sifa Guanxi Xianzhuang Pingxi [Analyzing
the Current Circumstances of Media-Judicial Relations in China], 6 Faxue Yanjiu [Legal
Studies Research] 149, 151 (2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Xu,
Media-Judicial Relations].
20. Interview 2003-20; Interview 2003-53.
21. See Interview 2003-21 (detailing criticism of the media); Interview 2003-163.
22. Interview 2003-3; Shi Tao, Canying He Laohu, Yuer He Zixingche [Flies and
Tigers, Fish and Bicycles], Minzhu Luntan [Democratic Forum], Nov. 23, 2002, at http://
www.asiademo.org/gb/2002/11/20021123b.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Shi, Flies and Tigers] (stating that "hitting flies, not tigers" is a
"commandment" of China's media).
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continued position as an arm of the Party-state. But media commercialization is dissolving the traditional pattern of media-state relations by enhancing the media's ability to appeal directly to, and create, "popular
opinion."
Presently, China's media are not external actors, a Fourth Estate;
they are one of many competing Party-state institutions seeking to solve
problems, expand influence, and force action by others. The media's
traditional close links to the Communist Party, combined with financial
incentives brought on by commercialization and increased attempts to
satisfy viewer and reader demands, make them particularly able to influence courts and other official actors. Increasingly, the media are able to
rely on both their Party position and their popular market appeal.
Thus, despite resemblances to the Western media, the Chinese media continue to play a very different role in the legal system. The Chinese
media at times come closer to playing the role of an official (albeit often
sensational) ombudsman than to playing the role of a media watchdog.
The media's position within the Party-state also means that they come
into direct institutional conflict with other government actors much more
than their Western counterparts because often they are competing with
other institutions to influence the views of Party-state leaders.
These developments have large implications for Chinese law. Understanding the role of the media is crucial to understanding the development of law and legal institutions in China. Growing conflicts between
China's 200,000judges and more than 500,000 reporters reflect the rapid
development of both courts and the media within a system in which institutional positions are fluid.23 Tensions between courts and the media
stem in part from the fact that China's media act not simply to influence
official decisionmaking; in many cases, the media's views are determinative because media "findings" are taken as fact by other official actors.
Such conflicts are also the product of a system in which the rules of the
game, and the boundaries of both authority and permissible conduct, are
heavily influenced by Party policy, and in which Party oversight of the
courts and media continues to be legitimate. Yet the conflicts between
courts and media also suggest the possibility that both institutions may be
enjoying expanded areas of autonomy and that the goals of individual
23. He Caiqing, Woguo Xinwen Shiye Wushi Nian Bianhua Juda Chengjiu Xiren
[The News Industry of Our Country Is Transformed and Achieves Great Success in the Past
50 Years], Guangming Ribao [Guangming Daily], Sept. 22, 1999 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (discussing the number ofjournalists). The numbers ofjudges and journalists
are rough approximations. The number of journalists likely includes many employees of
media organs who technically have reporter's licenses, but who do not engage in
reporting. At the same time, the number likely omits the significant number ofjournalists
who now report without official licenses. Id. Similarly, estimates of the number ofjudges
in China vary widely depending on who is counted as a judge. See Donald C. Clarke,
Empirical Research into the Chinese Judicial System, in Beyond Common Knowledge 164,
173-75 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003).
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judges and journalists may therefore be important factors in shaping both
institutions.
Understanding the role of the media in the Chinese legal system also
has important implications for comparative understanding of institutional development. This Article shows that the commercialization of the
Chinese media is not necessarily pushing the media toward an inexorable
separation from the Party-state or toward assuming a role as an independent watchdog. Given the multifaceted roles that the Chinese media
play, extrapolating solutions to problems in the courts or the media from
Western experience may be counterproductive.
China's experience challenges models of institutional development
that assume that a competitive media environment will necessarily increase transparency and result in improvements to the legal system, or
that China is necessarily moving toward Western-style legal and media
institutions. The vocabulary used to describe the recent development of
the media and the courts in China may be the same as that in the West,
but the terms carry meanings and roles that reflect the very different underlying political dynamics in China. Reliance on assumptions regarding
how Western institutions function risks confusing the actual functioning
of the Chinese system with aspirations derived from experiences elsewhere. The effect of the Chinese media also demonstrates the degree to
which marketization may be a mixed blessing for the Chinese legal system, and that media development will not necessarily help resolve the
broad range of problems the legal system now confronts. China's recent
experiences further reveal potential risks in popularizing law in the absence of institutions capable of resisting populist pressures.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I argues that commercialization of the media has led to a loosening of control over media content,
resulting in media that report on a widening range of topics, including
legal matters. Commercialization has thus provided the media with incentives to engage in a greater range of critical reporting on injustice and
official wrongdoing, generally referred to in Chinese as yulun fiandu, or
"popular opinion supervision," and to challenge the extensive content
restrictions that remain in place. But the media's ability to engage in
critical reporting also stems from the historical roles and structural position of the media as an arm of the Party-state.
Part I also shows that the norms governing the media's ability to engage in popular opinion supervision derive from a range of formal and
informal sources, including national laws and regulations, written and
oral Party policies, local regulations, defamation litigation, and overt
threats and intimidation. But increasingly that system does not operate
in a uniform manner. In addition, new technologies, most notably the
growth of internet news portals, are presenting strong challenges to propaganda authorities' current attempts to control the media.
Part II describes four distinct mechanisms by which the media affect
courts: public reports on cases, confidential internal reports on cases
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prepared for Party-state leaders, referral of readers' complaints to other
Party-state institutions, and informal intervention by journalists. All four
mechanisms facilitate the media's ability to affect, and sometimes dictate,
outcomes. Part II also examines recent judicial efforts to combat and
manage media coverage, demonstrating both courts' sensitivity to increased scrutiny as well as the difficulties journalists face when seeking to
report on the courts.
Part III discusses the implications of the empirical analysis in Parts I
and II for our understanding of China's legal development. It argues
that the media's effectiveness stems from two primary factors: the media's ability to influence Party-state leaders, and the media's ability to reflect and create public opinion. This Article then suggests that media
supervision should be understood as part of a broader central policy of
encouraging supervision of wrongdoing by a wide range of Party-state actors. The need for increased transparency is acknowledged in order to
curb official abuses, but it is also viewed with trepidation.
Turning to the implications of the media's role for the legal system,
this Article then argues that the media's influence and official role have
important repercussions for our understanding of the place and role of
China's courts. The media's impact demonstrates that increased
caseloads do not equate with increased judicial authority. The media reinforce norms of Party-state control over, and influence in, the courts at
the same time as they serve as checks on egregious cases.
Part III concludes by suggesting some initial steps toward theorizing
judicial independence in China. Recognizing the media's role in the
Chinese legal system reveals the need for a deeper understanding of the
range of actors and mechanisms that affect court decisionmaking. The
courts' reactions to media coverage, however, also demonstrate that
courts may increasingly be able to use their existing powers in new ways.
The media's ability to enjoy significant spheres of autonomy despite the
Party's media-control system suggests that a similar model may be possible, and already emerging, for China's courts. Understanding the media's impact on the legal system may thus help to map a strategy for enhancing the autonomy of China's courts.

Discussion of the media's effect on China's legal development and
dispute resolution has largely been absent from Western scholarship on
Chinese law. The most important recent works on Chinese law make only
passing reference to the role of the media, generally in the context of the
media's role in propagating state legal norms 24 or in serving state goals of
24. See, e.g., Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a Cage 133 (1999) (discussing use of media
to serve Party propaganda goals in law).
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boosting knowledge of and respect for law. 25 Insightful scholarship has
examined the complex legal framework that regulates the media 26 and
has described the important role the media play in propagating legal
norms and carrying out legal education, both by announcing formal laws
and regulations and by emphasizing certain areas of the law. 27 Western
scholars have written extensively on the roles and evolution of courts, the
procuracy, the legal profession, mediation institutions, people's congresses, and China's administrative state, and have long recognized that
China's courts are one of many mechanisms capable of resolving disputes. Nevertheless, prior scholarship has documented neither the media's impact on these institutions, nor the role of the media as players in
the legal system.
There is a significant volume of English-language scholarship, primarily in the fields of communication studies and political science, on the
development of the Chinese media, including an increasing volume of
scholarship examining the commercialization of the media. 28 Very little
recent scholarship has touched upon the role of the media as a problem
solver; nor has it examined how the media affect decisionmaking by
other Party-state actors, through either public reports or internal reports
prepared for Party leadership. None has directly addressed the media's
interface with courts and other legal institutions.
The relationship of the media to the courts has engendered extensive discussion in the Chinese media and among Chinese legal and media
studies academics. A number of leading Chinese scholars have written on
the topic. 29 Although many have discussed the media's impact on the
25. See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, China's Long March Toward Rule of Law 7 (2002)
[hereinafter Peerenboom, China's Long March].
26. See generally Perry Keller, Media Ownership and Regulation in China, in
Implementation of Law in the People's Republic of China 277, 286-304 (Uianfu Chen et al.
eds., 2002) [hereinafter Keller, Media Ownership] (analyzing Chinese media law); Perry
Keller, Privilege and Punishment: Press Governance in China, 21 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.
87, 88-89 (2003) [hereinafter Keller, Privilege and Punishment] (analyzing underlying
incentives of state and media actors).
27. See, e.g., Mechthild Exner, The Convergence of Ideology and the Law: The
Functions of the Legal Education Campaign in Building a Chinese Legal System, Issues &
Studies, Aug. 1995, at 68, 76-91 (discussing legal education campaigns); Tahirih V. Lee,
The Media and the Legal Bureaucracy of the People's Republic of China, in Power,
Money, and Media 208, 236-38 (Chin-Chuan Lee ed., 2000) ("The state-run media are
vehicles for informing the population of China about official interpretations of the
law ....
Judging from the size of the enterprise, the lawmaking bureaucracy of China
heavily depends upon the media to do its job.").
28. Much of the most insightful work on the Chinese media is collected in four
volumes edited by Chin-Chuan Lee. See China's Media, Media's China (Chin-Chuan Lee
ed., 1994); Chinese Media, Global Contexts (Chin-Chuan Lee ed., 2003); Power, Money,
and Media, supra note 27; Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism
(Chin-Chuan Lee ed., 1990) [hereinafter Voices of China].
29. See, e.g., He Weifang, Faguan Yu Dazhong Chuanmei [Judges and the Mass
Media], Nanfang Zhoumo [Southern Weekend], Jan. 9, 1998, available at http://
www.jc.gov.cn/personal/ysxs/fnsx3/fnsx2O39.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
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courts, much of the scholarship and commentary has focused on the relatively narrow question of the appropriate balance between media coverage and respect for court procedures, and on the relative merits, or lack
thereof, of limiting media coverage. Commentators have not generally
sought to understand the media in terms of their importance in the legal
system, or to explore the link between media influence and Party influence on the courts. Indeed, most Chinese academic writing on the impact of the media has treated the question separately from increasingly
prevalent discussions of court reform and judicial independence.
This Article seeks to contribute to the existing literature in both the
West and in China on the role of the Chinese media, and in so doing to
further the understanding of institutional development more generally.
Although its focus is on the media's role in law and dispute resolution,
the Article also contributes to understanding the media's role in exposing wrongdoing, content regulation of the media, the importance of intemet news providers, the role of confidential internal reports, and the
role the media play in receiving public grievances. China now has a lively
commercialized press that openly reports on a wide range of formerly
taboo topics, talk shows that field complaints about daily lives, journalists
willing to risk both monetary and physical hardship to expose wrongdoing, and internet news sites that spread word of the latest scandal nationwide within hours. This Article demonstrates, however, that the term
"media" in China continues to refer to institutions whose roles and authority extend beyond such public reporting to include a range of official
and unofficial roles that influence Party-state decisionmaking.
This Article is based on a combination of written sources and interviews with approximately 150 judges, journalists, lawyers, and academics,
primarily in China. I conducted interviews in Beijing, Shanghai,
Chengdu, and, in a few cases, New York. I interviewed approximately
twenty-five judges, sixty-nine journalists, forty-nine legal or media studies
academics (many of whom also have practical experience in either the
media or law), seven procurators or procuratorate officials, thirteen nonacademic lawyers, and thirteen "others"-businesspeople, employees of
internet websites, and government officials. I interviewed journalists and
judges affiliated with national, provincial, and local courts or media outlets. 30 All interviewees were promised anonymity. Reflecting the sensitiv[hereinafter He, Judges]; Xu Xun, Meijie De Zeren: Jiang Baodao Yu Pinglun FenkaiJianyi Baodao Ji Pinglun Anjian De Xinwen Guize [The Responsibility of the Media:
Separate Out Reports and Commentary-A Suggestion Regarding News Regulations on
Reports and Commentary on Cases], 1998 Renmin Sifa [People's Judiciary] No. 10 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Xu, Responsibility of the Media].
30. Of the journalists, twenty-four worked for newspapers or news agencies with a
central Party or government rank; nine for central television or radio; six for central
magazines; three for provincial television; nine for newspapers or magazines with a
provincial rank; ten for municipal papers; and eight for magazines or newspapers with only
loose Party-state affiliation. I discuss the concept of administrative rank of the news media
in Part I.B. Of the judges, three worked for the Supreme People's Court; nine worked for
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ity of the subject matter, many of the interviewees requested that I not
name their employer, and in some cases the city in which the interview
took place. Accordingly, in this Article I cite to interviews based on the
year in which they occurred and an interview number, but in order to
protect the anonymity of sources I do not otherwise identify interviewees.
Detailed information regarding the relationship of the Chinese media to the legal system is simultaneously extremely easy and extremely
difficult to obtain. The growth of the Chinese media, and in particular
the internet, makes written materials on the topic widely accessible. A
Google search in the Chinese language for the terms "media" and
"courts" resulted in 203,000 hits; the term "media supervision" yielded
93,900. At the same time, other documentary sources-ranging from
court opinions, to propaganda department notices, to internal reportsare difficult, and in some cases illegal, to obtain. The media-content-control system remains relatively secretive; questions of media regulation
continue to touch upon core questions of Party authority. Although
courts andjudges are increasingly open, many still view their relationship
to the press as a sensitive topic. Accordingly, although I was able to meet
with a wide range of journalists, judges, lawyers, and academics, others I
attempted to interview, both in the media and in the courts, were unwilling to meet with me.
Virtually every person with whom I met in connection with this research was introduced to me by friends or personal contacts. Despite the
selection biases inherent in relying on such contacts, reliance on personal
introductions remains essential for empirical research on the Chinese legal system, in particular when research may touch on politically sensitive
topics. One result is that the judges and journalists with whom I met are
most likely better educated than many of their peers. Many also support
and advocate reforms of their respective institutions. The large majority
of journalists and judges I interviewed work in courts or media outlets in
major cities. Their views thus may not reflect journalists and judges in
rural areas, and the cases they encounter are only a small slice of those
nationwide. Judges involved in particularly sensitive or high-profile cases
were generally not willing to meet with me. In other cases, interviewees
were willing to share information regarding particular cases but requested that I not publish such information. Thus in some cases I have
omitted information that might be relevant to my empirical analysis.
Nevertheless, my interviewees provide insights into both the courts and
the media that are crucial to understanding the evolution of both institutions. The often sharply divergent views that journalists and judges hold
on their roles also demonstrate that my sources were far from uniform in
their views or experiences.

provincial high courts or the high courts of municipalities with a provincial rank; four
worked for intermediate courts; and nine worked for county or district courts.
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A number of my interviewees, in particular many of the journalists
and academics, are active participants in current debates in China concerning the future of court-media relations. Accordingly, the information I obtained may also reflect their particular interests and goals. In
addition, the fact that court-media relations are increasingly drawing the
attention of observers outside China has been used as an argument to
3
support the need for further attention to the issue within China. 1
The documentary sources I rely upon range from scholarly articles to
newspaper and magazine reports and commentaries, to web postings and,
in a few cases, web chatroom discussions. My heavy reliance on newspaper accounts in an article that studies the impact of the media also raises
methodological questions. Yet media reports are far from uniform in
their views regarding media impact; many of the media's strongest critics
are themselves journalists and editors. In addition, many newspapers,
and in particular specialist legal papers, print a wide range of commentary on legal issues by legal professionals and scholars. Media reports
themselves also often provide the only publicly available accounts of court
decisions. Other sources on which I rely appeared only on the internet,
reflecting the degree to which the internet itself has become a forum for
public debate in China. Because there are potential problems with the
reliability of some of my sources-including interviewees, the official media, and online postings-I have principally relied on information that is
corroborated by multiple sources.
I.

HISTORICAL AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND:

COMMERCIALIZING MOUTHPIECES

A. HistoricalRoles
The media have served as an arm of China's Party-state since before
the founding of the People's Republic in 1949.32 The Communist Party's
31. A December 2003 report in China Newsweek, which was subsequently posted to the
website of the official Xinhua News Agency, cited this Article and seminars held in Beijing
to discuss an earlier draft of this Article as evidence of growing international attention to
court-media relations in China. The China Newsweek article included a summary of some of
my key arguments. Xu Xun, Meiti Pandian 2003 Niandu Meiti Sifa Zhjian De Chongtu He
Pingheng [The Media Checks Its Conflicts and Balance with Judicial Organs in the Year of
2003], Xinwen Zhoukan [China Newsweek], Dec. 17, 2003, available at http://
news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2003-12/17/content_1235847.htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Xu, Checks].
32. For a discussion of control of the press in the early years of the Communist Party
and the PRC, see Yuezhi Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy in China 14-17 (1998)
[hereinafter Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy], and Franklin W. Houn, Chinese
Communist Control of the Press, 22 Pub. Opinion Q. 435 (1958). See also Li Li & Du
Chenghui, Banbao Shi Dang De Yizhong Zhongyao Gongzuo Fangshi-Mao Zedong
Xinwen Xuanchuan Sixiang Xuexi Zhaji [Running Newspapers Is a Form of Important
Working Method of the Party-A Review of Mao Zedong's News Propaganda Theory], 29
Hubei Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban) [Journal of Hubei University
(Philosophy and Social Science Edition)] 20, 20 (2002) (on file with the Columbia Law
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early leaders recognized the importance of the media for informing and
33
instructing China's population, and for asserting political control.
China's media traditionally have been "an integral part of the government or of the Communist party,"3 4 controlled by the Party and used by
transmit and implement policies, and
the leadership to rally support, to 35
to carry out political mobilization.
The term "media" in China refers not only to state-controlled news
outlets but also to institutions whose roles include carrying out official
Party-state functions. In addition to disseminating official or approved
news publicly, China's media have served as a mechanism for informing
Party leadership of developments at the local level, including both public
grievances and wrongdoing by Party-state officials. 36 The media have
thus provided a route for leadership at each level of the Party-state to
37
obtain information that might not be available through other channels.
Review) (discussing Mao's recognition of the importance of media control). For an
examination of the press in Republican China (1911 to 1949), including a description of
the commercialization of the press and of the Republican press's role in advocating
liberalization, see Stephen R. MacKinnon, Toward a History of the Chinese Press in the
Republican Period, 23 Mod. China 3 (1997). See also Daniel C. Lynch, After the
Propaganda State 19-20 (1999) (discussing efforts to control media at end of Qing Dynasty
and government control of media during Republican period); Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese
Democracy 133-51 (1985) (discussing creation and evolution of China's popular press in
late nineteenth and early twentieth century); William P. Alford, Of Arsenic and Old Laws:
Looking Anew at Criminal Justice in Late Imperial China, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 1180, 1211
(1984) (discussing critical media coverage of legal proceedings in one 19th century case).
33. Houn, supra note 32, at 435, 438-39, 445, 448.
34. Id. at 435-36.
35. See Nathan, supra note 32, at 154-56; see also Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing
China 198 (1995) (discussing media's role in political mobilization); Patricia Stranahan,
Molding the Medium 3 (1990) (commenting that during the 1940s, the Communist Party
Central Committee's official newspaper, Liberation Daily, "was the medium through which
Party leaders gave direction to cadres who organized and implemented the Party's political
line among the masses"). This is not to suggest that the media have always spoken with a
uniform voice. The media have also been an area of significant factional conflict within
the Communist Party, with various media outlets, especially in the print media, being
associated with particular Party factions. See, e.g., Timothy Cheek, Propaganda and
Culture in Mao's China 172-87 (1997) (discussing role of People's Daily in factional
conflicts during 1950s); Merle Goldman, The Role of the Press in Post-Mao Political
Struggles, in China's Media, Media's China, supra note 28, at 23, 23-24 (discussing role of
the press during 1989 Tiananmen movement); Chin-Chuan Lee, Ambiguities and
Contradictions: Issues in China's Changing Political Communication, in China's Media,
Media's China, supra note 28, at 3, 8-9 (noting that the mass media have also served as "a
site of struggle among power elites," in part due to the importance of media control in
establishing political legitimacy).
36. See Victor H. Li, Law Without Lawyers 76 (1977) [hereinafter Li, Law Without
Lawyers] ("[O]ne of the functions of a Chinese newspaper is to act as a channel for
complaints by the public against particular actions.").
37. Nathan, supra note 32, at 154-55; see also Marlowe Hood, The Use and Abuse of
Mass Media by Chinese Leaders During the 1980s, in China's Media, Media's China, supra
note 28, at 37, 39 ("The media are not only the 'mouth and tongue' of the Party, but also
its eyes and ears."); He Chuan, "Neican"-Tongzhizhe De Ermu ["Internal Reports"-The
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The evolution of the media into information providers was crucial in a
system in which lower-level officials often had significant incentives to
overstate positive developments and underreport negative news. This information was, and continues to be, provided through a system of internal publications, generally published by key Party newspapers or news
agencies but circulated to persons only of a particular rank.3 8
From its earliest days, the claim to represent public opinion has been
an important component of Party assertions of legitimacy. The Party's
"mass line" doctrine was based on the idea that only by fully understanding the views of the populace could the Party push forward with its revolutionary goals.3 9 The use of the term "public opinion supervision" to describe media oversight reflects the media's role as a bridge between the
Party and the people, as well as the Party's claim that the interests of the
public are the same as the interests of the Party. This role has been underscored by the media's role in serving as a government complaints office. Since the 1950s, "mass work" departments at most major papers and
magazines have served as government complaints offices. These departments receive and vet popular grievances; worthy complaints are referred
to relevant government or Party departments, selected for publication in
internal or public editions, or forwarded to journalists for further
40
investigation.
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Chinese media, including both general publications and specialist legal journals, contained significant dis41
cussion of legal issues and the relationship of law to Party leadership.
Eyes and Ears of Those in Power], Suidao [Tunnel], Feb. 28, 1998, available at http://
www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Bay/5598/98/Sd9802e.txt (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter He, Internal Reports] (arguing that senior officials trust media
more than other arms of government because they view media as comparatively neutral).
The development of such alternative sources of information to inform Party leadership of
developments at the local level was not a complete innovation. During imperial times,
China's emperors relied on complex systems of communication, including secret reporting
concerning local conditions or popular opinion, to keep themselves informed. See
generally Silas H.L. Wu, Communication and Imperial Control in China (1970).
38. See infra Part I.B.2. The media, even in their internal reports, often failed to
report negative developments accurately, most notably during the Great Leap Forward, see
Nathan, supra note 32, at 182, but nevertheless did provide leaders with information not
available through other channels.
39. Lieberthal, supra note 35, at 64 (discussing the "mass line").
40. See Nathan, supra note 32, at 156-57 (discussing mass work departments).
41. This was particularly the case during 1956 and 1957, at the time of the Hundred
Flowers campaign, when the Chinese media gave voice to official views praising legal
regularity. Lubman, supra note 24, at 79; see also Cai Dingjian, Lishi Yu Bian Ge-Xin
Zhongguo Xianfa ZhiJianshe De Licheng [The Transformation of History-The Course of
Development of the Construction of the Constitutional System of New China] 40-42
(1999) (discussing propaganda regarding law, including through media, in 1950s);Jerome
Alan Cohen, The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China 1949-1963, at 8
(1968) (noting attention to legal issues in Chinese newspapers in 1950s); Lubman, supra
note 24, at 80 (discussing "emphasis on class warfare" in media coverage of law in early
1960s). For a discussion of legal periodicals and legal coverage in nonspecialist journals
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As legal institutions came under attack during the Cultural Revolution,
the media began to assume a more direct role not only of conveying
Party-state norms, but also of implementing policies and making key decisions. 42 The weakness of other government institutions during the Cultural Revolution meant that "the press acted as the most important institutional connector between citizens and the state. '43 Media served as
instruments of factional struggle, and reports became effectively determinations of fact,44 particularly in cases of alleged wrongdoing. In the ab-

sence of a functioning legal system during the Cultural Revolution, newspapers frequently assumed the role of directly assigning and announcing
Party determinations of guilt.
B. The ContinuingRoles of the Party Press
China's media have undergone both rapid growth and significant
commercialization over the twenty-seven years since China began its reform process in 1978. 4 5 The total number of newspapers in China grew
from sixty-nine in 1979 to a few hundred in the early 1980s to more than
two thousand in 1997; as of mid-2003 there were 2,035 newspapers in
China. 46 Likewise, the number of national, provincial, and local televiduring this period, see Tao-tai Hsia, Chinese Legal Publications: An Appraisal, in
Contemporary Chinese Law: Research Problems and Perspectives 20, 47-50 (Jerome Alan
Cohen ed., 1970); see also Cohen, supra, passim (translating materials from Chinese media
in 1950s and 1960s).
42. Describing the Chinese legal system in 1978, Victor Li observed that "a very large
proportion of the social norms in China are articulated and communicated through
[T]he law speaks directly to the general
newspapers, magazines, radio, and the like ....
public through the mass media." Li, Law Without Lawyers, supra note 36, at 41-42.
43. Nathan, supra note 32, at 152; see also Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy,
supra note 32, at 32-33 (describing media during Cultural Revolution).
44. Wei Yongzheng, Xinwen Chuanbofa Jiaocheng Uournalism and Communication
Law Teaching Materials] 113 (2002) [hereinafter Wei, Journalism and Communication
Law]. Wei Yongzheng notes that "media adjudication" of disputes can be said to have
"reached the height of perfection" during the Cultural Revolution. Id.; see also Sun
Xupei, An Orchestra of Voices 5-6 (2001) [hereinafter Sun, Voices] (noting that "the
media were instrumental in proliferating the disastrous excesses of the Cultural
Revolution" and that "[1]ies and inflammatory editorials filled the newspapers"); Huang
Jianming, Fazhi Shidai Huhuan Xin De YulunJiandu Moshi [The Need for a New Model of
Public Opinion Supervision in an Age of Rule of Law], Xinhua Wang Hunan Pindao
[Xinhua Network Hunan Channel], Apr. 5, 2001, at http://www.hn.xinhua.org/news/
2001-4-5/0145184042.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Huang, New
Model] (arguing that reform-era media reporting has been influenced by media's role
during Cultural Revolution of determining guilt).
45. See Eric Kit-wai Ma, Rethinking Media Studies: The Case of China, in DeWesternizing Media Studies 21, 21 (James Curran & Myung-Jin Park eds., 2000) ("The
most distinguishable characteristic of the Chinese media in the 1990s is the tension
On the
between rapid commercialization and continued ideological control.").
development and growth of advertising after 1979, see Junhao Hong, The Resurrection of
Advertising in China: Developments, Problems, and Trends, 34 Asian Survey 326 (1994).
46. Interview 2003-121; Guoguang Wu, One Head, Many Mouths: Diversifying Press
Structures in Reform China, in Power, Money, and Media, supra note 27, at 3, 12-13
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sion stations has grown to approximately one thousand in recent years. 4 7
The past ten years have also seen significant expansion in various forms
of new media, including talk radio 48 and the internet. 49 Despite this
rapid growth, virtually all major print, television, and radio outlets in
China formally continue to be linked to the Party-state and are required
to obey Party directives. 50 In addition, many continue to serve as information-gathering institutions for the Party-state.
1. Public Reporting. - Since the 1950s, the Propaganda Department
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Central Propaganda
Department, or CPD) has been responsible for overall management of
culture, including the mass media. 5 1 Most major papers are formally
linked to the Communist Party, and many central Party organizations
publish their own newspapers or magazines. 52 The Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee, for example, publishes People's Daily,5 3 the
Communist Party Youth League publishes China Youth Daily, and Legal
Daily is under the direct supervision of the Party's Central Political-Legal
[hereinafter Wu, Many Mouths]. The 1979 figure does not include newspapers at the
subprovincial level, which grew rapidly in the early years of the reform era; the later figures
do. Id.
47. Interview 2003-121. Figures on the total number of television stations in China
vary widely. For example, one observer estimates that there are approximately 300
television stations in China, Li Xiaoping, "Focus" (Jiaodian Fangtan) and the Changes in
the Chinese Television Industry, 11 J. Contemp. China 17, 18 (2002) [hereinafter Li,
Focus], while another observer reports that there are 980 terrestrial stations in China, see
Michael Keane, As a Hundred Television Formats Bloom, a Thousand Television Stations
Contend, 11 J. Contemp. China 5, 8 (2002). See also Zhang Li, Zhengque Chuli Difang
Dianshi Tai De Sanda Maodun [Accurately Solve Three Large Contradictions of Local
Television Stations], 2002 Shengping Shijie [Sound and Screen World] No. 9, at 39 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Zhang, Contradictions] (stating that there
are more than 2,000 local television stations in China). The discrepancy stems in part from
questions regarding how to measure numerous local television stations that are local relay
stations for national or provincial networks, and thus are not technically permitted to
provide their own content (although nevertheless they sometimes do so).
48. See Lynch, supra note 32, at 101-04 (discussing growth of radio call-in shows in
China); Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy, supra note 32, at 104-10 (discussing talk
radio in Shanghai).
49. See infra Part I.F (discussing various incentives that lead to expansion of the
media, including internet growth).
50. For a discussion of the media's obligations to follow the Party's leadership, see
Keller, Privilege and Punishment, supra note 26, at 89-90. Some internet news portals
have less direct ties to the Party-state and may receive Party directives less frequently than
do traditional media, but they are still subject to propaganda department oversight. See
infra Part I.F.2.
51. See Nathan, supra note 32, at 152-53 (discussing role of CPD).
52. Interview 2002-10.
53. ZhongguoJigouJi Lingdao Ren Ziliao Ku [Databank on China's Institutions and
Leaders], Renmin Wang [People's Daily Online] (n.d.), at http://www.peopledaily.com.
cn/GB/shizheng/252/9667/9670/20021127/875830.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
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Committee. 54 This model is replicated at the provincial and local levels,
such that most major provincial-level papers are affiliated with their respective provincial-level Party Committee. Thus Southern Daily is linked to
the Guangdong Province Communist Party Committee; the Shanghaibased Liberation Daily is the official paper of the Shanghai Municipal
Communist Party Committee; 5 5 and Beijing Legal Times is the official paper of the Beijing Municipal Political-Legal Committee. 56 All provincial
and many municipal and county Party committees likewise publish their
own newspapers.
Numerous government departments and institutions also publish
their own newspapers and magazines. 5 7 For example, the Supreme People's Court publishes People's Court News, while the Supreme People's
Procuratorate publishes ProcuratorateDaily. In addition to direct supervision by their parent government department or institution, these publications are also subject to overall regulation by the propaganda
department.
Reforms announced in mid-2003 may both reduce the total number
of newspapers and also lessen ties between the printed press and Party or
government departments or organizations. 58 Under the reforms, newspapers and magazines are no longer permitted to rely on mandatory subscriptions for support, and eventually all but a few of China's newspapers
and magazines will lose state subsidies. The reforms resulted in 677 publications being ordered to close by the end of 2003.59 All but nine of the
54. Interview 2002-3. Prior to 2001, Legal Daily was formally linked to the Ministry of
Justice. Id.
55. For an online introduction to Liberation Daily, seeJiefang RibaoJituan Wangzhan
Jianjie [Brief Introduction to the Webpage of the Liberation Daily Group], at http://
www.jfdaily.com.cn/jfdaily/jianjie/index.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2004) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Liberation Daily Brief Introduction].
56. Interview 2003-109.
57. See Lynch, supra note 32, at 41. Many provinces also have specialist legal
publications along with official Party papers. Thus, for example, the Sichuan Legal News is
attached to the Sichuan Province Communist Party Political-Legal Committee. Interview
2003-22.
58. Interview 2003-112.
59. See Qu Zhihong, 677 Zhong Tingban Baokan Gongzhi Yu Zhong, Zuichi Chuban
Zhi Jinnian Niandi [677 Periodicals to Be Closed Are Announced to the Public, Must
Cease by Year End], Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], Nov. 28, 2003, available at http://
bkdy.people.com.cn/dispnews.php?id=463 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Nailene
Chou Wiest, Ban on Forced Paper-Buying Bolstered, S. China Morning Post, July 25, 2003,
at 6; Xinhua, Zhongguo Baoye Yinru "Shengsi Jizhi," Guanfang Biaoshi Rang Quanli
Tuichu [China's Newspaper Industry Introduces the "Life and Death Mechanism," the
Authorities Say Power Should Retreat], Aug. 17, 2003, available at http://
dynamic.sohu.com/template/news/print.jsp?ENTITYID=212234909&Dyn (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter China's Newspaper Industry Introduces the "Life and
Death Mechanism"]; Xinhua, Print Media Reform Stops Mandatory Subscription, Nov. 27,
2003 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Quanguo Tingban Baokan Mingdan
[List of Closed Newspapers and Magazines Nationwide], Renmin Ribao [People's Daily],
Nov. 28, 2003, available at http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/14677/14737/22036/
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closed publications were of provincial rank or below; 60 seventeen were
legal publications. 6 1 The reforms are primarily designed to reduce the
burden on farmers and ordinary citizens; 62 in many cases local and specialized provincial papers previously survived only by generating revenue
through mandatory subscriptions by individuals and organizations. The
reforms may also reduce direct links between the media and the state by
reducing financial ties with government or Party departments or institutions. The reforms are not designed, however, to address or reduce oversight by the CPD.
Most major nonspecialized newspapers at each level of the Party-state
are still linked to the respective-level Party organization. Television and
radio stations are generally linked to a government entity: either to the
State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), or to the
corresponding provincial radio, film, and television bureau. 63 Nonetheless, television and radio stations remain subject to CPD oversight and
instructions, and television and radio remain subject to a degree of CPD
regulation and oversight equivalent to, if not higher than, the print
64
media.
Media outlets also have administrative ranks corresponding to the
administrative rank of the department or Party organization with responsibility for the publication or station. 65 In general, higher-ranking media
are more influential than lower-ranking media, both due to the likelihood that their audience will include higher-ranking officials, and thus
result in the intervention of such officials, and due to the significant autonomy to report critically on lower-ranking officials that such media generally enjoy. For example, People's Daily's administrative rank derives
from its link to the Central Party Committee. Ministry-linked papers have
a lower rank, as do papers linked to provincial Party organizations. Provincial papers, however, rank above those linked to municipal or county
Party organizations.
Yet administrative rank alone does not explain the influence of a
particular media outlet. Although CCTV and People's Daily technically
2216409.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (listing 677 closed papers and
magazines).
60. List of Closed Newspapers and Magazines Nationwide, supra note 59; see also
China's Newspaper Industry Introduces the "Life and Death Mechanism," supra note 59
(describing the requirement that publications become financially independent of their
superior government and Party departments).
61. See List of Closed Newspapers and Magazines Nationwide, supra note 59.
62. Interview 2003-121.
63. CCTV is subordinate to SARFF at the national level, while provincial radio, film,
and television bureaus oversee provincial stations. On regulation of television and radio,
see Lynch, supra note 32, at 34, 143-47.
64. Interview 2003-13. Television journalists and academic observers say that the
higher potential impact of their medium means that they are under more pressure from
propaganda authorities than are journalists in the print media. Interview 2003-57;
Interview 2003-79.
65. See H.L. Fu & Richard Cullen, Media Law in the PRC 27 (1996).
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share a roughly equivalent central Party-state administrative rank, a critical report on Focus is far more influential and likely to result in resolving
the problem than is a critical report in People'sDaily.66 At least part of this
difference in power stems from public impact and popularity. Focus,
which airs immediately after the 7 p.m. national news on CCTV 1, is reportedly the most watched program in China and a crucial mechanism by
which the Party disseminates news nationwide. Focus reaches an audience
far greater than that of People'sDaily. In addition, the differential makeup
of the audience appears significant: Although many officials watch Focus,
the viewership is largely made up of ordinary people. 67 In contrast, People's Daily's readership largely comprises officials; few ordinary people
read the paper. 68 The influence of Focus appears to stem from a combination of the program's ability to attract the attention of officials and its
ability to draw viewers from the public as well; public knowledge of and
attention to matters reported on Focus makes it difficult for officials, especially those at the local level, to ignore such reports.
2. InternalReports. - Party media also continue to serve as important
information-gathering mechanisms for Party-state leadership. In addition
to their public editions or broadcasts, most major Party newspapers, and
some magazines, produce "internal reference" publications, or neican.69
Internal publications often include material deemed by the relevant publication to be inappropriate for public dissemination, most often because
of the sensitivity of the content, 70 although some internal publications
also include educational or policy materials aimed at local officials.
Distribution of internal reports varies depending on both the rank of
the publication producing the internal report and the subject matter.
Circulation of internal reports can range from only a handful of copies
being circulated to central Party-state leaders in the case of the most sensitive and high-ranking publications, to tens of thousands for internal reports intended to inform local officials of policies and trends.7 1 For example, Legal Daily's internal edition is generally circulated to officials of a
66. Interview 2003-114; Interview 2003-117.
67. Interview 2003-114.
68. Id.
69. See Hood, supra note 37, at 40-41; He, Internal Reports, supra note 37. For
additional discussion of the role of internal reports, see infra Part II.B.
70. In some cases newspapers publish news in an internal publication to bring a
matter to the attention of officials prior to, or to clear the way for, public publication. In
other cases, papers may report simultaneously on a matter in public and internal reports,
with the internal report including additional information not contained in the public
report.
71. See Interview 2003-14 (stating that there are wide range of internal reports, with
circulation being determined by administrative rank of report); Interview 2003-81
(describing internal report on rural issues that is circulated to tens of thousands of countylevel officials nationwide); see also Hood, supra note 37, at 40 (stating that circulation can
range from millions to just a handful of top leaders, depending on nature of publication).
For a discussion of the types of and authorized audiences for various internal publications,
see generally He, Internal Reports, supra note 37.
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certain rank in the Ministry ofJustice and at the Party's Central PoliticalLegal Committee, as well as to other senior officials with a particular interest in, or responsibility for, legal matters. In addition, individual issues
are sent to officials with particular interest in, or responsibility for, topics
covered in that edition. 72 The Workers Daily internal report is sent to approximately 150 persons on a regular basis, including central government
ministry heads and the Party secretaries of each province, as well as to
persons who may have competence in the subject matter of a particular
73
report.
Internal publications operate in a clear hierarchy. The internal publications of Xinhua News Agency and People's Daily are the most influential, with copies being circulated to the Communist Party politburo.7 4 Internal reports of provincial Party papers are circulated to provincial Partystate leaders, 75 although in some cases copies may also be sent to officials
in the central government and Party. 76 Additionally, articles may be reprinted in the internal reports published for central government and
Depending on the publication or program, internal publications may be published
either on a regular schedule or only when issues of special importance arise. Interview
2003-3. Some papers have regular editions, with reporters dedicated to or primarily
writing for the internal publications. He, Internal Reports, supra note 37.
72. Interview 2002-7. The Legal Daily internal publication is published whenever
there is content that the paper deems appropriate for inclusion. Interview 2002-7. Topics
include important new developments and pending cases. In addition, Legal Daily publishes
a second internal edition, which is circulated to officials of a certain rank in county and
municipal governments nationwide. This version generally serves to inform officials
regarding legal policies and developments; the more restricted version focuses on major or
sensitive problems. Interview 2003-73. Other specialist legal publications, including
ProcuratorateDaily and People's Court News, also publish internal reports.
73. Interview 2003-4. Workers Daily is attached to the official All-China Federation of
Trade Unions. See Quanzong Zhishu Danwei [Organizations Directly Under the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions] (n.d.) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
74. Xinhua publishes a range of internal reports with different classifications. The
most sensitive are circulated to the politburo, while less sensitive versions are circulated
more broadly. For a discussion of the various types of internal documents that Xinhua
publishes, see Huai Yan & Suisheng Zhao, Notes on China's Confidential Documents, 2J.
Contemp. China 75, 85-87 (1993).
75. Interview 2003-23.
76. Interview 2002-10; He, Internal Reports, supra note 37. In Hebei Province, for
example, the Hebei Daily publishes four different forms of internal reference papers, each
with different circulations. The ordinary internal reference publications are circulated to
provincial officials above the provincial department level and to the heads of government
and Party secretaries of municipalities directly administered by the province. In 1998, the
Hebei Daily issued a total of 207 editions of internal reference reports, with a total of 465
articles. "Neican" Fahui Ermu Zuoyong ["Internal Reference" Develops Use as Eyes and
Ears], Hebei Ribao [Hebei Daily], at http://www.hebnet.net/mag10/nl/colart10893.htm
(last visited Sept. 10, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Internal
Reference Develops Use as Eyes and Ears]; see also Xinhua She Hubei Fenshe Jianjie [A
Brief Introduction to the Hubei Branch of Xinhua News Agency], at http://
www.hb.xinhuanet.com/fsjc/fsjc.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2004) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (listing internal publications that Hubei branch of Xinhua News Agency
publishes).
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Party leaders by People's Daily or Xinhua. 77 Likewise, newspapers linked
to municipal Party committees prepare internal reports that are circu78
lated to municipal leaders.
Newspapers, magazines, or the two major official news agencies,
Xinhua and China News Agency, prepare most internal reports. Certain
programs on CCTV, most notably the investigative program Focus and the
daily legal show, Legal Report, also prepare internal reports, usually videos
of stories that the programs' editors deem too sensitive to broadcast publicly. 7 9 Likewise, radio stations and some local television stations prepare
internal reports, most often in written form.8 0 Although internal reports
continue to play an important role, traditional Party news outlets prepare
most such reports; most commercialized media rarely, if ever, prepare
internal reports. 8 1
C. Controlled Commercialization
Commercialization of the Chinese media began with the reintroduction of advertising in the late 1970s 82 amid government efforts to restart
many publications and printing facilities that had shut down during the
Cultural Revolution. 8 3 Commercialization served to reduce the need for
state resources to support the media; concurrently, expanding the media
served state interests in economic development. This commercialization
continued and accelerated in the 1990s, with many media outlets becoming, or attempting to become, financially self-sufficient as the state cut
subsidies to the media. The new emphasis on profitability appears to
have been at least a partial success, as many newspapers with national
77. See Internal Reference Develops Use as Eyes and Ears, supra note 76 (reporting
that hundreds of articles from Hebei Daily's internal reports have been reprinted in the
internal publications of People's Daily or Xinhua); Wang Xin, Neican Ruhe Banchu Tese
[How to Make Internal Reports Play a Special Role] (n.d.) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Wang, Special Role] (stating that in 2000, fifty-four of Hubei Daily's
internal reports were reprinted in internal reports of Xinhua or People'sDaily, and that five
such reports resulted in instructions from top national leaders).
78. Interview 2003-24; He, Internal Reports, supra note 37.
79. Interview 2003-5; Interview 2003-83; Interview 2003-86; Interview 2003-166.
80. Interview 2003-5; Interview 2003-39; Interview 2003-57; Interview 2003-60;
Interview 2003-65.
81. Although the commercial offshoots of Party papers, see infra Part I.C, may have
the power to issue internal reports-and in some cases may be required to do so by their
parent papers-they do so infrequently. See Interview 2003-38; Interview 2003-39;
Interview 2003-52; Interview 2003-56; Interview 2003-66; Interview 2003-93; Interview 2003108. Internal reports by commercialized papers are generally included as part of the
internal reports prepared by their parent papers. Interview 2003-66; Interview 2003-80;
Interview 2003-110.
82. Lynch, supra note 32, at 54-55. Advertising was banned during the Cultural
Revolution. On the commercialization of the Chinese media, see Wu, Many Mouths, supra
note 46, at 57-60 ("Commercialization makes most media ... rely essentially on market
competition for their survival and prosperity .... ").
83. Keller, Privilege and Punishment, supra note 26, at 92.
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audiences now operate without government subsidy, 84 and many more
85
appear poised to become self-sufficient following recent reforms.
One manifestation of this push toward self-sufficiency has been the
transformation of a number of leading media outlets into state-owned
corporate media groups with a wide range of commercial interests,8 6 generally including both a major Party newspaper and other, more commercially focused, subsidiary newspapers and publications. 87 In some cases,
such as the official Guangzhou Daily, Party-mouthpiece papers have themselves become heavily commercialized. Such reorganizations have meant
that media outlets that formerly directly answered to a particular government ministry or Party organization are now corporate entities, although
still linked indirectly to the same department or organization. 88 One result may be that such organizations or ministries exert less direct influence over the content of affiliated publications, although the reorganization may also be facilitating greater CPD oversight.89
The emphasis on advertising and financial self-reliance has increased
the importance of attracting readers or viewers, 90 and has redirected the
focus of many media outlets from delivering and gathering information
on behalf of the Party-state to meeting audience demands. The print media now range along a spectrum in their commercial focus. At one end
are official Party papers and magazines, which continue to serve as
mouthpieces and where a significant percentage of content consists of
material that the publication is instructed to include. Although sensitive
to market pressures, most of the direct income of these official papers
and magazines comes from government and Party department subscriptions. In the middle of the spectrum are Party publications that are partly
commercialized, relying more heavily on their ability to generate reve84. Keller, Media Ownership, supra note 26, at 277. Subsidies continue, however, for
certain outlets, in particular radio, Lynch, supra note 32, at 72-73, and for certain major
Party publications such as People's Daily, Interview 2003-13.
85. See supra Part I.B.
86. See, e.g., Chin-Chuan Lee, Chinese Communication: Prisms, Trajectories, and
Modes of Understanding, in Power, Money, and Media, supra note 27, at 3, 12-13
(discussing press "conglomeration"); Ma, supra note 45, at 22 (discussing Guangzhou Daily
conglomerate).
87. Keller, Media Ownership, supra note 26, at 293; Keller, Privilege and Punishment,
supra note 26, at 93.
88. The media technically remain classified as public service enterprises, or shiye,
rather than commercial enterprises, or qiye-a reflection of the continuing link to the
Party-state. Keller, Privilege and Punishment, supra note 26, at 94.
89. Journalists at some media organizations comment that they formerly did not see
themselves as linked to the Party. After reorganization into corporate press groups,
however, they find their employers are more clearly tied to the Party. Interview 2002-2.
From the perspective of journalists and editors, however, this shift may not be entirely
negative: In the case of the national LegalDaily, for example, which was shifted from being
under the direct supervision of the Ministry ofJustice to being under the direct supervision
of the Party's powerful Central Political-Legal Committee, it may actually increase the
influence of the paper. Interview 2002-5..
90. Lynch, supra note 32, at 42-43.
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nue, but still with significant Party influence over content. These intermediate publications depend on both public and Party-state subscriptions
for revenue. At the other end of the spectrum are commercialized papers and magazines. Subject to the formal and informal norms that dictate permissible subject matter, they make their own determinations regarding content. Income to support such papers comes from advertising
and public sales. 91
The expansion of the print media in recent years has come from the
growth of commercialized papers and magazines, and in particular from
new publications that official Party papers and media groups have
launched. Such publications range from daily urban newspapers, to
weekly papers with more in-depth reporting, to a wide range of
magazines focused on topics such as fashion, computers, or automobiles.
These publications have proved to be crucial sources of income for the
official papers and media groups, in particular as readership of traditional Party papers has declined. 92 Thus, for example, the Southern
Daily Group, whose flagship Southern Daily is the official paper of the
Guangdong Province Communist Party Committee, also publishes the
mass-market Southern MetropolitanDaily and a weekly paper, Southern Weekend, that is widely regarded as one of China's most forthright and outspoken papers. The Sichuan Daily Group, which includes Sichuan Daily, the
Party paper for Sichuan Province, publishes West China MunicipalNews, a
mass-market daily. At the national level, the Central Party's flagship paper, People's Daily, publishes a total of twenty newspapers and
magazines. 9 3 Profits from commercialized, mass-market subsidiaries,
such as Huanqiu Shibao and Securities Times, help to underwrite the cost of
publishing People'sDaily.94 Significant differentiation has also developed,
with some papers and magazines targeting a broader readership with oftentimes sensational reporting, and other papers and magazines focusing
on attracting well-educated members of China's emerging middle class.
Media outlets, in particular newspapers, and journalists 95 are now
engaged in fierce competition as they struggle to attract readers and
91. Interview 2003-4.
92. Keller, Privilege and Punishment, supra note 26, at 88; see also Interview 2003-3
(commenting that profits are vital to this third category of publications, in part because
they are needed to support parent publications).
93. See Renmin Ribaoshe Baoxi Baokan [Newspapers and Magazines of the People's
Daily Publishing Syndicate], at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/21596/index.html (last
visited July 2, 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
94. Interview 2003-67; Interview 2003-110; see also Liberation Daily Brief
Introduction, supra note 55 (listing nine newspapers and three magazines that Liberation
Daily Group publishes).
95. Journalists are compensated not only based on how much they write, but also on
their ability to generate prominent news stories. Interview 2002-1; Interview 2002-5; see
also Ma, supra note 45, at 23 (discussing competition among journalists); Zhou He,
Chinese Communist Party Press in a Tug-of-War, in Power, Money, and Media, supra note
27, at 112, 121-22 (discussing compensation system at Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, which
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thereby revenue. 96 In most cases this competition is between rival Party
media groups. For example, in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province, five daily papers compete for the city's nearly two million readers.
All five are linked to either the municipal or the provincial Party committee. The two leading daily newspapers, Chengdu CommercialNews and West
China MunicipalNews, are attached to the Chengdu Municipal Party Committee and Sichuan Province Party Committee, respectively. 97 In
Guangzhou, the two major daily newspapers, Guangzhou Daily and Southern Metropolitan Daily, are attached to media groups of the Guangzhou
Municipal Party Committee and the Guangdong Province Party Committee, respectively. 98 Likewise, many papers formally linked to provinciallevel Party media groups, such as the Beijing Youth News, Southern Weekend,
and 21st Century Economic Herald, are widely available outside of the paper's home province, and in many areas national media compete directly
with media attached to the provincial or local Party-state. 9 9
requires journalists to produce "star stories" each month and rewards journalists for
additional stories).
96. Li, Focus, supra note 47, at 18-20 (discussing commercialization and competition
in China's television industry resulting from increased dependence on advertising revenue
and arguing that China's television stations must "steer a middle course between the
pressure from economic competition and political directives"); Elisabeth Rosenthal,
Beijing in a Rear-Guard Battle Against a Newly Spirited Press, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 2002, at
Al (discussing proliferation of "aggressive" newspapers, magazines, and television stations
competing by targeting readers' tastes).
Central government controls on the media as well as protectionist local policies,
however, mean that the media also benefit from significant limits on competition, in
particular restrictions on new entrants. See Interview 2003-13; Keller, Privilege and
Punishment, supra note 26, at 95. Regulations also limit access to, and thus competition
from, foreign media. Keller, Privilege and Punishment, supra note 26, at 113.
97. Interview 2003-23; Interview 2003-24. Chengdu Commercial News, which focuses on
Chengdu news, has a dominant market position in Chengdu, while its rival, West China
Municipal News, which is circulated province-wide, is strongest in areas of Sichuan outside
of Chengdu. Interview 2003-23; Interview 2003-24.
Too much financial success may have unintended effects: In Sichuan, the Chengdu
CommercialNews originally was largely privately funded and run, although it was attached in
name to the Chengdu Communist Party's Commerce and Trade Committee. Interview
2003-39. The paper later was brought under direct control of the Chengdu Party
Committee, apparently in part so that the paper's financial success could be used to
subsidize other local Party papers. Interview 2003-38; Interview 2003-46. Chengdu
Commercial News subsidizes both Chengdu Daily and the Chengdu Evening News, which are in
the same media group. Interview 2003-39; Interview 2003-44.
98. Interview 2003-46. Competition may also come from local papers owned by
central Party papers; in Beijing, one of the mass-market daily papers, Jinghua Shibao, is a
subsidiary of People's Daily. Newspapers and Magazines of the People's Daily Publishing
Syndicate, supra note 93. Affiliation with People's Daily in some cases gives the paper more
flexibility in its choice of stories than some of its rivals that are affiliated with the Beijing
Municipal Party Committee. Interview 2003-110.
99. Interview 2002-2. The degree of competition varies significantly depending on
location. Cities such as Chengdu, Nanjing, and Shenyang are known for having vibrant,
competitive newspaper markets, while the Shanghai market is generally seen as
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Media commercialization has also permitted the emergence of a
small number of publications with only indirect ties to the Party-state.
Often these publications are technically linked to quasi-official societies
or associations and are subject to propaganda department oversight but
are increasingly autonomous.10 0 Caijing,a leading magazine focusing on
finance and business, is technically registered as a publication under the
Securities Market Research Association, a quasi-government entity, but is
largely privately owned and operates with significant autonomy over content. 10 1 Likewise, Economic Observer, a Beijing-based weekly paper focusing on in-depth economic news, is owned by a commercial enterprise
0 2
with links to the Shandong Province government.
Commercialization has also encouraged increased media coverage of
law. In addition to specialist legal media such as Legal Daily, People's Court
News, and ProcuratorateDaily, a number of more commercially oriented
legal periodicals have emerged. Legal Daily publishes two market-oriented subsidiary papers, one aimed at legal practitioners and the other
10 3
aimed at the mass market, as well as a commercial monthly magazine.
Democracy and Law, published by the official China Society for Legal Studies,' 0 4 has been transformed into a market-oriented magazine, carrying
reports of cases and legal developments. Nonlegal publications also increasingly cover legal matters. The magazine Women of China publishes a
monthly legal edition, focusing on issues of concern to women; the magazine is largely funded by individual subscriptions. Likewise, China Reform
uncompetitive, in part reflecting stricter political controls over the media in the city.
Interview 2003-26; Interview 2003-46; Interview 2003-48.
Competition is most apparent in the print media, but there are also signs of increased
competition among television stations. Many provincial stations are available outside their
home provinces through cable television, thus increasing incentives to compete for
viewers. Most notable among these stations has been Hunan Television, which has become
well known for its interesting, and in some cases aggressive, reporting, as well as for its
commercial success. See Pei Yiyuan, Qiantan Shi, Xian Gonggong Pingdao De Jingying
Celile [A Brief Discussion of the Strategy of Operating Municipal and County Public
Stations], 2002 Shengping Shijie [Sound and Screen World] No. 11, at 51, 51-52 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review); Zeng Fan'an, Chuanmei Chanye, Zhongzai Zuoqiang
[Broadcast Media Industry, Emphasis on Strengthening], 2002 Xinwen Zhanxian [News
Frontline] No. 5, at 66 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Pan Qingshan,
Dianshi Zhibo Gaige Daodi Gai Zenyang Zuo? [In the End How Should Television
Broadcast Reforms be Carried Out?], 2002 Shengping Shijie [Sound and Screen World]
No. 9, at 12, 13 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing Chinese television
reform in general).
100. Wu, Many Mouths, supra note 46, at 55.
101. Interview 2003-17.
102. The paper is formally registered in Shandong Province, and is owned by a
commercial enterprise. The enterprise obtained the right to publish a newspaper by
purchasing the Jinan Academy of Social Sciences, which itself ran a newspaper and thus
was in possession of a publication license. Interview 2003-95.
103. Interview 2003-73. Revenue from these three publications subsidizes Legal Daily.
Id.
104. Guanyu Faxue Hui-Jigou Bianzhi [About China Law Society-Its Organization]
(n.d.) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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magazine, which is published twice a month, dedicates one issue every
month to discussing problems of concern to people in rural areas, with a
particular emphasis on legal matters.
Numerous television and radio programs at both the national and
provincial levels also focus on legal issues. Such programs reflect a state
policy to raise awareness of legal issues, generally referred to as increasing
"legal consciousness" among the populace, so as to increase reliance on
legal norms and to boost confidence in the law, and thus in the state
itself. Many such programs are commercially successful. 10 5 For example,
CCTV's nationwide Legal Report intersperses programs designed to raise
legal knowledge with occasional critical reports of local court decisions. 10 6 In Shanghai, a daily television show on law is primarily dedicated to raising awareness of legal issues.10 7 In addition, a daily half-hour
radio program on Shanghai Radio focuses on legal matters, primarily by
responding to legal questions from callers. 10 8 Numerous other provincial
and local television stations and radio stations likewise have launched lawrelated programs. 10 9
105. Liu Changyan, Dianshi Fazhi Jiemu You Nanti [There Are Difficulties in
Television Programs on the Legal System], 2002 Shengping Shijie [Sound and Screen
World] No. 6, at 27 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Liu, Television
Programs] (noting increasing number of viewers that law-related television programs are
attracting); see also Interview 2003-60. Both the national legal television program, Legal
Report, and the Shanghai legal program, Lawsuit Focus, have high viewer ratings. Interview
2003-60; Interview 2003-83. Three legal programs rank among the top ten most-watched
programs on Shanghai television. Shoushilfi Paihangbang [Viewership Rankings], at
http://www.stv.sh.cn/schedule/mon/dsj.htm (last visited June 7, 2004) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
106. Interview 2003-86.
107. Interview 2003-60.
108. Interview 2003-99.
109. Interview 2003-87; Interview 2003-99; see, e.g., Song Weicai, "Paian Shuofa"-Yici
Chenggong De Tuwei ["Shooting Cases to Discuss Law"-A Successful Breakthrough],
2002 Dianshi Yanjiu [Television Research] No. 3 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing legal program on Chongqing television). For a discussion of the obstacles local
legal programs face, see Liu, Television Programs, supra note 105.
Commercialization has also encouraged an increasingly diverse range of individuals to
become journalists. More people are choosing to become journalists, reflecting both the
growth of the media and relatively minimal requirements for those seeking to become
journalists. Although the low quality and ethical standards of some journalists have
attracted attention, the growth of the media has also attracted significant numbers of
highly educated persons. In addition, growing competition within the media has put a
greater premium on the ability of individual journalists, with successful journalists
commanding significant financial bonuses or being hired away to work for other papers or
programs. Rather than being products of an administrative system, journalists now
compete for positions and frequently shift from one job to another.
Increased specialization has been another effect of commercialization, with the news
media segmented into a range of fields. In law, for example, many municipal papers have
reporters who specialize in legal reporting, and an increasing number of people with legal
training are becoming journalists. Some journalism departments and programs have
begun to offer specialized training in particular subject areas, such as financial news.
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D. Investigative Reporting and "Public Opinion Supervision"
The commercialization of the media has paralleled significant
growth in investigative journalism. Such investigative journalism, often
taking the form of critical reporting on misdeeds or unfair actions by
officials or on social problems, is generally referred to as "media supervision," or "popular opinion supervision."1 10 The term "supervision" in
China has generally referred to the actions of a higher-level organ supervising a lower-ranking organization. 1 1 Both government policy and commercialization of the media, which has provided the media with incentives to report on an expanding range of topics, have fueled the growth of
such media oversight.
Party documents in the early years of the PRC stressed the importance of media criticism of government actions, 1 12 and China's media
The relationship of individual journalists to the subjects of their reports is also
changing. Although journalists for major Party media outlets continue to enjoy privileges
afforded to government officials, journalists for many of the commercial media are
"outside the system" and lack such privileges. Thus despite continued Party-state oversight
of the media, some have argued that journalists are increasingly operating as employees of
media outlets rather than the Party-state officials they were in the past. Journalists'
interests and goals are also increasingly diverse, and depend both on the individual
journalist and the particular outlet for which the journalist works.
110. The most commonly used term to describe "supervision" by the media is yulun
jiandu, literally "popular opinion supervision." This terminology is based on the media's
traditional position in the PRC as the mouthpiece both of the Party and "the people."
Although not a literal translation, yulun jiandu almost always refers to reporting by the
mass media, and thus I use the terms "popular opinion supervision" and "media
supervision" interchangeably. Cf. Keller, Privilege and Punishment, supra note 26, at 109
n.94 (discussing definition of yulunjiandu); Guo Zhenzhi, YulunJiandu Yu Xifang Xinwen
Gongzuozhe De Zhuanye Zhuyi [Popular Opinion Supervision and Western News
Workers' Specialization], 1999 Guoji Xinwenjie [International News Industry] No. 5, at 32
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Guo, Western News Workers'
Specialization] (stating that in China, "public opinion" refers to views that have been
selected by media or other official organs).
As Lowell Dittmer has explained, the term yulun has generally referred to "leadership
views as reflected in the official media which the masses are expected to share," as distinct
from renmin qunzhong de yijian, or "opinions of the masses," which reflects more
spontaneous views of various members of society. Lowell Dittmer, The Politics of Publicity
in Reform China, in China's Media, Media's China, supra note 28, at 89, 90.
111. See Cai Dingjian, Constitutional Supervision and Interpretation in the People's
Republic of China, 9J. Chinese L. 219, 219 n.3 (1995) (noting that "[i]n Chinese, the word
'supervision' has historically expressed a vertical power relationship where a master exerts
strong power over underlings").
112. See Li Baojin, Yi Fali Jiandu Yu Yulun Jiandu Hudong, Tuijin Fan Fubai [Use
Legal Supervision and Popular Opinion Supervision Together to Fight Corruption],
Shenzhen Shi Renmin Jianchayuan Yangguang Wang [Shenzhen Municipality People's
Procuratorate Sunshine Network], July 26, 2001 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Li, Fight Corruption] (discussing early Party references to importance of
media supervision). A 1950 Communist Party decision regarding reform of newspapers,
which apparently remains in force, stated that the media should criticize Party-state errors
and shortcomings. Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Weiyuan Hui Guanyu Zai
Baozhi Kanwu Shang Zhankai Piping He Ziwo Piping Dejueding [Decision of the Central
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have historically had quasi-official rights to conduct investigations, with
results being reported either in public or in internal publications. 1 3 In
14
the 1950s, such reporting included critical reports on the legal system.
The term popular opinion supervision did not come to prominence until
the 1980s, when the Chinese media began to engage in an increased
amount of investigative journalism.' 15 Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang explicitly endorsed public opinion supervision in 1987, leading to a wave of
116
reporting on official dereliction of duty and malfeasance.
The 1989 Tiananmen movement led to a lull in investigative reporting, as at least some in power blamed overly aggressive media for inciting
the protests. 1 7 Reporting on official malfeasance and social problems
Committee of the Communist Party of China Regarding Carrying Out Criticism and SelfCriticism in Newspapers and Magazines] (Apr. 19, 1950), reprinted in 1979 Xinwen
Zhanxian [News Frontline] No. 6, at 2 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
113. Nathan, supra note 32, at 156. For discussions of the role of the media in voicing
criticism in the 1950s, and in particular in exposing corruption, see Mo Hongwei & Zhang
Chengjie, Jianguo Qianhou Zhonggong Fangfu Fanfu Lun [A Discussion of the Prevention
of and Opposition to Corruption by the Chinese Communist Party in the Early Years After
the Establishment of the Nation], 67 Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of
Guizhou Minorities College] 68 (2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Pei
Xiansheng, Ldielun Mao Zedong De Xinwen Sixiang [A Brief Discussion of Mao Zedong's
Thoughts on the Media], 21 Henan Shifan Daxue Xuebao [Journal of Henan Normal
University] 8 (1994) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
114. See, e.g., Li, Law Without Lawyers, supra note 36, at 77-81 (discussing critical
media coverage of unfair cases in courts in 1950s).
115. See, e.g., Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty 155-65, 181-90 (1990)
(discussing critical reporting in years immediately after Cultural Revolution and popular
resort to journalists to seek redress); see also Won Ho Chang, Mass Media in China 47-50
(1989) (discussing reemergence of critical reporting, "seldom seen since 1957," in early
1980s). The early years of the reform period also witnessed the reemergence of reportage,
which mixed journalism with literature, often reflecting social ills. See generally Liu
Binyan, People or Monsters?: And Other Stories and Reportage from China After Mao
(Perry Link ed., 1983) (collecting works by Liu Binyan, reporter made famous by his 1979
story about corruption of a commune in northeastern China).
116. Zhao Ziyang, Yanzhe You Zhongguo Tese De Shehui Zhuyi Daolu Qianjin (2)Zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shisan Ci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui Shang De Baogao
[Going Forward Strictly in Accordance with the Path of Socialism with Special Chinese
Characteristics (2)-Report at the 13th National Party Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party] (Oct. 25, 1987) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Hood,
supra note 37, at 50-51 (describing how "provincial Party dailies and national papers" were
"suddenly chockfull of revealing examples of official malfeasance"); Judy Polumbaum, The
Tribulations of China's Journalists After a Decade of Reform, in Voices of China, supra
note 28, at 33, 42-43 (describing journalistic reform that followed Secretary Zhao's
report). This wave of investigative reporting challenged the traditional rules, under which
the press reported on official malfeasance only after the Party had investigated a case.
Hood, supra note 37, at 50-51.
117. Sun Xupei, Yulun Jiandu De Biyaoxing He Kexingxing [The Necessity and
Feasibility of Popular Opinion Supervision] (Sept. 11, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Sun, Necessity and Feasibility] (noting that although achieving
modest popularity in 1980s, number of investigative reports fell after 1989 when some in
power argued excessive critical reports incited the protests).
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resumed and expanded during the 1990s.' 1 8 In recent years, China's media have played important roles in exposing corruption and other criminal activity, in reporting on disasters that local officials conceal, and in
revealing corporate financial irregularities.' 1 9 Much reporting on improper official action or inaction and illegal conduct focuses on misdeeds
committed by low-ranking officials or those with close relationships with
officials.1 20 In many cases such reports highlight the use of official positions or connections to obtain financial advantage.1 21 In other cases, critical reporting highlights the inability of ordinary people to obtain redress
through formal channels, often because of obstruction from local
1 22
officials.
Media supervision includes a significant volume of reporting about
the courts and other legal institutions. This rise in reporting on law also
comes against the backdrop of increased media attention to legal matters
in general, reflecting governmental efforts to boost legal consciousness
118. See Rosenthal, supra note 96 (discussing reporting on social problems).
119. In early 2002, the vice chair of China's National Production Safety Commission
stated that corruption lies behind most major accidents, and often it is the media that first
brings such incidents to light. Yue Jianguo, You Liangxin Guanyuan Yao Guli Meiti Yulun
Jiandu [In Order to Have Officials of Good Conscience, Media Popular Opinion
Supervision Should Be Encouraged] (Apr. 2, 2002) (on file with the Columbia Law Review);
see also Zhengjian Hui Shouxi Guwen Cheng Yulun Jiandu Hen Zhongyao [Chief Advisor
to the Securities Commission States That Popular Opinion Supervision Is Very Important],
Renmin Wang [People's Daily Online], July 14, 2001, at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/
jinji/20010714/511584.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing the
importance of media supervision in ensuring proper corporate disclosure); Li, Fight
Corruption, supra note 112 (discussing media's role in exposing governmental
corruption).
120. Such reports often concern the failure of local officials to address known
problems: As one media commentator noted, local governments frequently forward
complaints from individuals regarding official misdeeds to the person at whom the
complaint is directed. Peng Jiajin & Jiao Yang, Xinhua, Jinjing Shangfang Renyuan
Jinnianlai Weihe Lfizeng Bujian? [Why Have Visitors to Beijing Increased Rather than
Decreased in Recent Years?], available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/focus/2004-04/09/
content_1408703.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
121. See, e.g., Zhao Beibei & Wang Weixiang, Yulun Jiandu Jiannan Qianxing
[Popular Opinion Supervision Moves Forward with Difficulty], Renmin Ribao [People's
Daily], Nov. 20, 2001, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/news/6056/20011102/
596557.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing media reports exposing
corruption, including use of official positions to obtain financial advantage). Some
journalists strategically balance critical reports with neutral or favorable reports. See, e.g.,
LiangJianzeng, "Du, Jiaodian Fangtan" Chenggong De Linjie Dian [Degree, the Crucial
Point Behind the Success of "Focus"], 2000 Dianshi Yanjiu [Television Research] No. 1, at
50 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Liang, Degree] (discussing media
supervision role of show Focus with its use of critical reporting).
122. See, e.g., Fang, supra note 3 (discussing difficulty of obtaining redress through
formal channels); Zheng Shengfeng et al., Bu Wang Dangbao Jizhe De Zhize He Shiming
[Don't Forget the Duty and Mission of Reporters for Party Papers], 2002 Xinwen Zhanxian
[News Frontline] No. 3, available at http://www.snweb.com/gb/xw/2002/03/
a0301008.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing how investigative
reporting of Nandan mining accident led to government inquiry into incident).
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and emphasize the importance of improving the legal system. 123 The increase in media oversight is justified in part by the seriousness of a range
of problems that undermine the day-to-day effectiveness of government at
all levels, including the courts. Thus -one commentator, writing in the
national ProcuratorateDaily, explained that when an administrative official
violates rules and the department responsible for investigating such misdeeds does nothing, the media must assume the role of investigator.
Likewise, "when judges . . .take the lead in trampling on justice, the
12 4
media must step in to protect justice."'
A range of Chinese media outlets, from CCTV to tabloid-style local
papers, engage in investigative journalism. A small number of programs
and publications have become well known for reporting on social issues
and for exposing injustice and wrongdoing. Chief among these is Focus,
the daily news and commentary program on CCTV. 125 Launched in
1994, it is widely regarded as the most influential media voice in China.
Reports of problems or injustices on the program frequently result in intervention by high-ranking Party-state officials demanding resolution of
such matters. Having one's grievances aired on the show is viewed by
many as the single most effective avenue of redress available in China
12 6
today.
The popular success of Focus has encouraged others to follow suit.
After the launch of Focus in 1994, other central media outlets, including
China Central Radio and a number of national newspapers, began pro123. See, e.g., Interview 2003-39 (stating that a goal of local reports on legal matters is
to raise legal consciousness). Supreme People's Court President Xiao Yang has welcomed
media supervision of the courts, describing it as essential to increase transparency and
boost confidence in the legal system. Xiao Yang Zhichu Yao Tebie Baohu Xinwen Danwei
Zhengdang De Yulun Jiandu Quan [Xiao Yang Points Out the Need for Special Protection
of the Rights of Media Outlets to Carry Out Ordinary Public Opinion Supervision], Fazhi
Ribao [Legal Daily], Jan. 18, 2002, available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/
2002-01/18/content_30651.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Xiao
Yang Points Out Need].
124. Xiao Chun, YulunJiandu Keyuliao De Yu Nanbawo De [What Can Be Predicted
and What Cannot Be Guaranteed in Popular Opinion Supervision], Zhengyi Wang [Justice
Web], Aug. 8, 2001 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Xiao, What Can Be
Predicted].
125. For a detailed study of the content of Focus, see Alex Chan, From Propaganda to
Hegemony: Jiaodian Fangtan and China's Media Policy, 11 J.Contemp. China 35 (2002).
For an introduction to the program, see CCTV.com Xinwen [CCTV.com News], Jiemu
Jieshao [Program Introduction], at http://www.cctv.com/program/jdft/02/index.shtml
(last visited Oct. 7, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
126. Li, Focus, supra note 47, at 26-27 (noting popular saying that "13 minutes of
television broadcast redresses 10 years of grievance" and that "mass media in China may
bear the unusual burden of functioning as a quasi-judicial system as well as a newsreporting organization"); accord Xu, Media-Judicial Relations, supra note 19 (noting
references to Focus as "the most authoritative 'tribunal' in China"). The program is not
limited to critical reporting, and propaganda authorities have pressured the program to
balance critical or negative reports with positive reports. See infra note 196 (discussing
balance between critical reports and positive reports).
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grams or columns focusing on media supervision. 12 7 Numerous local
and provincial papers have also established special sections to report on
"hot topics," 1 28 to engage in investigative journalism, 129 or to solve
problems. 130 In Shanghai, for example, a nightly program, Xinwen
131
Zhuijiu, focuses on solving problems for local citizens.
The effect of critical reports is closely linked to the status of the paper or station engaging in such reporting. The ability of Focus to highlight and force resolution of issues stems from a range of factors, including the program's Party-state ties and administrative rank, its high
viewership, its ability to generate revenue for CCTV, and the emphasis
top Party-state leaders place on the program's reports. Other national
media, including People'sDaily and Xinhua News Agency, are likewise perceived to be more effective in forcing resolution of problems or grievances than their lower-ranking or more commercialized counterparts,
primarily because such media are most likely to be noticed by national
leaders. 13 2 Journalists at central Party-state media, for example, comment
that national leaders are most likely to issue written instructions ordering
that problems exposed in the media be solved when such problems have
127. Chan, supra note 125, at 39.
128. See, e.g., Lu Zhifan, Zouchu Yulun Jiandu De Wuqu [Escape from
Misunderstandings Regarding Popular Opinion Supervision], 1995 Xinwen Zhanxian
[News Frontline] No. 17 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Lu, Escape]
(noting that, as of 1995, thirty-one provincial-level Communist Party papers had
established "focus" or "hot issue" sections, and there were more than sixty news television
programs at provincial or national level engaged in investigative reporting or public
opinion supervision).
129. Chan, supra note 125, at 39. Newspaper airing of popular grievances comes not
only in the form of investigative journalism, but also through publication of letters from
readers. See infra text accompanying note 489.
130. See, e.g., Zhang Shusheng, Dianshi Xinwen Pingmin Shijiao De Chenggong
Tansuo-Jianping Shanxi Dianshi Tai "Dushi Kuaibao" Lanmu [A Discussion of a
Successful Case of Television News from the Perspective of Ordinary People-A Brief
Discussion of the "Municipal Express" Program of Shanxi Television Station], 2002 Xinwen
Zhishi [News Knowledge] No. 8, at 43 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
Shanxi Television Station program that focuses on solving "ordinary life problems").
131. Interview 2003-57.
132. See, e.g., Chan, supra note 125, at 35 (describing former PresidentJiang Zemin's
intervention in case after watching report on Focus); Jaime A. FlorCruz, Chinese Media in
Flux, in Covering China 35, 36 (Robert Giles et al. eds., 2001) (same); Interview 2003-3
(stating that even national media outlets find it difficult to exert influence through critical
reporting because local officials are only concerned about Focus or People's Daily); Interview
2003-67 (commenting that top leaders watch Focus daily). Focus reportedly owes its survival
and much of its success to the fact that former Premier Zhu Rongji was a fan of the
program. Interview 2003-117.
Observers comment that ninety-nine percent of all critical reports on Focus have the
desired effect, frequently virtually immediately, with the Provincial Party Committee in the
province that is the subject of the report often holding an emergency meeting on the same
night the report airs. Interview 2003-3; see also Interview 2003-19; Interview 2003-166.
Even if such claims are unverifiable or overstate the program's effectiveness, Focus's
influence does appear to be substantial.
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been revealed by national Party media. Party-state officials are much less
likely to respond to reports in commercialized papers, such as Southern
Weekend. 133 But even reports from the national media often have limited
targets. Focus, for example, mostly exposes wrongdoing by county and
township officials.' 3 4 Moreover, although the media often claim credit
for exposing wrongdoing and pursuing justice, national papers also bemoan the fact that their reports are sometimes ignored by local
135
officials.
Provincial, municipal, and county media are generally less aggressive
than their national counterparts. As one report in a national paper described the situation, "many local media simply report on the activities of
local leaders, seeking to please such leaders, and 'continue old forms of
propaganda reporting."' 1 36 Investigative reporting on local problems is
133. Interview 2002-3; Interview 2003-3; Interview 2003-19. Targets of critical reports
in commercial papers are often not worried by such reports, believing that only "common
people," not Party-state leaders, will read them. Interview 2003-3. The high profile of
Southern Weekend, and its international reputation for being willing to push the limits of
what is permissible, may mean that its reports receive more attention than do reports of
other commercialized papers. Indeed, the paper is reported to be read by some of China's
top leaders. Interview 2003-19.
Journalists complain that local officials ignore critical reports from the local press and
only respond when they are "exposed" by the national press. For example, a Legal Daily
article in early 2002 described the role of the media in exposing the illegal construction of
an apartment building in Wuhan, which resulted in significant financial losses to
prospective purchasers of units in the building. The Legal Daily report complained that
local media initially reported the matter but were then pressured to write that the matter
had been solved. Only later, when Focus reported on the story, was the issue resolved.
This, said the Legal Daily writer, was not a victory for media supervision; it was a victory for
CCTV. Ai Jun, Yulun Jiandu 'Ji Zhuanwan" [Popular Opinion Supervision Makes an
"Emergency Turn"], Fazhi Ribao [Legal Daily], Mar. 4, 2002, at 5, available at http://
www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2002-03/04/content_32965.htm
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Ai, Emergency Turn].
134. See Liu Binlu, "Jiaodian Fangtan" Weihe Dou Pai Cangying Shao Da Hu [Why
Does Focus Hit More Flies and Fewer Tigers?], Xin Jing Bao [New Beijing Post], Apr. 15,
2004, available at http://news.163.com/2004w4/12523/2004w04_1082000574374.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that Focus largely criticizes low-level
officials).
135. See, e.g., Huang Dongli, Yulun Jiandu, Bu Zhishi "Baoguang" Eryi [Popular
Opinion Supervision, It Is Not Just "Exposing"], Fazhi Ribao [Legal Daily], Oct. 30, 2000,
available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2000-lO/31/content_7606.htm
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Huang, Popular Opinion Supervision]
(discussing cases in which reports in Legal Daily have been ignored by targeted government
officials and noting that effectiveness of media in exposing problems depends on rank of
news organization); Zhao Lin, Yulun Jiandu Zhihou, Weicun Gaibian De Ren He Shi
[Things and People That Cannot Be Changed After Popular Opinion Supervision],
Jiancha Ribao [Procuratorate Daily], Aug. 8, 2001, available at http://www.zzhf.com/
detail.asp?id=218 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing cases of injustice or
wrongdoing covered by ProcuratorateDaily that have not been remedied).
136. Mei Sangyu, Yulun Jiandu De Liliang [Power of Popular Opinion Supervision],
Zhonggno Qingnian Bao [China Youth Daily], Dec. 3, 1998 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); see also Interview 2003-39 (stating that local paper rarely runs critical reports); Ai,
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left to the national media or to media from other provinces.1 37 Local
journalists comment that they necessarily cooperate with local authorities
in order to solve problems, often either agreeing with local authorities to
highlight certain problems or making such authorities aware of critical
reports before they are broadcast.' 1 8 Nevertheless, market demands
mean that they must engage in some critical reporting if they are to maintain or expand market share. 139 Local media must choose their targets
carefully, and they generally leave reporting on major cases of official
malfeasance or corruption to higher-ranking media or media from elsewhere, but they are increasingly willing to highlight local problems, in
particular local government failures to respond to citizens' complaints.
China's journalists have tried to position themselves as voices of the
people, fighting injustice and wrongdoing. Commentators note, for example, that "the right of reporters to investigate is essentially the right of
the public to know,"1 40 and that the media are "an important means of
expressing the views of the people." 14 1 Some argue that the media are
increasingly independent and contend that the media should become an
Emergency Turn, supra note 133 (describing impediments to local reporters exposing
local problems).
137. There are exceptions, however, to the general rule that local media avoid
reporting on local problems or controversies. See, e.g., Wei Hongkang & Zhao Fei, Yulun
Jiandu Jingtou Zuozheng [Public Opinion Supervision, the Camera Lens Serves as
Evidence], 2001 Shiting Tiandi [Video and Audio World] No. 5, available at http://
www.xjbs.com.cn/sht/gj/62gj/15.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
investigative reporting by television and radio stations in Xinjiang); Zhang Xinguo, Yulun
Jiandu Bixu You Falfi Baguan [Media Supervision Must Be Guarded by the Law], Xin
Chuanbo Zixun Wang [New Broadcasting Information Web], Nov. 23, 2001 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Zhang, Guarded] (discussing reports by Wenzhou
Daily).
138. See, e.g., Interview 2003-23.
139. Id.; see also Wang Bin, Fahui Yulun Jiandu Youshi, Yingdui Baoye Shichang
Jingzheng [Developing the Advantage of Popular Opinion Supervision, Meeting Market
Competition in the Newspaper Industry], 2002 Hunan Shehui Kexue [Hunan Social
Sciences] No. 3 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Wang, Advantage]
(discussing the importance of engaging in popular opinion supervision to maintaining
market share, but criticizing papers for using such reports to boost circulation).
140. Zhao Ling, Huhuan YulunJiandu De Qingkong [Calling Out for the Clear Blue
Sky of Public Opinion Supervision], Jiancha Ribao [Procuratorate Daily], Jan. 17, 2002,
available at http://www.sc.cninfo.net/tanfo/dssh/law/block/html/2002011700614.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Zhao, Calling Out].
141. LangJingsong, Qiantan YulunJianduquanJiqi Falfi Baohu [A Brief Discussion of
Legal Protection for Popular Opinion Supervision], 2000 Xinwen Zhanxian [News
Frontline] No. 11, at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper79/1980/318188.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review). Advocates of media supervision also justify the media's role
by reference to the PRC Constitution. The constitution guarantees the right of citizens to
criticize and make suggestions to government, Xianfa art. 41 (1982), available at http://
www.fdi.gov.cn/resupload/epdf/e03378.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review), as well
as freedom of speech and of the press, id. art. 35. Other provisions that directly impact the
media include article 38, which bans libel, and article 53, which imposes obligations on all
citizens to protect state secrets. See also, e.g., Lang, supra (basing arguments for media
supervision on constitution). Counterarguments can also be found in the constitution: If
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external check on Party-state action.1 42 Yet China's media are also careful to position themselves in line with Party policy. Numerous commentators argue that popular opinion supervision by the media furthers goals
of the Party-state 143 and that the media remain the "mouthpiece of the
people and the Party." 14 4 Serving the goals of the Party includes assisting
in revealing wrongdoing at the local level, but also extends to serving
Party goals of stability and economic development.1 45 Commentators in
the media are viewed as administrative actors, they would lack power under the
constitution to supervise the courts. Xu, Media-Judicial Relations, supra note 19.
142. There has been significant criticism in China of the media's continued close ties
to the Party-state. See, e.g., Chen Yuru, Jinyou Caifang Quan Shi Bugou De [Just Having
the Right to Report Is Not Enough], Fazhi Ribao Wangluo Ban [Legal Daily Online], May
14, 2001, at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2001-05/14/content_17551.htm
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Chen, Not Enough] (contending that
media have grown from being exclusively propaganda instruments to organizations having
range of roles in society); see also Huang Hu, Cong You Yige "20 Wan" Shuoqi [Discussing
from Another "200,000"], Nanfang Tiyu [Southern Sports], Nov. 9, 2001, available at
http://www.sportsonline.com.cn/GB/channel21/549/1555/20011109/45843.html
(on
file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Huang, Another 200,000] (noting that in
the past, few dared to offend media because they were instruments of Party).
143. See, e.g.,Ji Dianlu & Gu Feng, Nfili Tigao YulunJiandu De Xiaoguo [Work Hard
to Raise the Effect of Popular Opinion Supervision], 2001 Xinwen Zhanxian [News
Frontline] No. 9, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper79/4307/493945.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that media supervision is mechanism for
implementing supervision by Party and masses, that news workers are spokespeople for
Party and masses, and that it is mistaken to view media as playing supervisory role); Wang
Ruicheng, Yulun Jiandu Yao Bawo Haodu [Popular Opinion Supervision Should Ensure
Good Quality], 2001 Shiting Tiandi [Video and Audio World] No. 4, available at http://
www.xjbs.com.cn/sht/gj/9.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that media
supervision must serve socialism and that many news reporters lack sufficient political
focus).
144. Wang Bixue,Jizhe Hefa Quanyi Burong Qinfan [Reporter's Legal Rights Are Not
Easy to Infringe], Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], Nov. 7, 2001, at 11, available at http://
www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/19/20011107/599673.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Wang, Legal Rights]; see also Guo, Western News Workers'
Specialization, supra note 110 (stating that China's media are mouthpiece of government
and Party); Xu Guangchun, Guanyu Yulun Jiandu De Jidian Sikao [A Few Thoughts on
Popular Opinion Supervision], 2004 Xinhua Wengao [Xinhua Digest] 4, at http://
www.ccyl.org.cn/study-think/file/thinkOO091 1.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(emphasizing media's obligations to Party); Xilie Meiti Jianjie Zhiyi-Nanfang Ribao [A
Series of Short Explanations of the Media-Southern Daily], at http://
www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/culture/nfsl.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2002) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing Southern Daily, official paper of Communist Party in
Guangdong Province, and stating that paper's role is to conscientiously carry out
propaganda of Party line, direction, and policy); cf. Sun, Voices, supra note 44, at 7
("Socialist freedom of the press means that the media should be subject to supervision by
the people, by the Party, and by law.").
145. Lu, Escape, supra note 128 (arguing that media supervision should not be
"absolutely independent"); see also Lang, supra note 141 (stating that media supervision
should follow discipline standards of propaganda departments and work for benefit of
Party and government); Li, Fight Corruption, supra note 112 (stating that media are an
important part of the Party's strategy to fight corruption). But see Yulun Jiandu Zaoyu
"Wending" Gongzuo Huiyi [Public Opinion Supervision Runs into "Stability" Work
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official publications argue that Party newspapers should examine issues of
concern to the Party, targeting problems with "representative characteristics,"1 4 6 that media supervision by Party papers should aim to "firm up
and strengthen the ruling Party's position," 147 and that newspapers
should seek the views of Party leaders regarding important critical reports
1 48
prior to publication.
In seeking to curb official wrongdoing, the media not only are acting
to uphold the goals of the Party-state; they also act as arms of the Partystate. The media's expanded role in engaging in "popular opinion supervision" is a continuation of one of the media's traditional roles-that of
reflecting popular opinion for the Party leadership. 149 "Supervision" by
the media also encompasses supervision carried out through internal
publications prepared for the leadership 1 50 and explicit cooperation with
Meeting] (Oct. 10, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Supervision
Runs into Stability Work] (mocking arguments that rely on appeals to stability to restrict
media). Reporters are not unique in their attempts to position their activities as consistent
with Party policy. Legal aid lawyers have made similar arguments. See Benjamin L.
Liebman, Legal Aid and Public Interest Law in China, 34 Tex. Int'l L.J. 211, 272, 282-85
(1999) (describing how legal aid lawyers in China argue that greater accessibility to the law
will facilitate Party's policy of increasing enforcement of the law).
146. Wang Songmiao, Yulun Jiandu Gai Jiandu Shenme? [What Should Popular
Opinion Supervision Supervise?], Zhengyi Wang [Justice Web], Dec. 31, 2001 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Wang, Supervise]. The same commentator noted,
however, that "what the center and the people are concerned about is basically the same
thing." Id.
147. Wu Quanheng, Gaijin He Jiaqiang Dangbao Yulun Jiandu Gongzuo [Correct,
Improve, and Strengthen Party Paper Public Opinion Supervision Work], 2001 Xinwen
Zhanxian [News Frontline] No. 11, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper79/
4743/519216.html; see also Huang Ping & Wang Shaohua, Xinwen Yulun Jiandu De Xin
Tansuo [New Thoughts on Media Popular Opinion Supervision], 2000 Xinwen Zhanxian
[News Frontline] No. 6, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper79/1364/
214441.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that Party paper in Hainan
Province "exposes" problems that provincial government and Party committee want
resolved); Zhang, Contradictions, supra note 47 (stating that local television stations
should engage in propaganda work for local government).
148. See Huang & Wang, supra note 147; see also Yun Xincai, Piping Yao Jiang
Zhengzhi [Criticism Must Discuss Politics], 1998 Xinwen Zhanxian [News Frontline] No. 7,
available at http://202.99.23.245/newsline/9807/newfiles/a1270.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (stating that critical reporting should have specific political goals and
that it should boost unity and avoid causing chaos).
149. Claims by the media to speak on behalf of the disadvantaged, and especially
those wronged by official misconduct, also resonate with age-old traditions in China of
remonstrating against official injustice.
150. See, e.g., Huang & Wang, supra note 147 (describing various forms of media
popular opinion supervision, including internal reports); Zhu Ruifu, Lun Gongkai Baodao
Yu Neican De Youji Jiehe [Discussing Opportunities for Cooperation Between Public
Reports and Internal Reports], 1999 Xinwen Zhanxian [News Frontline] No. 2, available at
http://202.99.23.246/newsline/199902/990201011011.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Zhu, Discussing Opportunities] (arguing that it is mistaken to
view media supervision as limited only to public reporting, and stating that use of internal
publications can help make supervision by media more effective). See generally Zhou Ze,
Yulun Jiandu Guanghuanxia De Meiti Diwei Fansi [Thoughts on the Position of the Press
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other arms of the Party-state, in particular the police, the procuratorate,
and Party discipline authorities. 15 1 For example, in 2000 the Beijing
procuratorate announced plans to improve cooperation with local media,
including the exchange of information and leads in cases and the coordination of propaganda work.' 5 2 The formal link to the Party-state is underscored by linkages between media supervision and other forms of "supervision," including supervision by the Party, by government, by courts,
and by procuratorates. 1 53 Indeed, in many cases provincial, municipal, or
county authorities take reports from the national media as conclusive and
neglect to carry out their own investigations. 154 Reports on Focus are said
to force the Party committee of the target province or municipality to
Under Popular Opinion Supervision], Fazhi Ribao Wangluo Ban [Legal Daily Internet
Edition], Apr. 22, 2002, at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2002-04/22/
content_35721.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that officials are only
concerned with views of officials senior to them, and that if problems are noticed by
higher-ranking officials they are solved quickly).
151. See, e.g., Lin Han & Tong Bing, Qianghua Yulun Jiandu De Youli JucuoGuanyu Hainan Sheng Xinwen Yulun Jiandu Zhongxin De Diaocha Baogao [Strengthen
the Effective Actions of Popular Opinion Supervision-Report on Investigation into the
Hainan Province News Popular Opinion Supervision Center] (Apr. 10, 2001) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (discussing coordination in Hainan Province).
152. Beijing: FalI Jiandu Yu Yulun Jiandu Lianshou Yufang Zhiwu Fanzui [Beijing:
Supervision by Law and Supervision by Public Opinion Go Hand in Hand to Prevent
Crimes by Those Acting in Official Capacity], Zhongguo Fazhi Wang [China Legal System
Network], at http://www.sinolaw.net.cn/fffy/zufj/11/zu28.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2004)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Faht Jiandu Yu Yulun Jiandu Liandong
Zouxiao [Legal Supervision and Popular Opinion Supervision Prove Effective Together],
Jiancha Ribao [Procuratorate Daily], July 20, 2001, available at http://library.sx.zj.cn/
xxtd/xxtd07/wjks/7-12.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting how in one
district in Shaoxing, Zhejiang Province, media provided clues to procuratorate in more
than twenty cases in one year, and describing an agreement among local media and
procuratorate to cooperate in carrying out supervision work); Wang, Advantage, supra
note 139 (referring to cooperation between government and the media with respect to
supervision work). Journalists at local papers elsewhere likewise work closely with local
authorities, particularly while investigating criminal cases. Interview 2003-39.
153. See, e.g., Han Meng, Lengyan Zhiji Yuanhua An [Taking a Cold Hard Look at
the Yuanhua Case], HuaxiaJingwei Wang [HuaxiaJingwei Online], May 25, 2002; Huang,
Popular Opinion Supervision, supra note 135 (noting that "news media supervision is an
important means to carry out public opinion supervision," and that many well-known
exposes by news media have drawn attention of relevant authorities and officials).
154. Interview 2003-13; see, e.g., Wei Yongzheng, Shixian Yulun Jiandu He Baohu
Mingyuquan De Pingheng, Weihu Yanlun Ziyou He Mingyuquan De Pingheng Shi Guoji
Zhunze [Implementing a Balance Between Popular Opinion Supervision and the
Protection of Reputation Rights, Protecting the Balance Between Freedom of Speech and
Reputation Rights Is the International Standard], Zhejiang Zaixian [Zhejiang Online],Jan.
9, 2001, at http://www.zjonline.com.cn/node2/node26108/node30205/node30212/
node302l3/userobject7ail689.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing how
an official was fired the day after critical report ran in national paper, with no investigation
carried out by local officials). In cases involving wrongdoing by high-ranking officials,
however, the process operates in reverse, with the media only running news articles after a
decision has been reached by Party discipline authorities and the media not carrying out
independent investigations themselves. Interview 2003-13.
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punish immediately the persons exposed, or to solve the problems covered. 5 5 Newspapers have described how their reports produce rapid decisions by local or provincial officials that are consistent with such reports.1 56 In many of these cases, the media findings appear to be taken as
conclusive evidence of wrongdoing, and facts are presented so as to com57
pel action by higher-ranking Party-state officials.'
Media links to various Party-state departments and entities also highlight the fact that the media in China are not monolithic. Just as a range
of factors determines the influence of a particular media outlet or report,
diverse interests and motives influence media decisions over content.
Such interests include the financial interests of the media and the interests of the government or Party entities to which the media are attached.1 58 Critical media reports may also be manifestations of internal
turf battles between rival agencies or institutions.
Additionally, the interests of individual editors and journalists also
influence media decisions to carry certain critical reports. Corruption
permeates China's media. 159 Reporters often receive offers of cash, or
offers to have their travel expenses paid by one party in a dispute, to
report on a particular matter. 160 The phenomenon of reporters "reporting for payment," or writing (or threatening to write) biased stories in

155. See, e.g., Tang Tanfeng, "Guanyang Shijian" Zhendong Zhongnanhai [The
"Guanyang Matter" Shakes Zhongnanhai], 2000 Shanqu Kaifa [Mountain District
Development] No. 8 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing how report on
Focus exposing local cadres who had forced peasants to grow tobacco resulted in
emergency meeting of Chongqing Municipal Party Committee day after broadcast, and
issuance by Party Committee of five decisions regarding matter).
156. See supra note 132.
157. Interview 2003-9 (stating that Party discipline authorities generally take media
reports to be the truth, and that their decisions do not vary from conclusions of media).
Nevertheless, the frequent media complaint that their reports go unheeded suggests that
the media are not always able to compel action.
158. See, e.g., infra note 206 (discussing People's Court News).
159. For a discussion of corruption in the Chinese media, see generally Zhao, Media,
Market, and Democracy, supra note 32, at 72-93.
160. Interview 2002-3 (stating that reporters are often paid by lawyers for travel costs
and may receive cash in exchange for reporting on cases).
New standards and a new regulatory framework for reporters announced in 2002, see
infra note 175, appear designed to address low ethical standards among journalists, cf.
2003 Nian QiJizhe Ye Yao Kao "Zige" [In 2003Journalists Will Also Need "Qualifications"],
Beiing Qingnian Bao [Beijing Youth News], Dec. 9, 2002, available at http://
www.people.com.cn/GB/news/6056/20030109/904318.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (stating that one purpose of new regulations is to ensure that reporters
"receive supervision"). The new rules also appear to be directed toward reasserting
government control over the media. Having made journalists and the media financially
independent, authorities may be seeking to use enhanced regulation to ensure that the
media do not stray too far. For a discussion of similar developments in regulation of the
legal profession via the imposition of requirements that lawyers perform government
assigned legal aid work, see Liebman, supra note 145, at 261-64.
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return for payments by concerned parties, is common.1 6 The media are
not unique in this regard. Reports of corruption among the media, in
particular among journalists covering the courts or reporting on official
misdeeds, reflect the financial incentives and corruption in the legal system more generally, but there is no evidence to suggest that the media
62
are any less corrupt than other actors.'
Short of outright bribery, commercial pressures also play a role in
determining the targets of media reporting. Partial marketization of the
media has created powerful financial incentives for the media to skew
their reports, or to report or remain silent on particular topics. 1

63

At-

tempts to please advertisers, as well as government officials, may affect
reporting.' 64 Similarly, journalists may act to assist friends or contacts.
161. See, e.g., Lu, Escape, supra note 128 (criticizing effect economic interests have
on media reporting); Zhao Zhigang, Yulun Jiandu De Yihua Yu Meiti Zilf [The Alienation
of Media Supervision and Media Self-Regulation], Jiancha Ribao [Procuratorate Daily],
Dec. 19, 2001 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Zhao, Alienation of
Media Supervision] (discussing corruption in media and stating that it is common for
reporters to receive phone calls from interested parties offering to pay their travel
expenses or offering money to report on particular case). Reporters may also be paid for
attending a press conference. Interview 2002-5; see also Interview 2003-111 (noting that
many journalists are wealthy, and questioning how journalists make so much money);
Jianying Zha, China Pop 117-21 (1995) (discussing corruption in Chinese media); Lynch,
supra note 32, at 61-64 (discussing paid news); Ma, supra note 45, at 23 (discussing
payments to journalists for reporting on particular stories); Zhao, Alienation of Media
Supervision, supra (reporting that National Reporters Association received 1200
complaints regarding "for-fee" reporting between 1997 and 2001).
162. See, e.g., Xinwwen Jiandu Nengfou Cujin Sifa Gongzheng [Can Media
Supervision Push Forward Judicial Fairness?], 1998 Zhongguo Lfishi [Chinese Lawyer] No.
12, at 8 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (commenting that it is common to read
articles about media supervision but rare to read articles on media corruption, and
discussing attempts by media to manipulate court outcomes). One journalist commented
that the only reason journalists are less corrupt than actors in other state institutions is that
their position outside the formal legal system gives them fewer opportunities to make
money. Interview 2003-4.
Corruption in the media reflects the fact that the media are participants in a legal
system that is increasingly driven by financial incentives. Increased legal fees and the
expanded use of contingency fees have resulted in lawyers being increasingly willing both
to take on a wide range of cases and to challenge powerful persons or entities, at least at
the local level. See infra Part I.F.2 (discussing parallels between lawyers and journalists).
Judges likewise face increased financial incentives, from both corruption and from
compensation systems that punish judges for deciding cases incorrectly and reward judges
for generating positive press coverage of court activities. Penalties for deciding cases
incorrectly may take the form of administrative demerits or a reduction of the annual
bonus paid to judges; in serious cases judges may lose their positions. Interview 200-20;
Interview 2003-45.
163. See, e.g., Lu, Escape, supra note 128 (criticizing practice of journalists being
compensated for reporting on certain issues); Zhao, Calling Out, supra note 140 (arguing
for reduced role of commercial interests in determining media coverage).
164. Cheng Xi, Meiti Dui Qiye De Xinwen Yulun Jiandu-Anran He Yingguangxia
Shijian De Qishi [Media Supervision over the Enterprises-Enlightenment from the Enron
and Yingguangxia Incidents] (May 13, 2002), at http://www.cddc.net/fagui/76.htm (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Cheng, Supervision]; see also Interview
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Thus certain disputes go unreported, and others are covered, in order to
protect a wide range of interests of both media outlets and individual
journalists.1 65 Such pressures may be exacerbated in a system recently
transformed from heavy reliance on state subsidies to near-complete financial autonomy, and in which the media lack a tradition of objective
neutrality and are without norms of professional behavior for journalists.
E. Content Regulation; Controlling the Boundaries
China's media operate subject to a web of formal and informal regulations that inform, and in some cases dictate, how and what the media
report. China's media-content-control system has traditionally relied on
a combination of policy statements and instructions from Communist
Party propaganda authorities, 166 a system of editor responsibility for content, 1 6 7 and postpublication sanctions for those who violate explicit or
implicit limits. 168 This system continues today.
Party policy statements are only one factor influencing editorial decisions regarding content. Four sources of primary norms inform such decisions: (1) government laws and regulations; (2) Party documents and
instructions; (3) informal content regulations and self-censorship; and
(4) local restrictions and impediments to reporting, often in the form of
direct intimidation of journalists or through defamation litigation. Although this system imposes significant constraints on reporting, and in
particular on critical reports regarding government activities, the system's
often unclear boundaries permit journalists space to innovate and experiment within permissible limits.
A system of postpublication sanctions punishes those who violate
laws, Party directives, or informal norms. Party ideological workers review

2003-48. Journalists themselves are often responsible for generating advertising revenue.
Zhongdang Pan, Improvising Reform Activities: The Changing Reality of Journalistic
Practice in China, in Power, Money, and Media, supra note 27, at 68, 86-87.
165. China's media are not different from Western media in this respect. See James
Curran, Rethinking Media and Democracy, in Mass Media and Society 120, 124 (James
Curran & Michael Gurevitch eds., 3d ed. 2000) (noting, in discussion of media in Western
countries, that "the market can give rise not to independent watchdogs serving the public
interest but to corporate mercenaries that adjust their critical scrutiny to suit their private
purpose").
166. See Keller, Privilege and Punishment, supra note 26, at 136 ("The substantive
legal rules concerning press content are simply not stated in sufficient detail to give
practical guidance to anyone who lacks access to CPD documents and official guidance.").
167. Lynch, supra note 32, at 160-61 (quoting Polumbaum, supra note 116, at
52-53).
168. See Dittmer, supra note 110, at 96 (noting that "[a] t least until the late 1980s the
media prided themselves on their lack of prepublication censorship"). Although
prepublication review by propaganda department officials is sometimes required,
prepublication review is generally not key to overall Party management of the media.
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the media postpublication for transgressions. 169 Journalists or editors
who breach norms or who misjudge the prevailing political winds may
suffer loss of their positions, 170 the closing of publications, or imprisonment.1 7 1 In less serious cases, responsible editors are summoned for
meetings with, or called by, the propaganda department and warned to
be more careful in the future. 172 Offending editions may also be barred
173
from sale after publication.
1. FormalLaws and Regulations. - A range of formal government-as
opposed to Party-laws and rules provide formal content regulations in
certain areas and govern requirements for participation in the media industry. A strict government licensing system permits only approved publications to publish news and limits access to China's airwaves. 174 Government regulations also determine who may participate in news gathering
and threaten license revocation for anyone who breaches regulations or
Party discipline rules. 175 Laws and regulations also impose content re169. Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy, supra note 32, at 21. Propaganda
department review is sometimes part of a regularized system of review; in other cases it is in
response to specific complaints made regarding a publication or broadcast.
170. Interview 2003-39; see, e.g., China Paper Fires Reporter over Story, Quill, Oct.
2001, at 37, 37 (describing journalist fired for reporting about local court scheme to sell
organs of executed prisoners).
171. Rosenthal, supra note 96; Interview 2003-26; see also Keller, Privilege and
Punishment, supra note 26, at 97-98 (discussing punishment of editors and papers);
Media Freedom in China: Roundtable Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm'n on China, 107th
Cong. 8, 11 (2002) (statement of Kavita Menon, Committee to Protect Journalists),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_house_
hearings&docid=f:81228.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Media
Freedom Roundtable] (reporting demotions and firings at Southern Weekend after paper
published unflattering description of criminal activities in Hunan Province).
172. Interview 2003-38; Interview 2003-48. In the case of critical reports on other
jurisdictions, propaganda authorities in the target jurisdiction may telephone the
propaganda department responsible for the publication, which in turn will pass along the
complaint to the paper. Interview 2003-48; Interview 2003-58.
173. Jonathan Ansfield, Reuters, China Stifles Curb-Defying Magazine, June 23, 2003
(on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) (reporting that propaganda authorities barred sale
of issue of Caijing and discussing closure of Beijing tabloid).
174. A licensing system likewise regulates other forms of media, including publishing
and film production. The General Administration of Press and Publications oversees this
system for the print, publishing, audiovisual, and electronic media sectors, while the State
Administration of Radio, Film, and Television regulates the broadcast media. For a
detailed discussion of this system, including related regulations, see Keller, Media
Ownership, supra note 26, at 279-86; Keller, Privilege and Punishment, supra note 26, at
100-01.
175. The General Administration of Press and Publications also regulates reporters.
Under new regulations announced at the end of 2002, all reporters are required to take a
national examination and obtain a license in order to be employed by the media. In 2003
Journalists Will Also Need "Qualifications," supra note 160. The new system will be phased
in over a five-year period. Prior regulations had also regulated reporters, but had not
required a formal licensing exam. See generally Fu & Cullen, supra note 65, 97-108
(discussing regulations on reporters). Journalists, however, say that they do not expect the
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strictions regarding such subjects as national security and state secrets,1 76
and govern certain forms of media, such as the internet. 177 Regulations
governing newspapers, for example, ban material that opposes the Party's
leadership, undermines social stability, or subverts the socialist system.
Also, the regulations oblige newspapers to uphold socialism and carry out
propaganda work on behalf of the Party and government. 178 These formal laws and regulations play an important role in limiting new entrants
to the industry and in defining sanctions in certain cases, but in day-today editorial decisions they are less important than are Party policy
pronouncements.
2. PropagandaDepartment Instructions. - Formal and informal Communist Party policy pronouncements and regulations set the overall tone
for the press and provide detailed provisions regarding both required
and impermissible content of public reports. The CPD, which has primary responsibility for China's media policies, provides overall guidance,
and the propaganda bureaus of provincial and local Party branches are
responsible for implementing such policies at their respective levels.1 79
Party instructions may be formal or informal. Formal Party policy is set
forth via directives, which are issued internally through the propaganda
department hierarchy to media organizations and are discussed in meetings of journalists and editors.18 0 Less formal mechanisms include telephone calls to media editors, speeches by Party officials, and regular
meetings with journalists and editors.' 8 1 Party guidance, at all levels,
ranges from details regarding how to cover major news stories, to requirements that media use only officially prepared texts for certain stories, to
instructions to the media to focus, or remain silent, on particular isnew system to have significant impact, primarily because there is little new content to the
exam requirement. See Interview 2003-3; Interview 2003-48.
176. See, e.g., Baoshou Guojia Mimi Fa [Law on Guarding State Secrets] art. 20
(1998) (stating that media publications and broadcasts shall not reveal state secrets);
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa [Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China]
art. 398 (1997) (barring divulgence of state secrets); see also Fu & Cullen, supra note 65,
109-35 (discussing regulations on state secrets and national security); Keller, Privilege and
Punishment, supra note 26, at 121-23 (discussing laws and regulations imposing content
regulations on China's print media and noting vagueness of such standards).
177. Keller, Media Ownership, supra note 26, at 280.
178. Baokan Guanli Zhanxing Guiding [Interim Rules on the Administration of
Newspapers] arts. 7, 8 (1990).
179. Party influence also includes the ability to approve senior editors and other
employees of major media outlets. Keller, Privilege and Punishment, supra note 26, at
116.
180. Id. at 97.
181. Interview 2003-13; Interview 2003-74; see also Media Freedom Roundtable, supra
note 171, at 6, 6-8 (statement of He Qinglian, Journalist, Princeton Univ.) (describing
content control system). In addition, the career paths of propaganda officials and editors
often overlap, with individuals shifting between editorial jobs at official media and
positions within propaganda departments over the courses of their careers.
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sues. 182 Thus, for example, in July 2003 the CPD instructed media nationwide to refrain from critical public reports on the police,
83
procuratorates, and courts for a period of two months.1
Propaganda departments generally issue directives weekly, although
they may also issue instructions more frequently with regard to particular
topics, such as major international or domestic news items.18 4 Reporters
comment that most propaganda department directives are instructions
not to report on certain issues, or to handle sensitive matters in a particular way.18 5 If media do not receive instructions regarding a particular
18 6
subject, they generally are free to report on the topic.
Each propaganda department has the authority to issue directives,
which causes media to face different degrees of regulation depending on
their administrative rank and the particular propaganda department with
direct authority over the publication or station. Media with national rank
must obey directives of the CPD; provincial media must obey the CPD
instructions as well as those of their respective provincial propaganda departments; and municipal-level media must obey central, provincial, and
municipal propaganda directives. In areas such as Chengdu and
Guangzhou where there is competition between provincial party newspapers and those attached to municipal party committees, this may result in
certain newspapers being permitted to report on topics that are off limits
to their lower-ranking competitors. 1 8 7 Likewise, content barred in one
182. Interview 2002-3; see also John Pomfret, China Closes Beijing Newspaper in
Media Crackdown, Wash. Post, June 20, 2003, at A19 (discussing CPD notice that banned
reporting on range of sensitive cases); Rosenthal, supra note 96 (discussing CPD circular
to media editors specifying "do's and don'ts" of topics). For an argument that the Partystate "guides the media only on significant political issues, and those related to national
security," see Li, Focus, supra note 47, at 29.
Instructions to the print media requiring that certain topics be covered are rare, but
propaganda authorities often dictate the topics to be covered on Focus. Interview 2003118. Indeed, most positive reports that the program airs are the direct result of
propaganda department instructions. Id.
183. Interview 2003-113; Interview 2003-160. The ban followed an increase in critical
media reports on the police and legal authorities during and after the SARS epidemic.
Interview 2003-160.
184. Interview 2003-4.
185. Id.; Interview 2003-73.
186. Interview 2003-4; Interview 2003-39; Interview 2003-73. Most prohibitions are
never lifted. Thus reporters say that after a period of time has passed since a directive was
issued, they may experiment by reporting on a formerly forbidden topic to see if the
propaganda authorities will respond. See, e.g., Interview 2003-4; Interview 2003-46; see
also Li, Focus, supra note 47, at 30 (quoting a leading television journalist as stating that
"[n]o one ever tells you that there is a field you can now report which was not allowed
previously").
In cases in which domestic reporting is off limits, foreign media coverage may help to
highlight an issue. In some cases, journalists who are unable to report on certain matters
may either pass on such stories to foreign journalists or suggest that those with grievances
raise them with members of the foreign media.
187. Interview 2003-39; Interview 2003-93. For example, the municipal propaganda
department barred municipal-level media in Chengdu from reporting on a Chengdu
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area may be permitted elsewhere. Central media may feel greater compulsion to adhere to CPD instructions than do papers of lower rank,
where scrutiny by central authorities is less likely. Local propaganda authorities may also differ in the degree to which they enforce CPD
instructions.
Guidance may also include instructions to use only Xinhua News
Agency reports regarding certain sensitive matters. Thus local newspapers have significant discretion in reporting on local news but may be
required to use only Xinhua materials for national and international reports. 18 8 During the SARS outbreak, for example, the media were initially barred from reporting on it. After the government acknowledged
the severity of the outbreak on April 20, 2003, media were permitted
more discretion but still relied on Xinhua dispatches for much of their
news. One reporter for a local Beijing newspaper stated that the paper
ran approximately fifty percent of their own stories on SARS and fifty
percent of stories prepared by Xinhua. 8 9 At the local level, however,
local propaganda departments may sometimes require official Party papers to send reports on major local news items to the department for
approval prior to publication. 190
Nonetheless, the flow of information between the Party and the media is not unidirectional. Reporters also play a role in influencing the
range of permissible topics, such as by choosing to bring an item to the
attention of Party authorities through an article in an internal publication. In some cases, doing so results in explicit instruction from the prop-

deputy mayor who gambled while on a visit to Las Vegas; provincial-level papers carried the
story. Interview 2003-39. Papers with municipal rank may face additional restrictions in
the form of provincial propaganda authorities restricting their ability to report on matters
outside their locality. Interview 2003-39; see also Wang, Advantage, supra note 139
(discussing competitive advantages of provincial-level paper in Hunan compared to
municipal paper due to its ability to engage in greater range of popular opinion
supervision). Provincial authorities may also restrict local papers by limiting the number of
pages they are permitted to publish each day. Interview 2003-39.
Papers with a national rank, likewise, may have advantages over those with a lower
rank. In Beijing, the dailyJinghuaShibao is owned in part by People's Daily and is not under
the jurisdiction of the Beijing Propaganda Department. Interview 2003-108. If Beijing
propaganda authorities are unhappy about the content of the paper, they must raise their
concerns with CPD officials, who then may pass along such criticism to People's Daily.
Interview 2003-110.
188. Interview 2003-38; Interview 2003-44. When bombs exploded in cafeterias at
Beijing University and Qinghua University in February 2003, for example, the CPD
instructed papers and television stations nationwide that they could use only the Xinhua
dispatch on the incident and told newspapers that they were not permitted to run the story
on the front page. Interview 2003-44; Interview 2003-65.
189. Interview 2003-109; see also Interview 2003-110 (stating that papers in Beijing
were initially required to use only Xinhua reports on SARS but were later permitted more
discretion in using their own reports).
190. Interview 2003-44.
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aganda department to focus on such issues in public coverage. 19' In
other cases, reporters from central media outlets may agree jointly to
cover a story without first clearing it with the CPD, 19 2 thus likely making
future coverage by others easier.
Propaganda department control of content is not consistent and
tends toward extremes. Media may be subject to high degrees of scrutiny,
with certain topics off limits entirely, during particularly sensitive periods.
Thus Focus ran few critical reports during the first half of 2003-the result of heightened CPD oversight of the program leading up to and during the National People's Congress meeting in March, at which new gov19 3
ernment leaders were formally announced, and during the SARS crisis.
In other cases, media coverage of a topic is largely unregulated until it
reaches a certain point when all further public reporting on the topic is
banned. Again, the SARS outbreak presents a clear example: After an
initial ban on reports was lifted, many in the media were extremely aggressive in reporting on the outbreak. Once the outbreak was under control, however, the CPD banned the media from reports reflecting on the
19 4
outbreak, and the media were instructed to use only Xinhua reports.
Once the CPD issues an explicit ban on reports on a subject, most editors
and journalists comply.
3. Informal Norms. - Informal, unwritten norms also set boundaries
on the topics on which the media may and may not report, in particular
with regard to coverage of alleged official misconduct, unfair official decisions, or other potentially sensitive topics. Reporters comment that these
informal rules are the most important source of guidance as to the limits
within which they must operate when they are engaged in investigative
journalism. 19 5 The boundaries of what may and may not be reported are
fluid, and depend not only on the target of the report and status of the
news organ carrying the story, but also on the program or page on which
the item will air or be published.196
191. Interview 2002-3; cf. Li, Focus, supra note 47, at 24 (arguing that Focus has also at
times "set the government agenda for policymaking and reform").
192. Interview 2002-3; Interview 2002-10.
193. Interview 2003-117.
194. Interview 2003-110.
195. Interview 2002-1; see also Interview 2002-2 (stating thatjournalists know what can
and cannot be published, just as they know what lead stories should be each day, and that
reporters who fall afoul of such restrictions are usually young and inexperienced);
Interview 2003-13 (commenting that internal norms have come to be more important than
law or Party instructions). For a summary of these informal rules, explained in terms of
the difficulties the press faces in reporting on official misconduct, see Lin Xiang, Yulun
Jiandu Nanzai Hechu [Where Are the Difficulties in Popular Opinion Supervision],
RemninJiancha [People's Procuracy], Aug. 27, 2000 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Lin, Difficulties].
Such rules are not entirely distinct from CPD
pronouncements; rather, such informal rules are informed by often unclear Party
statements and notices.
196. Interview 2002-2. Magazines have somewhat more flexibility than newspapers
with regard to content. Magazines are generally regulated by the publishing division of
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The most important informal rules concern the targets and subject
matter of reports. Most critical reports expose low-ranking officials, in
particular officials at the county level and below. 19 7 In addition, critical
media reports generally expose misdeeds either at a lower administrative
rank than or in a jurisdiction other than that in which the report will be
published or aired. 19 8 It is rare for papers to target problems at the same
level of government as the paper itself.1 99 As one local television journalist explained, reports on problems with the local government are possible
propaganda departments, rather than the stricter news division that oversees newspapers.
Interview 2003-14; Interview 2003-18. Individual media outlets also must balance critical
reporting with positive reports. For example, Focus is reported to have explicit rules
requiring that the program air two positive stories for every critical report. According to
studies and reports by CCTV journalists, approximately twenty to forty percent of the
reports on Focus consist of "popular opinion supervision." Sun Zhengyi & Liu Tingting,
2003 Nian Zhongguo Xinwenye Huiwang: San Yue [Review of China's Journalism in 2003:
The First Quarter], Renmin Wang [People's Daily Online], Dec. 30, 2003, at http://
www.xici.net/main.asp?doc=33595470 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also
Chan, supra note 125, at 41-43 (noting that 91 of 340 episodes of Focus in 1999 were
critical reports and describing how program often broadcasts reports clearly designed to
serve Party propaganda goals); Liang, Degree, supra note 121 (stating that approximately
one-third of all reports on Focus are critical). At Legal Report, journalists must balance
critical reports, which are often popular with viewers, with other programs; in general
'supervision" work makes up only one quarter of the program's reports. Interview 2003-87.
197. Interview 2003-75; Lin, Difficulties, supra note 195. Propaganda department
notices have explicitly told the media that critical reports should limit their targets to
county-level and lower-ranking officials, although some national media journalists state
that they are also able to criticize some municipal leaders, including deputy mayors and
municipal bureau heads. Interview 2003-4. Legal Report criticizes decisions by intermediate
courts or municipal governments but has never run a program critical of a decision by a
provincial high court. Interview 2003-83. The size and relative national importance of the
municipality will also inform decisions on whether to run critical reports. Interview 200387. At times, however, the media may challenge these norms and criticize provincial
governments. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 399-404 (discussing Liu Yong case).
A posting on the China News Research Center website noted that the news media do
not hesitate to report the names of ordinary people but rarely report the names, or even
localities, of corrupt officials. Generally, the media target only low-ranking officials,
following a policy of "getting the sesame seed but losing the watermelon," and not
pursuing high-ranking officials until they have already been punished by other authorities.
ChenJunyou, Yulun Jiandu De Bugong [The Unfairness of Popular Opinion Supervision],
Zhongguo Xinwenren Wenhua Wang [China News Culture Web], May 19, 2002 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Chen, Unfairness]; see also Chan, supra note
125, at 44 (discussing targets of critical reports on Focus).
198. Interview 2002-7.
199. Interview 2003-44. Thus, for example, local papers rarely carry critical reports
about local governments. Interview 2003-80. A journalist at a local paper linked to the
local municipal Party committee commented that the newspaper not only finds it difficult
to report on problems in the local municipal government, but also avoids criticizing the
district government of the municipal district in which the paper's offices are located.
Interview 2003-24. In general, such rules do not apply to internal reports. For example,
Legal Report will run criticism of provincial authorities in its internal reports, even though
the program never criticizes such officials on-air. Interview 2003-87. At the local level,
however, reporters may eschew criticism even in internal reports, or may show such
internal reports to the targets of criticism prior to submitting them. Interview 2003-44.
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only if they target general problems, not particular officials, or wrongdoers with relatively low rank. Thus, for example, when seeking to expose
problems with major local hospitals, the journalist instead prepared a re200
port that exposed problems in a minor hospital that had a low profile.
Critical reports regarding the politically important cities of Beijing
and Shanghai by any media outlet are rare, 20 ' as is criticism of the central
government or national ministries. 20 2 Critical reports regarding provincial governments are also infrequent, and when they do occur they come
largely from media with a central government or Party rank. 203 Thus, for
example, a provincial-level newspaper may report on county-level
problems, but will rarely carry reports critical of the provincial government. 20 4 Economic Observer, a weekly paper known for its probing commentary on economic and social issues, avoids critical reports on issues in
Shandong, as the paper is formally registered in Shandong and thus is
subject to regulation by the Shandong Province Propaganda Department. 20 5 Non-local media-most often media from other provincesfind it easier to report on misconduct in a province or area than do local
media. 20 6 Indeed, Southern Weekend, regarded by many as China's most

For a discussion of difficulties faced by television journalists producing legal-themed
programming at the local level, see Liu, Television Programs, supra note 105. In
Shanghai, some critical reports are tolerated so long as the targets are not too powerful,
but the media must also run follow-up articles describing how local authorities solved
problems the media exposed. Interview 2003-56; see also Interview 2003-108 (commenting
that any critical reports in one mass-market Beijing daily paper focus on small problems or
on ways to improve government services).
200. Interview 2003-65.
201. Interview 2003-117; Interview 2003-160.
202. CPD rules explicitly ban media from reporting on crimes committed by any
officials at or above the rank of deputy minister; in such cases, the media are only
permitted to use reports prepared by Xinhua or People's Daily. Interview 2003-75.
203. Interview 2002-5.
204. Interview 2003-22 (stating that provincial paper will never criticize provincial
government and that most criticism is of low-level problems).
205. Interview 2003-48; Interview 2003-95.
206. Interview 2003-39; Interview 2003-51. Similar norms apply to media tied to a
particular department or organization: It is easier for a newspaper to report on
wrongdoing outside its relevant bureaucratic area than it is to report on wrongdoing
within such area. See Lin, Difficulties, supra note 195; Interview 2002-2. For example,
Legal Daily-tied to the Ministry of Justice and the Party's Central Political-Legal
Committee-is more likely to be critical of the courts than is People's Court News. See
Interview 2003-73 (stating that People's Court News avoids criticism of courts); Interview
2003-158 (same); see also Dangqian Fayuan De Xuanchuan Ying Bawo Liangge Zhongdian
[Two Important Points That Should Be Grasped in Court Propaganda at Present], Renmin
Fayuan Bao [People's Court News], at http://www.gzcourt.org.cn/zfxw/zfxw.jsp?lsh=10
(last visitedJune 30, 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Reuiew) (stating that primary role
of People's Court News is to "improve the image of courts," and to carry out propaganda work
on court decisions and activities).
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courageous newspaper over much of the past decade, rarely reports on
20 7
wrongdoing in its home province of Guangdong.
Media affiliated with the central government, ranging from CCTV,
the central television network, to newspapers such as People's Daily, China
Youth Daily, and Legal Daily, have significantly more flexibility to publish
critical reports than do provincial or local media. 20 8 As a result, such
media are both the recipients of a significant volume of complaints from
aggrieved individuals and are likely to be most feared by local officials.
Yet even the national press often shrinks from covering scandals above
the local level. 20 9 Journalists comment that it is comparatively rare for
them to run critical reports regarding officials above the county level, a
practice known as "hitting flies, not tigers," 2 10 although some central media outlets appear increasingly willing to criticize implicitly the policies of
some central government ministries and departments.
Informal norms also govern subject matter, making some topics easier to report on than others. Journalists comment that they must look
not only to the rank of the target of a critical report, but also to any
potential ideological sensitivity of the topic concerned. 21 1 For example,
the media enjoy more leeway to report on wrongdoing in the financial
sector than in many other areas. 21 2 Propaganda authorities likewise permit the media broader freedom in reporting on scandals in sports and
the arts. 213 Certain topics are also very clearly off limits, including re207. Interview 2002-2. When the paper does include critical reports on Guangdong,
the paper's targets are usually low-ranking officials. Interview 2003-46.
208. Interview 2002-1.
209. Interview 2002-2; see also Sun, Necessity and Feasibility, supra note 117
(discussing study of People's Daily critical reports between 1993 and 1997 finding that
majority of such reports did not name a specific person, that only 8.5% of critical reports
in the paper were targeted at officials, and that virtually all of these were reports on lowlevel officials).
210. Shi, Flies and Tigers, supra note 22; Interview 2003-3.
211. A reporter for China Youth Daily summarized the three issues reporters must
consider before deciding to report: the status or government level of the subject of the
report; the nature of the case and whether it affects a "phenomenon" (which would make
the matter more sensitive); and the ideological sensitivity of the case. Guanyu Sifa Yu
Chuanmei De Taolun [A Discussion on the Media and the Judicial System], Nanfang
Zhoumou [Southern Weekend], Apr. 16, 1999, available at http://jc.gov.cn/personal/
ysxs/fnsxl/fnsx87.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting China Youth Daily
reporter Lu Yaogang).
212. Interview 2003-17; Interview 2003-48; Interview 2003-93; Interview 2003-95; see
also Susan V. Lawrence, An Investigative Financial Magazine Is Sued by an Angry Target: A
Trial for China's Media, Far E. Econ. Rev., May 9, 2002, at 29, 29 ("China's Communist
Party Propaganda Department gives financial publications more rein than most other news
organizations."); Robert L. Keatley, Nat'l Comm. on U.S.-China Relations, The Role of the
Media in a Market Economy, China Pol'y Series, Feb. 2003, at 1, 1, available at http://
www.ncuscr.org/Publications/media-report-web.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (stating that "[i]t is probably no coincidence that the greatest increase of press
freedom can be found in the field of economic journalism").
213. Interview 2003-75; Interview 2003-93. Explanations for why certain areas are less
restricted than others vary. Thus, while reports on soccer or the arts may be of less political
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reports that
ports about national leadership, criticism of the military, 21and
4
suggest problems with China's family planning policies.
The editorial system of each publication or station enforces these
informal rules, with each news article or program subject to at least three
levels of editorial review.2 15 Occasionally editors may seek guidance from
propaganda authorities regarding whether a particular item is appropriate for the public, 2 16 and at times certain sensitive publications or programs are explicitly required to do so. 2 17 In general, however, if editors
need to ask whether a particular item may run or broadcast, then they
21 8
already know the answer is no.

4. Local Regulations and Impediments: Defamation Litigation. - Local
rules and regulations, threats of local reprisals, and fear of defamation
litigation also constrain the media. The difficulties reporters encounter
at the local level illustrate both the potential impact of critical reportshence the fear journalists arouse amongst targets of investigations-and
the degree to which even journalists from powerful central media outlets
must consider the potential responses of local officials to their reports.2 19
Some local governments have responded to increased critical media
coverage by passing regulations requiring reporters to obtain permission
concern than reports on other topics, observers attribute the relative freedom that the
media enjoy in financial reporting in part to the lack of propaganda department
competence in such matters: It is difficult to restrict such reports if those doing the
censoring do not understand the subject matter. Interview 2003-17. Moreover,
propaganda department officials are primarily concerned with ideology, and reports on
the financial sector are seen as relatively nonideological. Interview 2003-18. Critical
reports on corporate misconduct are also consistent with government efforts to crack down
on market irregularities. Yet even in areas in which the media enjoy relatively more leeway,
some subjects may be off limits. Thus, for example, although the media generally have
significant latitude to criticize companies and enterprises, criticism of certain high-profile
national brands is off limits. See, e.g., Interview 2003-65 (describing use of internal report
in place of criticism of high-profile national brand).
214. Interview 2003-4; Interview 2003-10; Interview 2003-60.
215. Interview 2003-13; Interview 2003-39. For a discussion of internal controls at
newspapers, see Fu & Cullen, supra note 65, at 33.
216. Interview 2003-13.
217. Some particularly important media programs, most notably Focus, are at times
subject to prebroadcast review by CPD officials. During certain periods, all topics covered
by Focus are cleared in advance, ensuring, some say, that the government is not only aware
of the problems covered before they are "exposed," but also that the government is
confident it will be able to solve such problems quickly after the program airs. Interview
2003-79; Interview 2003-82. Other programs, including Legal Report, similarly are subject to
preclearance by the CPD during particularly sensitive periods, such as during the annual
meeting of the National People's Congress. Interview 2003-83.
218. Interview 2002-2.
219. Another result of tight local regulation is that local media often actively protect
local interests, especially those of the local Party-state. See, e.g., Cheng, Supervision, supra
note 164 (noting that local interests, personal interests, and personal relations all affect
media coverage); Lu, Escape, supra note 128 (criticizing media that protect local
interests).
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in advance of publishing critical reports 220 or prior to conducting interviews; 22 1 some regulations go so far as to forbid the publication of bad
news altogether. 222 Other local governments have responded to negative
220. See Zhang Weibo & Li Jinyuan, Gansu Dunhuang Zhengfu Fa Wenjian Dui
Xinwen Caifang Shezhi Zhang'ai [Gansu Dunhuang Government Issues Document,
Imposes Obstructions to News Reporting], Zhongguo Qingnian Bao [China Youth Daily],
Jan. 14, 2002, available at http://www.yifannet.com/xinwen/guonei/2002/01/14/
3285873828792.html (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) (noting that after critical local
story, city introduced new regulations requiring permits and preapproval for all local
stories); see also Pan Duola, Yulun Jiandu Jidai Lifa [Media Supervision Urgently Awaits
Laws Being Drafted], Nanfang Ribao Jituan [Nanfang Daily Group Website], Mar. 7, 2002,
at http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zt/zt/015lian/200203070O13.asp
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting calls for such laws to be abolished, but also stating that in
many cases officials find it easier to rely on informal channels to block publication of
negative reports).
221. Interview 2003-75; Liu Weidong, Tamen De Ti'an: Yu Yulun Jiandu Youguan
[Their Draft Proposals: Related to Popular Opinion Supervision], Nanfang Zhoumou
[Southern Weekend], Mar. 3, 2003, available at http://61.177.149.152/handbook/law/
wenji/fzhm/fzhml71.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Liu, Draft
Proposals]; Wang Songmiao, Falfi, Caishi Yulun Jiandu De Jianshi Kaoshan [Only Law Is
the Strong Patron of Popular Opinion Supervision], Zhengyi Wang [Justice Web], Mar. 23,
2001 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Wang, Only Law]. Courts have
also relied on such provisions to resist media coverage. See Interview 2003-75 (stating that
in certain provinces, courts require journalists to obtain permission to report on courts
from provincial high court); Interview 2003-86 (same); see also Wang, Only Law, supra
(reporting on directive of Guangdong High People's Court that requires approval from
court's news office prior to conducting interview with court official in Guangdong
Province).
222. Liu, Draft Proposals, supra note 221; see also Supervision Runs into Stability
Work, supra note 145 (reporting on local government officials who called for reduction in
number of "hotlines" for citizens' complaints and blamed press for causing chaos and
undermining stability); Wang Songmiao, Ai! Yulun Jiandu [Ai! Popular Opinion
Supervision], Zhengyi Wang [Justice Web], Nov. 8, 2001 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing need to obtain permission, and noting comments that provisions in
PRC Constitution regarding freedom of speech and right to criticize are "not worth a
sentence by a township boss").
Not all local governments are so outwardly hostile to the media. In 2001, a local Party
committee in Changzhi, Shanxi Province, issued an invitation to all national and local
media outlets to carry out supervision work in the city. You Zheyang Yige Shiwei Shuji (Er)
[There Is This Kind of Municipal Party Secretary (2)], Shijiazhuang Ribao [Shijiazhuang
Daily], May 9, 2002, available at http://www.sjzdaily.com.cn/jpdb/20020509/gb/
jpdb%5E15%5E3%5EA0603001.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also
Zhongguo Xinwenshe [China News Agency], Jilin Guiding, Xingzheng Jiguan Bude Zuai
Xinwen Yulun Jiandu [Jilin Regulation, Administrative Organs May Not Block News Media
Popular Opinion Supervision] (Dec. 6, 2000), at http://www.unn.com.cn/GB/channel2/
2196/2197/200106/20/73328.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
regulations in Jilin Province barring government officials from obstructing media
supervision and requiring the media immediately to reveal any illegal conduct by
enterprises); Wang Qiming, Xinwen Baoguang Ruhe Caineng You Xiawen? [How Can
Revelations in the News Have Outcomes?], Renmin Wang [People's Daily Online], May 12,
2000, at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/183/6103/6104/20020203/
661586.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing regulations in Anhui
Province requiring officials to accept media supervision and requiring that government
investigations be initiated where media reveal illegal or non-ordinary actions).
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coverage with extralegal measures. Numerous press reports describe
abuses journalists have suffered, including beatings at the hands of local
police, 223 losing their jobs for reporting too aggressively on local government activities, 224 or being falsely convicted of crimes. 2 25 In other cases,
223. See, e.g., "Da Bupa" DeJizhe XuyaoJianqiang Houdun ["Not Afraid of Beatings"
Reporters Need Strong Support], Jinghua Shibao [Jinghua Times], Mar. 30, 2002, at 6,
available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper1787/5851/588784.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (reporting three hundred complaints by journalists of harm
suffered between 1998 and 2002); Zhao, Calling Out, supra note 140 (reporting academic
comments condemning police for verbal and physical abuses of reporters, criticizing local
officials for abusing their powers by obstructing journalists, and stating that local
restrictions on reporting should not be imposed so as to protect interests of local officials);
see also Sheying Jizhe De Falfi Kunjing [The Difficult Legal Surroundings of
Photojournalists], at http://newsphoto.myetang.com/pinlun9.htm (last visited Jan. 7,
2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that photojournalists are often beaten
and listing cases in which reporters have been abused); Qu Lanyun, Yulun Jiandu Huhuan
Falfi Baohu [Popular Opinion Supervision Calls Out for Legal Protection], Jiancha Ribao
[Procuratorate Daily], Apr. 7, 2002 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing
violence againstjournalists); Wang Xia,Jizhe Wei Shenme Zong Aida? [Why Are Reporters
Always Beaten?], Zhongguo Xinwen Wang [China News Web], May 15, 2000, at http://
www.chinanews.com.cn/shidian/200004/new/7.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Wang, Beaten] (discussing violence against journalists); Wu Xianghan
& LiJingying,Jizhe Wanzai Caifang Youzao Cubao Ganshe, LfUshi Fabiao Kanfa [Reporters
Going to Interview in Wanzai Again Run into Violent Interference, Lawyers Express
Viewpoints], Zhongguo Qingnian Bao [China Youth Daily],Jan. 6, 2002, available at http:/
(on file with the Columbia
/www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/47/20020106/642010.html
Law Review); Wu Xianghan & Li Jingying, Jiangxi Wanzai Baozha Shigu Zhong Kan
"Fengsuo" Yu "Fan Fengsuo" Xinwen Zhan [Viewing the News Battle Between "Sealing off"
and "Opposing Sealing Off' in the Explosion Accident in Wanzai, Jiangxi], Zhongguo
Xinwen Wang [China News Web],Jan. 5, 2002, at http://www.chinanews.com.cn/2002-0105/26/152001.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Wu & Li, Sealing
Off] (explaining verbal abuse directed at reporters); Yang Wenxue & Zhou Huagong,
Zhuanjia Pingshuo Yulun Jiandu [Experts Comment on Popular Opinion Supervision],
Jinghua Shibao [Jinghua Times], Mar. 27, 2002, at 6, available at http://
www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/46/20020327/695703.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (complaining that physical attack on one of paper's journalists should be
treated as attack on public, not just as a tort); Zhou, supra note 150 (stating that in many
cases, officials respond to media coverage by taking revenge against reporter); Zhu
Daqiang, Xiao Yang Biaoshi Fayuan Jiang Yifa Baohu Xinwen Caifang Quan He Yulun
Jiandu Quan [Xiao Yang States that Courts Will Protect Media Interview Rights and
Popular Opinion Supervision Rights According to Law], Zhongguo Xinwen Wang [China
News Web], Jan. 28, 2003, at http://www.chinanews.com.cn/n/2003-01-27/26/
267980.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Zhu, Courts Will Protect]
(quoting president of Supreme People's Court as arguing for increased protections of
reporters' rights and stating that courts themselves must not interfere with or obstruct
reporters).
Even journalists from powerful central media, including Focus, have been detained
and beaten. Interview 2003-114.
224. Chen, Not Enough, supra note 142; Cheng Kejie Cong Jujue Jiandu Zouxiang
Huimie [Cheng Kejie Goes from Rejecting Supervision Toward Extermination] (Aug. 22,
2000), at http://www.cctv.com/zhuanti/chengke/main/ckj822-02.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
225. See Chen, Not Enough, supra note 142 (reporting on cases in which reporters
have been convicted of accepting bribes, soliciting prostitution, or cheating after
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newspapers carrying critical reports disappear or are destroyed before
22 6
they can be sold in the area covered in a critical report.
Even where local governments do not use force or threats,journalists
may find that critical reports are blocked. 22 7 Targets may rely on connections to a higher level of government to intervene, may directly contact
the propaganda department with authority over the publication or station, 22 8 or may telephone an editor at the publication or program. 22 9 Reports also describe how local officials have relied on connections, often
appealing to higher-ranking officials or engaging in bribery in order to
block critical reports. 230 The degree of effort used to block such reports
appears to increase with the importance of the publication or program.
publishing reports that angered local officials, and criticizing practice of arresting
reporters and then finding a crime with which to charge them); Ding Dong, Xinhua, Cong
Jizhe Chi Guansi Tanqi [Discussing from Reporters Being Sued] (Apr. 23, 2001), at http:/
/www.hn.xinhua.org/news/2001-4-23/01423171505.htm
(on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (reporting on journalist jailed for twelve years after reporting on misuse of funds
by a local official); see also Cao Ruilin, Qiantan Jizhe Zai Yulun Jianduzhong De
Renshenquan Baohu [A Brief Discussion on the Protection of the Physical Safety of
Reporters in Popular Opinion Supervision], 2001 Xinwen Zhanxian [News Frontline] No.
7, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper79/3848/464331.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that increased protections in China's criminal laws are
needed to protect reporters); cf. Stephen R. MacKinnon, Press Freedom and the Chinese
Revolution in the 1930s, in Media and Revolution 174, 177 (Jeremy D. Popkin ed., 1995)
(commenting, in discussion of journalism during the Chinese revolution, that
"U]ournalism in China has always been a risky business because the journalist ipso facto
became a political figure").
226. See, e.g., Lin, Difficulties, supra note 195 (discussing how edition of Southern
Weekend covering illegal pyramid sales was not available after purchase of all copies by
someone); see also Xu Xun, Zhongguo Xinwen Qinquan Jiufen Disici Liangchao [The
Fourth Wave of China's News Tort Disputes] 19-33 (2002) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Xu, Fourth Wave] (discussing newspapers disappearing or being
burnt); Guo Songmin, Renmin Ribao Ruhe Wei Ziji Tao Shuofa [How People's Daily Seeks
Justice for Itself], Zhongguo Qingnian Bao [Cb na Youth Daily], Sept. 22, 2003, available at
http://news.163.com/editor/030922/030922.802003.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Guo, How People's Daily Seeks Justice for Itself] (reporting on
confiscation of a People'sDaily edition in county that was target of critical report); Liu, Draft
Proposals, supra note 221 (describing cases in which editions of Southern Weekend have
disappeared); Interview 2002-2 (stating that Southern Weekend has repeatedly faced problem
with newspapers disappearing in certain areas).
227. See, e.g., Cai Enze, Huhuan Yulun Jiandu De Chuntian [Calling Out for the
Spring of Popular Opinion Supervision], Renmin Fayuan Bao [People's Court News], May
23, 2002, available at http://www.hubce.edu.cn/jwc/wc5/messages/6580.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Cai, Calling Out] (reporting on a line at CCTV
of persons seeking to block coverage by Focus); Lin, Difficulties, supra note 195 (stating
that number of reports prepared for Focus have been blocked prior to being broadcast, and
discussing similar activities at local level); Peng & Jiao, supra note 120 (stating that
existence of two lines outside CCTV offices shows that "in a materialistic society, the media
can also be purchased"); Wang, Legal Rights, supra note 144 (same).
228. Interview 2003-15; Interview 2003-18; Interview 2003-39; Interview 2003-80;
Interview 2003-85; Interview 2003-93.
229. Interview 2003-39; Interview 2003-87.
230. Xu, Fourth Wave, supra note 226, at 19-33.
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Approximately one-third of the critical reports that journalists at Focus
prepare are never aired, often because of intervention by interested parties. 23 1 Similarly, at Legal Report, journalists prepare critical reports in secret because, generally, if the targets of the reports become aware of the
reports in advance, they will seek to block the broadcast and the program
23 2
will not be able to run the report.
Critical media coverage has also spawned a significant volume of defamation litigation, much of it apparently intended to silence the media.2 33 Editors and journalists comment that economic risks arising from
critical reporting, in the form of potential defamation lawsuits, are now as
significant as the risk of sanction by propaganda departments, 2 34 and potential defamation litigation is a significant concern ofjournalists. 23 5 The
vagueness of existing law on defamation is one reason. 236 Local officials
and locally powerful persons, including judges, also appear to be using
defamation litigation to intimidate reporters and to seek retribution
23 7
against those who have engaged in critical reporting.
231. Interview 2003-117.
232. Interview 2003-83.
233. See, e.g., Wei Yongzheng, Guanyu Yulun Jiandu Yu Xinwen Fazhi Wenti De
Fangtan [An Interview Regarding Popular Opinion Supervision and News Rule of Law],
2000 Xinwen Jizhi [News Reporter] No. 2, at http://www.zjonline.com.cn/node2/
node26108/node3O2O5/node3O2l2/node3O2l5/userobject7ail886.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Wei, Popular Opinion Supervision] (stating that
defamation lawsuits are being used to "resist media supervision"). There is, moreover, a
significant volume of litigation concerning infringements of privacy and factually
inaccurate reporting. Some commentators argue that the media have brought the
defamation litigation upon themselves by neglecting basic ethical standards and rushing to
publish sensational stories without checking the facts. See, e.g., Wei Yongzheng, Xunqiu
Xinwen Yu Fal6i De Gongshi [Seeking Consensus Between News and Law], 1999 Zhongguo
Jizhe [China Reporter] No. 6, available at http://www.zjonline.com.cn/node2/
node26108/node3O2O5/node3O2l2/node3O2l3/userobject7ail691.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (arguing that media should serve Party and nation and "should not
serve as a peeping tom on private matters"). I plan to address this phenomenon in a
future article.
234. Interview 2003-15. Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that a single defamation
lawsuit could threaten a publication's existence; in contrast, political mistakes can be "life
threatening." Id.
235. See, e.g., Huang, Another 200,000, supra note 142 (stating that, due to threat of
defamation litigation, some reporters are afraid of using their power to supervise); Liu Lili,
Dangbao Zhankai Yulun Jiandu De Nandian Ji Duice [Difficulties and Strategies for
Opening up Popular Opinion Supervision by Party Papers], 2001 Neibu Wengao [Internal
Reports] No. 4, at 26 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Liu, Difficulties]
(describing litigation as a significant barrier to effective supervision by Party papers).
236. See, e.g., Huang, Another 200,000, supra note 142 (arguing that defamation law
is biased in favor of rights of individuals due to lack of legal provisions protecting
journalists' rights).
237. For a general discussion of this phenomenon, see Wei Yongzheng, Yulun Jiandu
He "Gongzhong Renwu" [Popular Opinion Supervision and "Public Persons"], 2000 Guoji
Xinwenjie [International News Industry] No. 3, available at http://www.zjonline.com.cn/
node2/node38/node58/node60/node76/userobject7ai1661. html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (discussing need to address use of lawsuits to seek revenge against

2005]

WATCHDOG OR DEMAGOGUE?

Much of the media commentary regarding these problems argues
that a "media law" or "news law" is needed to protect reporters and establish the rights of reporters to report without obstruction from local officials. 238 Local governments have experimented with regulations protecting media supervision, including prohibiting targets of media criticism
from reviewing manuscripts prior to publication and banning interference in publication.2 39 Yet the problems the media face may also be the
result of the media's own power. Local authorities' attempts to silence
the media, whether by regulation, force, or litigation, are a direct result
journalists); see also Guo, How People's Daily Seeks Justice for Itself, supra note 226
(discussing use of lawsuits by targets of media supervision).
238. See, e.g., Chen, Not Enough, supra note 142 (asserting that lack of protections
for right of reporters to investigate is one reason why reporters often suffer harm while
reporting); Cheng, Supervision, supra note 164 (arguing that law is needed to describe the
relationship of media to government, and to make clear that media are independent of
government); Lang, supra note 141 (observing significant restrictions on reporters,
including provisions regarding state secrets and national security, but absence of
significant legal protections for media); Qin Jie & Shen Lutao, Xinhua, Renda Daibiao
Zaici Jianyi: Jiakuai Yulun Jiandu Lifa Bufa [People's Congress Representatives Once
Again Suggest: Speed Up the Pace of Legislating Regarding Public Opinion Supervision]
(Mar. 14, 2001), available at http://zgrdxw.peopledaily.com.cn/gb/paper7/7/
class000700002/hwz102620.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on
demands from delegates to the 2001 meeting of the National People's Congress for
legislation regarding public opinion supervision); Wang, Only Law, supra note 221 (calling
for "News Law" to protect reporters' rights to investigate and report news); Wei, supra note
154 (calling for "supervision law" that would protect media and facilitate media
supervision). Yet not all advocates of a media law view it as protecting the rights of
reporters; some argue that a law is needed to impose legal consequences on reporters for
misdeeds. Cf. Sun, Voices, supra note 44, at 7 (arguing that primary function of press law
would be to deter unethical conduct by journalists); Zhao, Calling Out, supra note 140
(presenting various arguments for media law that protects right to report).
Drafting of a media law began in 1987, largely as an effort to ensure press autonomy
and improve government transparency, but it was abandoned after the 1989 Tiananmen
crackdown. Chin-Chuan Lee, Ambiguities and Contradictions: Issues in China's Changing
Political Communication, in China's Media, Media's China, supra note 28, at 3, 7; Liu,
Draft Proposals, supra note 221. A number of drafts have apparently been prepared,
however, and discussion of the law revived from time to time in the 1990s. Id. See
generally Keller, Privilege and Punishment, supra note 26, at 106-10 (discussing drafting
and potential impact of a "press law"). In late 2002, the deputy director of the General
Administration of Press and Publications announced that a news law would not be
forthcoming in the next few years, due to the lack of "maturity" of China's news industry.
"Xinwenfa" Jinqi Buhui Chutai, Waizi Niandi Jinru Baokan Faxing ["Media Law" Will Not
Appear in the Short Term," Foreign Investment Will Enter Newspaper Distribution at the
End of the Year], Zhongguo Xinwen Wang [China News Web], Nov. 16, 2002, at http://
(on file with the Columbia Law
www.chinanews.com.cn/2002-11-16/26/244229.html
Review). Others, including some delegates to the National People's Congress, have argued
for a "news openness law" that would make official documents and news public. Chen, Not
Enough, supra note 142.
239. Qu, supra note 223 (describing provisions regarding media supervision in
Zhoushan Municipality of Zhejiang Province); Xiao, What Can Be Predicted, supra note
124 (discussing regulations in Zhuhai).
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of the perception that media coverage will produce results, often in the
form of intervention from higher-ranking Party-state officials.
China's media-control system is dynamic, and thus many of the rules
and norms discussed in this section are from time to time challenged or
ignored. Editors' decisions to carry particular reports reflect a range of
internal and external considerations, including their understanding of
the prevailing political winds, their own ability to challenge limits, personal relationships with propaganda authorities, the financial interests of
the media outlet and its parent, and the perceived influence of the target
of the potentially critical report. The degree of autonomy that particular
media outlets enjoy thus may vary dramatically both over time and depending on the content of particular reports.
Although central media generally have more discretion to engage in
critical reporting than do local media, in some cases commercialized media may find it easier to publish critical reports. 240 Because the targets of
such reports are less concerned with the effects of reports in the commercial press, they are less likely to seek to block such reports. In contrast,
although reports in People'sDaily and on Focus are more likely to produce
desired effects than are local media reports, targets of central Party media
criticism are more likely to endeavor to block publication. 2 4' The dynamic nature of both regulation and editorial discretion precludes broad
conclusions regarding the relative level of autonomy-or freedom-of
central or local media.
F. ChallengingBoundaries; Incentives and the Internet
1. FinancialIncentives. - Despite the continued overlay of informal
and formal regulation, China's media are enjoying significantly greater
discretion over content than at virtually any time since 1949.242 This loosening of the reins results in significant part from financial and practical
necessity. Increased competition, especially in light of efforts to make the
media financially self-sufficient, has led editors to push the limits of what
they are allowed to print. 2 4 3 Journalists at commercialized papers, in particular those at the local level, say that their papers would not survive if
240. Interview 2003-26.
241. Interview 2003-3.
242. The amount of Party-dictated content varies from paper to paper. Nevertheless,
it does appear that the print media have discretion over a significant portion of content.
For example, one journalist for a national paper linked to the Party stated that despite the
paper's official status, it has discretion with regard to approximately sixty percent of its
content. Id.
243. Interview 2003-26; Interview 2003-80. Commercial pressures are not entirely in
the direction of more aggressive reporting, especially when it comes to reporting on areas
in the same jurisdiction as the media outlet. Increased reliance on advertising revenue
may also make the media less likely to report on certain topics or government entities. Liu,
Difficulties, supra note 235. Likewise, commercialization is also blamed for encouraging
the media to fabricate or exaggerate news. See, e.g., Huang, New Model, supra note 44.
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they strictly observed all propaganda department rules. 24 4 Competition
thus is encouraging the media to cover topics previously absent from the
Chinese media and to bring an increasingly wide range of popular grievances to light.
This loosening of control is also linked to the direct financial interests many provincial or local Party organizations have in the financial success of the media via Party-owned media groups. Such interests stem primarily from the use of profits from commercial papers to underwrite
unprofitable official Party media.2 45 For example, Southern Weekend contributes a portion of its revenue to its parent, the Southern Daily Media
Group, and therefore, at least indirectly, to the Guangdong Province
Party Committee. 246 As one journalist for a paper linked to a municipal
Party committee commented, "As long as we are successful, we have more
room."

24 7

The desire to attract increased numbers of viewers or readers is only
one factor that informs a program or paper's editorial choices, 248 and an
important aspect of commercial success is the ability to identify permissible boundaries. Even absent formal sanctions, programs or papers that
go too far may invite increased propaganda department monitoring,
which in turn leads to a dampening of content-and potential loss of
market share. Journalists at CCTV, for example, report that Focus has lost
viewers in recent years. Aggressive coverage by the program resulted in
in turn resulted in less aggressive reportincreased CPD scrutiny, which
2 49
ratings.
in
drop
a
ing and
In the past, media autonomy generally derived from CPD loosening
of controls: When the media enjoyed periods of greater discretion, it was
because the CPD chose not to monitor the media closely, not because it
lacked the ability to do so. This is changing, as propaganda authorities
appear to be facing difficulties monitoring an expanding number of media- outlets and an increasing volume of news topics. 250 Journalists de244. See, e.g., Interview 2003-46.
245. See, e.g., Interview 2003-24 (discussing how profits from commercial paper go to
parent Party paper); Interview 2003-52 (same).
246. Interview 2003-18; Interview 2003-46. Similarly, 21st Century Economic Herald, a
biweekly paper that is also part of the Southern Daily Media Group, contributes a certain
percentage of its profit to the group. Interview 2003-52.
247. Interview 2003-38.
248. Interview 2003-86.
249. Interview 2003-82; Interview 2003-83; Interview 2003-117; Interview 2003-160.
The CPD also from time to time instructs Focus to refrain from criticizing certain provinces
or from discussing certain topics. Interview 2003-117. The ratings decline, however, may
also reflect the growth of programs modeled on Focus; the program is now one of many
that engage in investigative reporting.
250. Journalists comment that propaganda authorities are increasingly unable to keep
up with the media, particularly newspapers. Interview 2003-39. This is especially true in a
system that generally relies on the ability of authorities to mark certain topics as off limits:
Propaganda authorities increasingly find it difficult to list everything that is off limits.
Interview 2003-67; Interview 2003-95.
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scribe themselves as often trying to keep one step ahead of propaganda
officials, in some cases going so far as to prepare backup programming in
the event the authorities intervene to block a broadcast at the last minute. 2 5 1 Because journalists say that they generally are not sanctioned unless they report on topics that propaganda departments have explicitly
marked as off limits, 25 2 journalists and editors who succeed in pushing
the limits of permissible content are often those who are able to publish
stories quickly, before the authorities can act. Even at Focus, the ability of
journalists to report on issues quickly, before interested parties are either
aware of the program or have had an opportunity to raise concerns with
253
the CPD, often determines whether a critical report may be aired.
The Chinese media are best understood not as increasingly independent, but as commercialized government mouthpieces, where increased
editorial discretion is permitted in order to ensure financial self-sufficiency (and, in some cases, return of profits to the Party-state itself) and
to provide incentives to serve Party-state interests in curbing abuses at the
local level. 25 4 Market incentives are used not only to reduce reliance on
subsidies, but also to finance the delivery of Party-state messages. 2 55 Yet
251. Interview 2003-65.
252. Id.
253. Interview 2003-117.
254. The observation that commercialization does not necessarily result in media that
pursue liberal democratic values is not unique to China. As Curran has argued, the market
can be used to rationalize authoritarian rule, and in many cases investigative journalism is
actually part of media management by those in power. See Curran, supra note 165, at 124,
133-34 (noting role of privately owned media in supporting authoritarian governments in
Latin America and Taiwan, and describing how ruling elites may develop systems of
clientist patronage with media); see also Anne S.Y. Cheung, Self-Censorship and the
Struggle for Press Freedom in Hong Kong 138-47, 159-76 (2003); Chin-Chuan Lee, State,
Capital and Media: The Case of Taiwan, in De-Westernizing Media Studies, supra note 45,
at 124, 124-26 (discussing "patron-client relationship" between ruling Nationalist Party
and media under authoritarian rule in Taiwan, a system under which media were
"politically subservient but had considerable autonomy in nonpolitical areas"); Zaharom
Nain, Globalized Theories and National Controls: The State, the Market, and the
Malaysian Media, in De-Westernizing Media Studies, supra note 45, at 139, 139, 145
(arguing that "rapid expansion of the media [in Malaysia] needs to be located at least
within the larger framework of increasing commercialization and ongoing state control"
and that "ownership and control of the media are in the hands of a few who are closely
aligned to the government and who wish to profit from the situation"). Barriers to and
costs of market entry may likewise undermine the ability of free markets to guarantee
media independence. See Curran, supra note 165, at 128-29 (noting four specific barriers
to media independence in free market system).
255. For case studies suggesting the degree to which commercialization may enhance
the delivery of Party propaganda, see Yong Zhong, The Other Edge of Commercialization:
Enhancing CCTV's Propaganda, Media Int'l Aust., Aug. 2001, at 167; cf. Monroe E. Price
& Peter Krug, The Enabling Environment for Free and Independent Media: Contribution
to Transparent and Accountable Governance 7 (U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., Occasional
Papers Series No. PN-ACM-006, 2002), available at http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/
democracy-and-governance/publications/pdfs/pnacm006.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (comparing U.S. model of mass media development, where public service
broadcasting is "designed to compensate for perceived market failure," with European
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the granting of both discretion and incentives has resulted in media that
increasingly seek to appeal to the public in ways that pressure the Partystate to respond to popular views. Such views may be of particular importance in a system in which there are few other mechanisms for channeling popular interests and opinions.
2. The Internet: Technological Challenge?- The degree to which propaganda departments may be finding it increasingly difficult to monitor
the media is illustrated by the growth of internet news sources. Significant Western attention has focused on the ability of Chinese authorities
to block access to overseas websites, 25 6 and authorities are devoting significant resources to monitoring and restricting web postings. 2 57 Domestic
internet news sites, however, also challenge a media-control system that
relies on the ability of propaganda authorities to issue directives dictating
either that certain news items should not be reported, or how certain
258
items should be covered.
Internet news reporting is leading to more rapid dissemination of
news, including news regarding official wrongdoing. In December 2001,
for example, the internet edition of People's Daily reported on an official
in Ningxia who had neglected to rescue a drowning girl; within twenty
days of the story being posted on the website, the official was forced from
office. Media reports praised the case as the fastest punishment of official
misconduct in China's history.2 59 People's Daily noted the important role
that the internet had played in the case, commenting that, without it, the
local Party discipline authorities might never have dealt with the
matter.

26 0

broadcasting, where "public service broadcasting has been the base, and the private sector
evolved to provide effective competition and opportunities for new and different voices
(not the least of them commercial ones)").
256. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Internet Filtering in China,
IEEE Internet Computing, Mar./Apr. 2003, at 70, 70-75.
257. See, e.g., Jin Wangluo Mingan Yanlun, Jishi Tongxun Gongju QQ Bei Jiankong
[Forbidding Sensitive Discussion on the Internet, Instant Messaging Tool QQ Is
Monitored], Yazhou Shibao [Asia Times], June 27, 2003 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing monitoring of instant messaging). Propaganda authorities have also
emphasized the ways in which the internet may be used to further state propaganda goals.
See, e.g., Xinhua, Li Changchun: Chongfen Fahui Hulianwang Deng Xinxing Meiti Qianli
He Youshi [Li Changchun: Fully Bring into Play the Potential and Advantage of Newly
Emerged Media Such as the Internet] (Jan. 19, 2004), available at http://news.sohu.com/
2004/01/19/00/news218700015.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
Guangdong Party Secretary Li Changchun's encouragement of greater use of emerging
media, such as the internet, to improve news propaganda).
258. Interview 2003-26 (stating that propaganda authorities are finding regulating the
internet difficult).
259. See, e.g., Wang Songmiao, Shuangjian Hebi: Kuanfu Zhengyi De Shidai Huhuan
(1) [Two Swords Combine Harmoniously: The Call of an Age of Pursuing Justice (1)],
Jiancha Ribao [Procuratorate Daily], Jan. 17, 2002 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Wang, Two Swords].
260. Jian Da, Renmin Shiping: Yulun Jiandu De Shengli [People's Opinion: A
Victory for Popular Opinion Supervision], Renmin Wang [People's Daily Online], Dec. 8,
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Journalists comment that internet news providers, in particular the
three major official internet news services, Xinhua Wang, Renmin Wang,
and Zhongxin Wang, are able to publish more than they could in their
respective print editions. The reasons these internet news services are
able to do so appear to stem from relaxed editorial oversight of web news
by their own institutions, and also from the fact that they are able to react
to news reports quickly.2 61 The websites of such official media outlets are
also more heavily commercialized than are their parent papers or news
services. Thus it appears that Renmin Wang, the web version of People's
Daily, has a much greater financial stake in attracting readers than does
its parent. Yet the fact that the websites are attached to Party mouthpieces also provides cover to others in the media: Once a news item has
run on one of these services it is easier for others to report on such
26 2
topics.
Internet sites such as Xinhua Wang, Renmin Wang, and Zhongxin Wang
are permitted to create their own online news content. 26 3 Some other
2 64
sites, including regional sites such as the Qianlong network in Beijing,
are also licensed to provide original news content online. Internet sites
2001, at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/20011208/622095.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review); see also Wei Wenbiao, Kuse De Shengli [Agonizing Victory],
Fazhi Ribao [Legal Daily], Jan. 13, 2002, at 2 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(praising media's role in resolving case). Online reports from the web edition of People's
Daily likewise played a role in exposing the Nandan disaster in 2001, when local officials
initially concealed the deaths of three hundred people in a mine. Guangxi Nandan
Zhongda Shigu Liangzhong DiaochaJieguo-1 [Two Types of Results from the Investigation
into the Nandan Major Accident], Zhihuicheng [Wisdom City], at http://
www.zhcchina.com/html/Cat26/1871-1.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); see also Min Dahong, 2001 Nian Huigu: Zhongguo De Wangluo
Meiti [Looking Back at 2001: China's Internet Media], Tianji Wang [Chinabyte.com]
(Dec. 18, 2001), at http://it.sohu.com/72/65/article15746572.shtml (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (discussing media supervision via the internet and noting that
problems regarding China's railways raised in online forum were addressed immediately
after they were discussed online); China Paper Fires Reporter over Story, supra note 170, at
37 (recounting controversial story on organ-harvesting that ran on People's Daily website).
The fact that some journalists in China appear to be using the internet to push the
boundaries of permissible reporting is not inconsistent with China's attempts to control
access to overseas internet content. Nevertheless, it does suggest that internet usage by
Chinese media may be developing in ways more complex than outside observers who focus
on attempts to control access to foreign content assume. Cf. Barb Palser, The Great
Online Wall, Am. Journalism Rev., Nov. 2001, at 74, 74 ("No one can publish hard news
inside China without the government's permission (at least, not for long), and many sites
are legally limited to electronic versions of print or broadcast reports.").
261. Interview 2003-108; Interview 2003-148.
262. Interview 2002-5; Interview 2003-67.
263. Interview 2003-108; Interview 2003-148.
264. Beijing Shi Huode Dengzai Xinwen Yewu Zige De Zonghexing Fei Xinwen
Danwei Wangzhan [Comprehensive Websites in Beijing That Are Authorized to Publish
and Disseminate News but That Do Not Belong to a News Work-Unit], Beijing Xinwen
Wang [Beijing News Web], at http://www.beijing.org.cn/beijing/zhxwz.htm (last visited
Feb. 2, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (listing "non-news" organizations in
Beijing that are permitted to post news articles).
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not linked to traditional Party media are not allowed to create their own
news content and are not technically permitted to employ reporters. 265
Despite such restrictions, these sites are increasingly important providers of news. The past few years have also seen the growth of commercial internet portals not directly linked to any major newspaper or
agency. The two leading portals, Sina and Sohu, both provide a wide variety of news. 266 Neither portal has the right to write its own news reports
or employ its own reporters; 267 instead, both post articles from other
sources, generally local and national newspapers, television stations, and
news agencies. 2 68 Working through contracts with such newspapers, the
portals post as many as five thousand stories a day to their respective
2 69
websites.
Internet portals exercise significant discretion over which articles receive the highest profile by placing certain articles on the site or news
homepages. 270 This discretion can result in local stories that might otherwise go unnoticed receiving national attention. In some cases, the portals do so with the explicit aim of highlighting a problem or issue, one
that might otherwise be ignored. 271 The speed with which news is posted
to the sites-often concurrently with publication in the original source,
265. See Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi, Xinxi Chanye Bu [Information Office of
the State Council, Ministry of Information Technology], Guanyu Hulianwangzhan Congshi
Dengzai Xinwen Yewu Guanli Zanxing Guiding [Interim Regulations on the Publishing
and Transmitting of News on Internet Websites] art. 7 (Nov. 6, 2000) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (stating that websites established by non-news organizations may post
and disseminate news prepared by media with provincial rank or higher, but may not post
or create news on their own or prepared by other sources); see also Min Dahong, Xinwen
Meiti Wangzhan De Yingxiangli Cong He Er Lai? [Where Does the Influence of News
Media Websites Come From?], Renmin Wang [People's Daily Online], Mar. 19, 2003, at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/22100/26515/26516/1752150.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (same); Xiao Yuheng, Weishenme Buneng Shouyu Xinwen
Wangzhan Caifangquan? [Why News Websites Cannot Be Given the Right to Cover News?],
Xinlang Wang [Sina Online], Mar. 21, 2003, available at http://cul.Sina.com.cn/s/200303-21/31224.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Xiao, Why News
Websites] (noting that only small number of websites are permitted to create their own
news content, and criticizing such restrictions).
266. The web address for the Sina news homepage is http://news.sina.com.cn. The
web address for the Sohu news homepage is http://news.sohu.com.cn.
267. The two are permitted to employ reporters and to write their own stories on
science and the arts, but are not allowed to report on "news." Interview 2003-108;
Interview 2003-148; see also Guanfang Zhichu Shangye Wangzhan Bu Jubei Caifangquan
[Authorities Point Out That Commercial Websites Do Not Have the Right to Cover News],
Jisuanji Shijie Ribao [Computer World Daily], Feb. 5, 2000, available at http://
www.zaobao.com/special/newspapers/2000/pages3/computer2O500.html
(on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
268. Sina Corp., Form 10-K- Annual Report 8 (Mar. 31, 2003); Sohu.com Inc., Form
10-K Annual Report 4 (Mar. 28, 2003).
269. Interview 2003-148.
270. Id.
271. Id.; see also Xiao, Why News Websites, supra note 265 (discussing impact of
commercial portals).
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or, in the case of major breaking stories, in frequent updates throughout
the day-means that news may spread nationally before local authorities
are even aware of the article being published. The portals are subject to
propaganda department oversight; in the case of Sohu, for example, representatives from the portal have regular meetings with Beijing Propaganda Department officials.2 72 Propaganda officials from time to time
also order the portals to remove stories from their websites. 273 In general, however, the portals are able to rely on the fact that the news they
are reporting has appeared in official publications elsewhere as a shield.
China's media-control system has traditionally relied on the ability to
silence reports on disfavored topics. In particular, in cases in which the
media overstep the boundaries, propaganda authorities have issued instructions warning other newspapers not to reprint such stories, or not to
report on certain topics. Such a system faces increased challenges,
though, especially where news reports are often posted to numerous websites within hours of their first being published. 27 4 For example, in June
2003 internet portals reprinted media reports regarding the theft of university entrance examinations in Sichuan's Nanbu County. 2 7 5 In order to
prevent persons outside the county from learning of the questions in advance, officials cut all fixed telephone lines to the county and announced
that they would monitor all cellular phone calls. Internet portals that
posted the story were told to remove the article from their sites, but this
did not occur before news had spread to numerous other sites as well.
Similarly, in December 2003 andJanuary 2004, Sina, Sohu, and other websites gave extensive coverage to the public outcry that followed news from
272. Interview 2003-148.
273. Id.
274. There are similarities between the CPD's approach to regulating internet
content and its regulation of traditional media. Propaganda authorities set guidelines for
permissible content but rely on individual publications or providers to enforce such
guidelines. Internet portals such as Sohu and Sina monitor postings in online chatrooms,
for example, and remove postings deemed to overstep the bounds of permissible content;
they risk sanction if they fail to do so. Authorities have targeted a number of individual
"cyber dissidents" for punishment, thus sending a message that those who overstep
boundaries will be punished. See Mark Magnier, Chinese Authorities Battle Hard to
Tighten the Web, L.A. Times, Jan. 13, 2004, at Al (describing one-year imprisonment of
student and internet essayist Liu Di, known online as "Stainless Steel Mouse"); Robert
Marquand, The "Mouse" That Caused an Uproar in China, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 6,
2003, at 1 (reporting arrest of Liu Di as part of larger effort to control online media).
275. Gao Kaoshijuan Bei Dao Quan Xian Tongxun Xianzhi Sichuan Nanbu Xian
Jingfang Zhuajin Poan [Limited Communication Throughout County As a Result of Stolen
University Entrance Examination Papers, Sichuan Nanbu Police Firmly Grasp Breaking the
Case], Qingdao Xinwen Wang [Qingdao News Web], June 12, 2003, at http://
(on file with the
www.qingdaonews.com/content/2003-06/12/content_1536988.htm
Columbia Law Review); Sichuan Nanbu Xian Gao Kaoshijuan Bei Dao Gonganbu Jiaoyubu
Lianhe Poan [University Entrance Examination Papers in Nanbu County, Sichuan, Are
Stolen, Public Security and Education Bureaus Unite to Break Case], Zhongguo Qingnian
Bao [China Youth Daily], June 13, 2003, available at http://www.china-school.net/news/
200361283523.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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Harbin that a woman driving a BMW had run over and killed a farmer,
yet did not receive any jail time. 2 7 6 The killing in the BMW case followed
an argument regarding a minor traffic accident. Internet reports on the
case led to tens of thousands of postings to web chatrooms, many expressing outrage that the woman had not received a jail sentence and suggesting that she had received special treatment because of connections to
local authorities. 277 As pressure on Party leaders to intervene in the case
mounted, the CPD instructed the sites to remove coverage of the story
and shut down all internet chatroom discussion of the case. 278 Nevertheless, reports on the case were widely available online even after the CPD
2 79
ordered discussion curtailed.
The use of the internet to highlight popular grievances is the outgrowth of a policy of encouraging critical reporting. The loosening of
control, in particular with regard to reporting on official malfeasance,
reflects an apparent Party-state decision to encourage a variety of actors
to support state goals of addressing social problems by bringing popular
grievances into official channels. The development of China's media
thus parallels the development of the legal system more generally in important respects, in particular in the granting of incentives to those who
challenge local authorities.
In the legal system, government authorization of contingency fees
and class actions has encouraged lawyers to bring a broadening array of
lawsuits, often on behalf of the victims of wrongdoing by officials or by
enterprises with strong Party-state ties. 280 Likewise, the 1989 passage of
the Administrative Litigation Law has encouraged individuals to use liti276. WangJipeng, Wangluo Meiti: Yingxiangli Shidai De Lailin [Internet Media: The
Coming of Its Age of Influence] (Jan. 11, 2004), at http://www.blogchina.com/new/
display/20935.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Wang, Internet
Media] (discussing coverage of case and chatroom postings).
277. Xinhua, "Baoma" Zhuangren An Wangshang Dianjilfi Weiju Diyi, Chaoguo
Feidian [Hit Rate on the Web for the "BMW' Case Ranks First, Exceeds SARS] (Jan. 8,
2004), at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-01/08/content_1266893.htm
(on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing large volume of postings regarding case).
278. Liang Jianzeng, Qianheng Fengsha Jingwai Zhongwen Wangzhan, Zhongguo
Dangju Meiri Shantie Shang Baiwan [Tyrannically Blocking Overseas Chinese-Language
Websites, the Chinese Government Every Day Removes More Than a Million Postings],
Renminbao [Renmin News], Mar. 12, 2004, at http://www.renminbao.com/rmb/articles/
2004/3/12/30286.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing, on dissident
website, removal of website postings); Robert Marquand, China Mutes Online News,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 10, 2004, at 7 (stating that authorities banned reporting on
case and ordered removal of web postings on case); Jim Yardley, Chinese Go Online in
Search of Justice Against Elite Class, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 2004, at Al (same).
279. Yardley, supra note 278.
280. I discuss this phenomenon in greater detail elsewhere. See Note, Class Action
Litigation in China, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1523, 1536-39 (1998) (arguing that rise of class
action suits in China has expanded kinds of suits brought despite procedural obstacles).
For further discussion, see also KevinJ. O'Brien & Lianjiang Li, Campaign Nostalgia in the
Chinese Countryside, 39 Asian Survey 375, 381-82 (1999) (discussing role of popular
complaints in fighting corruption).
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gation to challenge government action, and in so doing has pursued
Party-state goals of curbing administrative wrongdoing. Although those
pursuing administrative litigation continue to face numerous obstacles,
tens of thousands of such cases are brought every year.
Similarly, the Party-state is encouraging the media to bring popular
grievances to light. Airing such grievances-whether in court, in the media, or both-serves the twin goals of allowing the substantive concerns
raised to be addressed and of ensuring that the disputes are raised, and
resolved, via formal channels, and thus not on the streets. As with lawyers, some journalists air grievances in order to pursue profit. Others
may act for different reasons, including the interests of their employers
or supervising Party-state departments, and their own consciences and desire to redress wrongdoing.
China's journalists appear to be particularly adept at taking advantage of the space created by the central Party-state's attempts to rein in
wayward officials. Indeed, part of the art of being an investigative journalist in China, as with being an effective cause lawyer, is to be skilled at
reading both market demand and the frequently shifting boundaries between encouraged and discouraged conduct. Journalists comment that
once a particular topic, such as fighting local corruption, becomes a focus
2 81
of the Party, reporters have extensive discretion to cover such issues.
Journalists also collaborate to evade content restrictions. Journalists forbidden from writing on a particular topic by local propaganda authorities, for example, may send articles to friends at newspapers in other
provinces. 28 2 Likewise journalists at national media organizations say that
281. See, e.g., Interview 2002-3. One interviewee commented that when the media
face restrictions, they are very tightly restricted. When the media are free to report on a
particular topic, however, the absence of professional or ethical norms means that, in
many cases, they are as uninhibited as the media anywhere in the world, and thus their
reports tend to run to extremes. Interview 2002-1.
Government officials have repeatedly praised the role of the media in aiding the
government's fight against corruption. See, e.g., Li, Fight Corruption, supra note 112
(collecting cases in which media played important role by exposing criminal activities by
government officials); see also Zenyang Kandai Yulun Jiandu [How to View Popular
Opinion Supervision], Nanfang Zhoumo [Southern Weekend], Apr. 16, 1999 (on file with
the ColumbiaLaw Review) (quoting Ministry of Justice official as stating that media are most
effective tool in fighting corruption); Xu Yunping et al., Jiaqiang Yulun Jiandu, Tuijin
Gongzheng Zhifa [Strengthen Popular Opinion Supervision, Push Forward Just
Implementation of Law], Fazhi Ribao Wangluo Ban [Legal Daily Online], Sept. 30, 2000,
at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2000-09/30/content_6134.htm (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on Sichuan provincial Party deputy secretary praising
role of media in law implementation); Zhou Yiming, Guizhou: Jianchazhang Zhongshi
Yulun Jiandu Chuan Jiahua [Guizhou Procuratorate Chief Passes Along an Anecdote
Emphasizing Media Supervision], Zhengyi Wang [Justice Web],June 10, 2001 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on officials in Guizhou procuratorate being
instructed to resolve cases that have been covered in media).
282. Interview 2003-39; Interview 2003-109. Competitive pressures may also lead rival
papers to complain to the propaganda authorities that their rivals have exceeded the
boundaries of permissible content. Interview 2003-39; see also Shi Tao, Bangmang,
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they sometimes receive information about cases from local journalists
who have been unable to run their reports in local media.283 In addition,
media reports that are blocked from print media are from time to time
posted on the internet.28 4 In other cases, newspapers circumvent
prohibitions on critical reports regarding municipal governments by
printing general complaints in the form of letters from readers that discuss a problem without explicitly blaming the local government. 28 5 Additionally, journalists at national papers who have articles blocked may seek
to publish their articles elsewhere, in papers or magazines with lower
28 6
profiles.
Parallels to China's experience of legal reform suggest that the development of the media-like the development of the legal system-cannot
be understood solely in terms of independence from the state, or editorial or professional freedom. In both areas, bubbles of discontent-be
they in critical online news reports and postings, or in administrative suits
or class actions against local governments-are permitted. But they are
tolerated in part because rooting out local problems-and insulating the
center from similar criticism-furthers Party-state goals of economic development, social stability, and control. Journalists and lawyers are adroit
at maneuvering and pursuing their own interests within this system, and
in identifying ways in which their own interests may be packaged as being
consistent with those of the state.
II. MEDIA

AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The media's role as a Party-state institution and their ability to appeal directly to the public give the media particular ability to influence
China's weak courts. This Part examines the four mechanisms by which
the media affect the courts and other Party-state actors. Focusing on four
high-profile cases and the phenomenon of "media adjudication," subpart
A examines the impact of public reports. Subpart B describes the influence of internal reports. Subpart C describes the media's role in formally
referring complaints from readers or viewers to other state actors. Subpart D explores journalists' use of informal channels to affect disputes,
often through telephone calls, letters, or meetings carrying the implicit
threat of media scrutiny if a matter is not resolved to journalists' satisfaction. These four categories are not mutually exclusive; journalists use a
Bangxian Yu Bangxiong [Helpers, Hacks, and Accomplices], Minzhu Luntan [Democratic
Forum], May 23, 2001, at http://www.asiademo.org/gb/2001/05/20010523b.htm (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing practice of reporting competitors' transgressions
to propaganda departments).
283. Interview 2003-87.
284. Interview 2003-46; see also John Pomfret, China Confronts Child's Death, Asian
Wall St. J., July 4, 2003, at A8 (discussing article posted to web after Chengdu Propaganda
Department officials banned publication).
285. Interview 2003-75.
286. Interview 2003-81.
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combination of mechanisms to apply pressure and solve problems (and
in some cases may employ all four mechanisms), and distinctions between formal and informal mechanisms are at times unclear. Influence is
not one-sided, however, and thus subpart E discusses the mechanisms by
which courts control and manage media coverage.
Distinctions between "legal" institutions and other government and
Party actors are ambiguous in China, where the courts have limited power
over other institutions and are subject to significant Party-state oversight.
Although this Part focuses on the courts, it also discusses the impact of
media coverage on other official actors. The discussion also demonstrates that the media should be understood as one such institution. The
media are one of many official institutions with the competence both to
resolve disputes and to pressure other actors. Yet the combination of the
media's traditional roles and of recent commercialization give the media
particular influence and power.
China's courts have undergone significant reforms in recent years,
with particular attention to boosting the legal training of judges, reducing corruption, and formalizing legal procedures. The reforms reflect
central government commitments to improving the quality of courts and
to raising the profile of the formal legal system. The reforms have coincided with a sharp increase in the number of cases in China's courts:
China's courts heard 5.93 million cases in 2001, more than double the
number heard a decade earlier. 28 7 The growth in litigation reflects both
increased legal awareness and central government efforts to steer disputes into the formal legal system. The growth also appears to stem in
part from the greater volume of law on the books. 288 The rapid growth
of litigation has coincided with decreased reliance on other forms of dispute resolution, most notably mediation. This increased volume of litigation and.greater relevance of law have made courts more significant institutional players.
Still, China's judiciary continues to suffer from numerous weaknesses
and limitations. Although new judges are required to pass the national
bar exam, many olderjudges still lack legal training. 28 9 Emphasis on pro287. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [Work Report of the Supreme
People's Court] (Mar. 11, 2002); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [Work Report
of the Supreme People's Court] (Mar. 28, 1992).
288. See Zhongshi Guoji [CCTV International Channel], Jiujie Renda Lifa Tedian
[The Characteristics of the Legislation of the Ninth Session of the National People's
Congress] (Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://www.lianghui.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/
283105.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing recent emphasis on
lawmaking); The Development of Contemporary Chinese Legislation (Sept. 28, 2003), at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/kuaixun/76336.htm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (describing rapid increase in volume of legislation during reform period).
289. See FengJianhua, Ball Now in Trained Judges' Court, Beijing Rev., Jan. 8, 2004,
at 20, 20-21, available at http://www.bjreview.com.cn/200402/Nation-200402(A).htm (on
file with the Columbia Law Review); Feng Jianhua, Why Judges Are Getting a Bad Rap,
Beijing Rev., Jan. 8, 2004, at 22, 22-23, available at http://www.bjreview.com.cn/200402/
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cedural law remains weak. 290 Local governments and Party committees
also control court finances and appointments, 29 1 so courts are often reluctant to rule against either local authorities or those with connections
to such authorities. 29 2 Courts' formal powers are also limited: They lack
power to invalidate legislation and administrative rules and regulations,
and their powers to interpret laws and regulations are extremely circumscribed.2 93 Often courts find themselves in conflict with other administrative actors. Even in areas where they have formal authority, courts still
lack the power to enforce decisions, particularly when such decisions are
*contrary to the interests of locally powerful individuals, entities, or other
294
government administrative departments.
Local Communist Party political-legal committees also have the authority to intervene in individual cases, as do Party officials. Higher-level
officials exert pressure on individual judges and courts by both informal
and formal routes. 295 Officials may make it known, often via phone calls
or informal notes, that they are aware of, and have a particular interest in,
a case. 29 6 Sometimes, however, pressure comes from written instructions,
or pishi, regarding the handling of cases. 29 7 In such cases, courts have
Nation-200402(B).htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (interview with Zheng
Chengliang, senior judge and President of National Judges College); Xu Lai, Wei Tongguo
Guojia Sifa Kaoshi Huo Bu Jubei Dazhuan Wenhua Chengduzhe Buneng Dang Faguan
[Those Who Do Not Pass the National Bar Exam or Who Do Not Have the Equivalent
Cultural Level of a Junior College Degree Are Not Permitted to Be Judges], Fazhi Ribao
[Legal Daily], July 18, 2001, at 1, available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/
2001-07/19/content_21125.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
290. See Zhang Jieqin & Xiang Yang, Qiantan Chaoqi Jiya De Yuanyin He Duice
[Thoughts on the Reason and Solution to Illegal Prolonged Detention] (Nov. 25, 2003), at
http://www.law.cn/news/xrcq/yczpzx/20031127115041.htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
291. See Lubman, supra note 24, at 256 (discussing appointment ofjudges).
292. See, e.g., Note, supra note 280, at 1525 (discussing local authorities' control of
court finances).
293. See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and into the Fire: WellIntentioned but Misguided Recommendations to Eliminate All Forms of Administrative
Detention in China, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 991, 1069 (2004) (discussing lack ofjudicial review
to resolve legislative inconsistency).
294. See generally Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System:
The Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 Colum.J. Asian L. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Clarke,
Power and Politics] (discussing obstacles to enforcement of civil judgments and suggesting
ways in which problems can be overcome).

295. The fact that officials intervene does not necessarily mean that these cases are
politically sensitive or touch on core Party ideological concerns. Interference is often on
behalf of individuals or Party-linked enterprises, and is often aimed at protecting economic
interests. As one journalist commented, influence is as often about personal relationships
as it is about politics. Interview 2003-73.
296. Media reports are not the only mechanism for bringing cases to the attention of
Party-state officials. Officials also issue instructions based on information received from
other sources, including personal contacts and complaints from other government
departments. Interview 2003-45.
297. See He Weifang, Xinwen Yu Sifa Erti [Two Questions on News and the Judicial
System], Zhongguo Gaige Bao [China Reform News], Feb. 20, 1998, available at http://
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little choice but to resolve the matter quickly in accordance with the instructions. 298 As He Weifang wryly stated, such a practice suggests that
the Chinese legal system is best described as "rule by instruction," rather
than "rule by law."2 9 9 Judges complain that instructions are often
opaque, stating only that the case should be "resolved" or "emphasized."
Judges are left to guess at the meaning of the instruction-and thus the
appropriate resolution of the case-while assuming responsibility if this
guess is later deemed incorrect.30 0 Where public reports result in instructions, media opinions that led to the instruction are likely to be clear. In
the case of internal reports, however, judges comment that they may not
be given a copy of the report and that they may need to seek out the
author to obtain a better understanding of her concerns. In certain
cases,judges feel compelled to show the court's opinion to the journalist
prior to formally issuing the decision, to ensure that the reporter (and
thus the official who has issued the instruction) is satisfied with the deci30
sion before it is issued. '
These problems notwithstanding, some judges report positive developments. Judges say that courts are gradually removing judges who lack
legal training, and that the frequency with which higher courts or Party
officials intervene in pending cases, or with which lower courts seek the
30 2
opinions of superior courts before issuing decisions, is decreasing.
The greater relevance of law has also reduced the frequency with which
Party-state leaders issue instructions that explicitly order courts to reach
www.jc.gov.cn/personal/ysxs/fnsx3/fnsx2O38.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter He, Two Questions] (discussing influence of written instructions from Party
officials on judges); Interview 2003-49 (stating that reporters need articles to result in
written instruction regarding article's subject matter from a Party-state leader in order to
be effective). Commentators note that media reports often result in the local Party
committee or a higher-ranking court taking notice of the case; courts then are required to
report directly to the Party committee or to the higher court regarding handling of the
case. Interview 2003-19; Interview 2003-78.
298. He, Two Questions, supra note 297; see also Interview 2003-3 (stating that media
apply pressure by appealing to power, not by appealing to law); Interview 2003-45 (stating
that media simply substitute their views of right and wrong for those of courts).
299. He Weifang, He Weifang: Cong Sun Zhigang Shijian Kan Zhongguo Fazhi
Fazhan [He Weifang: Viewing the Development of Rule of Law in China from the Sun
Zhigang Incident], Renmin Wang [People's Daily Online], June 10, 2003, at http://
www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/46/20030610/1013342.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter He, Viewing the Development].
300. Interview 2003-45; Interview 2003-78.
301. Interview 2003-45. The media often report on Party leaders issuing instructions
in particular matters, see infra Part II.A.4 (discussing the Sun Zhigang case), generally as
examples of successful resolution of cases. The media also occasionally carry reports
critical of local officials who issue instructions for illegitimate reasons, suggesting that
media scrutiny may help to reduce the illegitimate use of instructions. Although media
scrutiny of the role of instructions may lead to calls for reduced use of instructions, the
media may also have an interest in preserving the system and thus their own influence.
302. Interview 2003-32; Interview 2003-63; Interview 2003-156; see also Interview 20037; Interview 2003-20.
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certain outcomes in individual cases; increasingly, such instructions order
courts to "handle the case according to law." 30 3 At the same time, the
increased relevance of law has facilitated media oversight. The growth of
law has provided standards for journalists to point to in criticizing illegal
behavior and has transformed legal issues into topics of mainstream public discussion.3 0 4 The existence of more written law is making it easier for
journalists to highlight wrongdoing, in particular when law and popular
30 5
morality align with each other.
A. Public Coverage of Cases
Legal news sells in China, and the growth in litigation has coincided
with expanded coverage of court cases. Although much critical reporting
on the courts seeks to highlight problems that plague the courts, sensational and heavily moralistic coverage has led to charges that the media
have become adjudicators, forcing courts to follow the media's demands.
Yet media coverage of individual cases is also an important route for highlighting broader social problems, and in some cases serves as a mechanism for pressing for changes to the legal system.
This section examines four cases that highlight the impact of media
coverage on court decisionmaking. The limited availability of information regarding how courts handled each of these cases impedes drawing
firm conclusions regarding the impact of the media. Nevertheless, public
news reports, internet commentaries, and interviews suggest that, in each
case, public media coverage resulted in pressure on Party-state leaders or
institutions to intervene. The cases described below may not be representative of cases in China's courts; most cases in China are not covered in
the media. The cases I discuss have been selected because they emphasize the roles the media may play when they choose to intervene, and also
the tension that has emerged between the media and the courts. 30 6
1. Executed by the Media? The ZhangJinzhuPhenomenon. - Du Shugui,
the deputy police chief discussed at the beginning of this article, was not
the first public security official to find that media coverage of an alleged
misdeed led quickly to the death penalty. On August 24, 1997, Zhang
Jinzhu, a local public security official in Zhengzhou, the capital of Henan
Province, was driving when he hit a man and boy on a bicycle. Zhang,
who had been drinking, did not stop after he ran them down. Instead, he
continued driving for another 1500 meters, dragging the man and his
bicycle under his car.
A local paper, the Dahe News, carried an initial report on the accident
the next day, noting that the car involved was a luxury Crown Toyota
303. Interview 2003-164; see also Interview 2003-118.
304. Interview 2003-118.
305. Id.
306. I do not discuss the potential of foreign media to influence cases in China's
courts. Foreign media involvement is most likely to have an effect in cases that are off
limits to the Chinese media, particularly in politically sensitive cases.
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vehicle. 30 7 The reference to the vehicle suggested that the driver might
have been a government official, but the article provided few other details. Reporters at the paper became aware of Zhang's identity a day after
the incident but refrained from publishing his name, apparently under
pressure from the local police.30 8 The Dahe News continued to report on
the case, noting both the facts of the case and the public outrage that the
initial reports generated, reflected by the thousands of telephone calls
the paper received. Two days after the accident, having read about the
case in the Dahe News, the Henan Province Party Secretary telephoned
and issued written instructions to Party officials in Zhengzhou demanding the case be solved. 30 9 Local officials then arrested Zhang, 3 10 and the
3
Dahe News proceeded to publish his name. "1
Despite the arrest, little happened until October 13, when Focus carried a report on the case. 3 12 The report vilified Zhang and heaped scorn
313
on his claim that he had not been aware that he hit the two victims.
Other media joined in, and Zhang became a symbol of officials across
China who take advantage of their positions. Under media pressure, the
local procuratorate soon brought formal charges against him.3 14 In a
trial held in December 1997, the court convicted Zhang of causing a traffic disorder and intentionally causing harm, sentencing him to death. 31 5
In its decision, the court stated that Zhang's actions were "especially
307. See Chen Zhong, Diyi Zhong Weixian-Zhang Jinzhu Exing Jiaotong Zhaoshi
An Zhenxiang Diaocha [The First Kind of Danger-A Truthful Investigation into the
Terrible Zhang Jinzhu Traffic Accident] ch. 1, at http://www.shuku.net:8080/novels/
baogaowenxue/dyzwx/dyzwx01.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2004) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Chen, First Kind of Danger] (chapter entitled Zhengzhou Xue
An [The Murder Case in Zhengzhou]).
308. Id. ch. 6, at http://www.shuku.net:8080/novels/baogaowenxue/dyzwx/
dyzwx06.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (chapter
entitled Xuanhua Yu Saodong [Hubbub and Ferment]).
309. See Hu Zhenjie, Guanyu "Zhang Jinzhu Jiaotong Shigu Taomian An" De Leng
Sikao [Cold Thoughts Regarding the "ZhangJinzhu Traffic Accident Flight Case"], 1998
Zhongguo Liashi [Chinese Lawyer] No. 5, at 51.
310. Chen, First Kind of Danger, supra note 307, ch. 6. On the role of the Party
secretary, see Tang Qing, Cong ZhangJinzhu Beipan Sixing Tan Yulun Jiandu [Discussing
Popular Opinion Supervision Based on ZhangJinzhu Being Sentenced to Death], Xueshu
Luntan [Academic Forum] 89 (Supp. 1999) [hereinafter Tang, Discussing Popular
Opinion Supervision]; see also Hu, supra note 309 (describing the case).
311. Chen, First Kind of Danger, supra note 307, ch. 6.
312. See Liang Jianzeng, "Jiaodian Fangtan" Hongpishu (18) [The Red Book of
"Focus" (18)], Jiangnan Dushi Bao [Jiangnan Metropolitan Daily], available at http://
jxnews.cc/n496/ca300981.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Liang, The Red Book of "Focus"] (stating that coverage by Focus was
turning point in case).
313. This point was crucial because Zhang's failure to stop after hitting the pair was
the basis for the charge of intentionally causing harm, which carries a maximum sentence
of death.
314. Chen, First Kind of Danger, supra note 307, ch. 6.
315. See Yi Jie, Shale Yige Zhang Jinzhu [One Zhang Jinzhu Has Been Killed],
Zhongguo Qingnian Bao [China Youth Daily], May 12, 1998, available at http://
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cruel" and had a negative effect on society. The court concluded that if
Zhang were not executed, "it would not be enough to assuage popular
316
rage."
Zhang made further headlines when, upon being sentenced to
death, he blamed his sentence on the media, in particular CCTV. 317 He

was executed
Some in the
media's role:
months after

318
in February 1998, six months after the original incident.
media appeared to agree with Zhang's assessment of the
An account of the actions of the Dahe News that ran a few
Zhang's execution was titled 'Journalist Sends ZhangJinzhu

to the Guillotine."

3 19

Although the Dahe News had apparently taken significant risks in exposing wrongdoing by a local official, its role in the case also greatly enhanced its position in the Zhengzhou newspaper market. 320 Indeed, the
www.cyol.net/cyd/zqb/jpwk/qsp/9235%5EQ223.htm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
316. Jiang Xiao, "Fankui" Zhong De Fazhi Guannian [Legal Concepts in "Feedback"],
2000 Xinwen Zhanxian [News Frontline] No. 7, available at http://www.people.com.cn/
GB/paper79/1367/214571.html (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) [hereinafterJiang,
Legal Concepts]. Use of the phrase "it would not be enough to assuage popular rage" in
capital cases was common in China prior to the 1997 revision of the Criminal Law. The
1979 Criminal Law stated that the death penalty could be imposed only for people who
"committed the most heinous crimes." Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa [Criminal
Law of the People's Republic of China] art. 43 (1979). Many courts apparently looked to
factors such as "popular rage" to determine whether conduct qualified as heinous. The
1997 Criminal Law-which became effective after Zhang hit the man and child-states
that the death penalty should be used only where crimes are "extremely serious."
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa [Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China]
art. 48 (1997). The removal of reference to whether a crime is "heinous" was apparently
designed to remove consideration of popular opinion from determinations of whether the
death penalty is applicable. The phrase continues to be common in media descriptions of
criminal cases, however, and courts continue to use the phrase "guilty of the most heinous
crimes" in sentencing defendants to death. See, e.g., Niu Wen & Wan Jinlong, Zuida Eji:
Liu Da Duxiao Jinri Jiangbei Qiangjue [Guilty of the Most Heinous Crimes: Six Fierce
Drug Traffickers Are to Be Executed Today], Sichuan Zaixian [Sichuan Online], June 26,
2003 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (using phrase "guilty of the most heinous
crimes" in report of decision by Sichuan High People's Court).
317. Chi Yuzhou, Zhengzhou Jingmeng [Awaken from the Zhengzhou Dream],
available at http://dahecun.nease.net/wdjx/jxyh/zzjm.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2004) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Liang, The Red Book of "Focus," supra note
312 ("'These reporters want to push me until I am dead!'" (quoting ZhangJinzhu)).
318. Jiang Hua, Jizhe Ba Zhang Jinzhu Songshang Duantou Tai [Journalist Sends
ZhangJinzhu to the Guillotine] (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
319. Id.; see also Hu, supra note 309 (implying that Zhang would not have been
sentenced to death without media involvement); Zhang, Phenomenon, supra note 3
(describing Zhang's execution as "a bullet for justice").
320. Feng Xiaohong & Wan Shitong, "Dahe" Dongliu: Ji Zouxiang Shichang De Dahe
Bao ["The Great River" Soars: The Market Oriented "Great River Daily"], 1998 Xinwen
Zhanxian [News Frontline] No. 9, available at http://202.99.23.245/newsline/199809/
980901011007.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that Dahe News became
famous as result of case, and that its conduct was praised by provincial authorities);
Zhengzhou Baoye Longhu Dou [The Fierce Competition in the Newspaper Industry in
Zhengzhou], ZhongguoJingying Bao [China Management Daily], Oct. 5, 2002, available at
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fact that it was trying to improve its market share in Zhengzhou, where
the Zhengzhou Evening News dominated the local news market, likely
played a role in Dahe News's coverage of the case. The paper also handled the case carefully, initially reporting only the accident and then waiting until Party officials had ordered Zhang's arrest before publishing his
name.
Reports of similar cases suggest that the Zhang Jinzhu "phenomenon" was not an isolated incident. In Hunan Province, for example, the
trial ofJiang Yanping, an official at a state-owned construction enterprise,
for economic crimes attracted more than one hundred reporters and was
broadcast live by Changsha Television.3 2 1 Prior to and during the trial,
the news media referred to the defendant as a "criminal," and at least one
paper ran a headline stating that "execution will be too light a punishment."322 Jiang's lawyer issued a statement condemning media coverage,
arguing that such reports had infringed on her human rights and constihttp://sory.myrice.com/baoshejingying/w/3.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(noting that the paper became more famous and dominated market after case).
321. Changsha Zhongyuan Shouci Xianshi Tingshen Xinwen Paishe Yifang Meiti
Chaozuo [Changsha Intermediate People's Court Limits the Time for News Filming in
Court in Order to Prevent the Media from Stirring Up News], Hong Wang [Rednet
Online] (May 24, 2002), at http://news.rednet.com.cn/Articles/2002/05/341568.htm
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); Wang Hui, Guanyu Yulun Jiandu Keguan Bu
Keguan Zenme Kan? [How Should We Look at Objectivity and Subjectivity of Popular
Opinion Supervision?], Fazhi Ribao Wangluo Ban [Legal Daily Online], Apr. 23, 2001, at
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2001-04/23/content_
6774.htm (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Wang, Objectivity and Subjectivity].
322. Wang, Objectivity and Subjectivity, supra note 321. Another paper wrote in a
headline that "we certainly must see the corrupt female official come to her end." Sun,
Thoughts, supra note 7; see also Wei, Journalism and Communication Law, supra note 44,
at 116 (noting that media coverage of case had stated that there was public rage atfiang's
crimes); Wu Xianghan, Xinhua, Meiti "Hongzha" Jiang Yanping Yinfa Faljie Reshi Youli
[Media "Bombing" of Jiang Yanping Results in Concern Amongst Persons in the Legal
World], Zhongguo Qiannian Bao [China Youth Daily] (Apr. 5, 2001), at http://
www.hn.xinhua.org/news/2001-4-5/0145174000.htm
(on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Wu, Media Bombing] (detailing media's implied presumption of guilt
in their coverage). Commentators stated that the media grossly inflated the sum involved
in the case, claiming thatJiang had embezzled ten million yuan, when in fact she was only
accused of stealing 700,000 yuan. See Sun, Thoughts, supra note 7; Wu, Media Bombing,
supra. In addition, although the procuratorate did not charge Jiang with offering bribes,
newspapers reported that she had "given" both money and sex. Wu, supra; see also Kang
Duhua, Xinhua, "Xiwen Fa" Queshi Dailai De Ganga [Awkwardness Brought on by the
"News Law"]
(Apr. 5, 2001),
at http://www.hn.xinhua.org/news/2001-4-5/
0145184000.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (contending thatJiang was tried by
media, arguing that media influenced outcome of case, and stating that legal restrictions
on the press are needed). For an example of coverage during the trial that stated that
Jiang had committed a "terrible crime," had traded sex for power, and was "corrupt
beyond measure," see Ou Dongyong, Renzheng Wuzheng Juzai, Roudan Jiang Yanping
Zhongyu Renzui [Both Physical and Personal Evidence Exists, Vixen Jiang Yanping in the
End Admits Her Crime], Nanfang Dushi Bao [Southern Metropolitan Daily], Mar. 24,
2001, available at http://news.sohu.com/24/70/news144407024.shtml (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
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tuted illegal interference with the judicial process. The lawyer noted that
China's revised Criminal Procedure Law, which came into effect in 1997,
bars anyone from assigning guilt prior to a determination of guilt by the
323
court, thus suggesting that media coverage of the case violated the law.
Jiang subsequently received a death sentence. 324 Likewise, in the case of
Zhang Jun, who was accused of robbery and multiple counts of murder, 325 newspaper reports prior to trial declared that the defendant
pieces," and wondered why a three-day
should be "sliced into a thousand
326
trial was even necessary.
2. Black Whistles: Media Impact on Decisions to Prosecute. - In early
2002, media reports stated that an anonymous soccer referee had mailed
40,000 yuan and a confession to a professional soccer club. The revelation came after nearly a year of speculation in the media regarding "black
whistles"-referees who accept money to affect the outcome of matches.
The charges were further amplified when a Shanghai television program
323. Wu, Media Bombing, supra note 322. The declaration was largely ignored by the
media. Id.; see also Cai Dingjian, Meiti Shenpan Yinggai Jiangwen-Cong Jiang Yanping
An Tanqi [Media Adjudication Should Lower Its Temperature-A Discussion Based on the
Jiang Yanping Case], Fazhi Ribao [Legal Daily], Apr. 15, 2001, available at http://
www.jc.gov.cn/personal/ysxs/fnsx3/fnsx2763.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Cai, Media Adjudication] (criticizing media coverage of case, and arguing
that media was mostly interested because case involved sex and violence); Huang, New
Model, supra note 44 (stating that much of what media reported in case was later shown to
have been unfair).
324. Zang Wenli, Hunan Zuida NQ Tanguan Jiang Yanping An Ershen Weichi Sixing
Yuanpan [Appeals Court Upholds Original Sentence of Death in Hunan's Biggest Case of
a Corrupt Female Official], Renmin Wang [People's Daily Online], Mar. 30, 2002, at
833
1.html (on file with the
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/19/20020330/69
Columbia Law Review).
325. Li Zejun Deng 4 Beigao Shangsu Changde Daan JiangJinru Ershen [The Appeal
of Li Zejun and Four Other Defendants in the Big Changde Case Will Enter the Second
Instance Court], Hunan Baye Wang [Hunan Newspaper Web] (Apr. 26, 2001), available at
http://www.hnby.com.cn/20010426/document/77948.htm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); Xinhua, ZhangJun An Yishen Xuanpan, 14 Ming Zuifan Bei Pan Sixing [Verdict
Is Announced in the Zhang Jun Case in the First Instance Court, 14 Criminals Are
Sentenced to Death] (Apr. 23, 2001), available at http://www.hnby.com.cn/20010423/
document/75819.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
326. Wei, Journalism and Communication Law, supra note 44, at 116; see also Jiache
Zhuangsiren Hou Taoyi, Fujian Jingguan Zheng Hui Zhaoshi 4 Nian Hou Zhongbei Pan
Sixing [Fleeing After Driving a Vehicle and Killing a Person, After Four Years Fujian Police
Official Zheng Hui Is Finally Sentenced to Death for the Trouble He Caused], Qingdao
Xinwen Wang [Qingdao News Web], Jan. 4, 2002, available at http://www.
7 22
qingdaonews.com/content/2002-01/04/content52 1 .htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (reporting on official in Fujian Province sentenced to death for killing two
people in drunk driving accident; official was originally sentenced to fifteen years in
prison, but case was retried twice, apparently after media coverage arguing that initial
sentence was too lenient, and defendant was sentenced to death for crime of harming
public order). See generally He, Two Questions, supra note 297 (noting that media often
report charges filed by procuratorate as facts, and that in such cases it is difficult for courts
not to be influenced).
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declared that it had a list of the names of eight alleged black whistles. 327
Referee Gong Jianping quickly became the center of media attention,
with some suggesting that he had anonymously returned 40,000 yuan that
328
he had received in bribes.
Continuing media reports expressed frustration at inaction by legal
authorities. 329 Crucial to the controversy, and apparently to initial reluctance by the police and the procuratorate to become involved, was uncertainty over whether the referee's actions were illegal under China's Criminal Law, and, if so, with which crime Gong and the other black whistles
should be charged. In particular, there was significant disagreement regarding whether referees could be tried as state workers, in which case
they would face a maximum punishment of death if they were guilty of
corruption.3 3 0 This in turn led to a general discussion of the appropriate
steps to be taken when the law is unclear, especially in light of the provision in China's recently revised criminal law stating that criminal charges
may be brought only where the law clearly defines acts as being criminal. 33 1 Commentators contended that this meant any ambiguity must be
327. Interview 2003-5; see also Cao Zhuilin, Xinhua, Yulun Jiandu Yingfang
Youzhibing [Popular Opinion Supervision Should Avoid Childish Illnesses] (Apr. 11,
2002), at http://www.hn.xinhua.org/news/2002-4-11/2002411103915.htm (on file with
the Columbia Law Review); Cong Zibai Shu Dao Gongkai Shenpan-"Heishao" Gong
Jianping An Yinian Dashi Ji [From the Confession to the Open Trial-A Record of a Year
in the Case of"Black Whistle" GongJianping], Renmin Wang [People's Daily Online],Jan.
29, 2003, at http://www.sportsonline.com.cn/GB/channel2/507/3076/20030129/
135503.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
328. See From the Confession to the Open Trial-A Record of a Year in the Case of
"Black Whistle" Gong Jianping, supra note 327.
329. See, e.g., Peng Qing, 50 Wan Maixia Zuxie Fuzhuxi, Liu Yingfu Baolu Zhongguo
Zuqiu Heidong [500,000 Bought the Deputy Chairman of the Soccer Association, Liu
Yingfu Reveals the Black Hole of Chinese Soccer], Tiyu Zhoubao [Sports Weekly], July 26,
2001, at http://sports.lycos.com.cn/arts/spgn/spgnqt/66617.html
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review); see also Interview 2003-73 (arguing that media coverage forced
procuratorate to bring charges).
330. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa [Criminal Law of the People's Republic
of China] arts. 382, 383 (1997). In contrast, under article 163 of the criminal law, the
maximum punishment for commercial corruption is fifteen years imprisonment. Id. art.
163. See generally Hu Songqing, Fali Guan Buliao Zuxie Guanyuan Shouhui? Wang Bing
Tan Heishao An Jinzhan [Can Law Not Address Soccer Association Officials Who Take
Bribes? Wang Bing Discusses the Progress of the Black Whistle Case], Sichuan Zaixian
[Sichuan Online], Apr. 3, 2002, at http://sports.scol.com.cn/glfootball/20020403/
20024394923.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting difference in punishment
that would result depending on whether the referees were classified as state workers or as
employees of a commercial enterprise); Peng, supra note 329 (describing evolution of
controversy and discussing arguments against trying Gong as a state worker); Tao Lan et
al., Zuqiu Heishao Sifa Nengfou Jieru [Can Judicial Organs Get Involved with Soccer's
Black Whistles], Renmin Wang [People's Daily Online], Jan. 15, 2002, at http://
www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/46/20020115/648384.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (reporting on arguments over how to define alleged crime).
331. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa [Criminal Law of the People's
Republic of China] art. 3.
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resolved in favor of the defendant. 33 2 The media, while covering the legal debate, also demanded action. As one Xinhua News Agency reporter
contended, "it makes no sense" to argue against involving judicial organs
on the grounds that the law is unclear; such an explanation "is not some333
thing that society can accept."
In February, after extensive media coverage of the scandal, the Supreme People's Procuratorate issued a nationwide notice to
procuratorates saying cases could and should proceed against corrupt
soccer referees. 334 The Procuratorate's notice, which was drafted in consultation with officials at the National People's Congress, 33 5 referenced
the public controversy, stating that the matter was an important and sensitive issue with potentially harmful social effects. The notice instructed
that the cases should be handled in accordance with a policy of sanctioning a small number of people in order to educate many, and explicitly
stated that the cases could be brought under article 163 of the criminal
law, which governs the acceptance of bribes by employees of companies
or commercial enterprises. 33 6 The Supreme People's Procuratorate initially did not release the notice publicly. A few weeks after issuing the
notice, however, a procuratorate official revealed its existence during the
annual meeting of China's National People's Congress, apparently in re332. Although some scholars and officials contended that all that was needed was a
reasonable interpretation by the Supreme People's Court or Supreme People's
Procuratorate of what it means to be a state employee, others contended that the lack of
clarity precluded resort to an interpretation. See Tao Lan et al., supra note 330 (quoting
Deng Zibin, Beijing University criminal law expert, as being "against using criminal law to
punish behaviors . . . not explicitly forbidden by any legal provision").
333. Id.
334. Interview 2002-3 (arguing that media pressure led to the Supreme People's
Procuratorate Interpretation); Interview 2003-73 (stating that media pressure resulted in
the interpretation). The Supreme People's Procuratorate issued the notice on February
25, 2002. Xinhua, Gaojian Fa Tongzhi YaoqiuJianchaJiguan Yifa Yansu Chuli "Hei Shao"
[Supreme People's Procuratorate Issues Notice Requiring the Serious Treatment of "Black
Whistles" in Accordance with Law], Mar. 14, 2002, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/
newscenter/2002-03/14/content_316014.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter SPP February 25 Notice]; see also Shexian Shangye Shouhui Zui, Gong
Jianping Zhengshi BeiJiancha Yuan Pibu [Suspected of Receiving Bribes in a Commercial
Context, Gong Jianping Is Formally Detained by the Procuratorate] (Apr. 17, 2002), at
http://sports.sohu.com/05/51/sportsnews164335105.shtm
(on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Gong Jianping Is Formally Detained].
335. Interview 2003-13. Given the high profile of the case, it appears likely that the
contents of the notice were also discussed with other central government and Party
departments. Interview 2003-116.
336. GongJianping Is Formally Detained, supra note 334. The notice further stated
that procuratorates at each level of government should treat the cases seriously and should
address the problem from the perspective of maintaining social stability and ruling the
country by law. Id. Critics of the notice argued that the procuratorate had caved ir to
media pressure and that the reliance on article 163 was unjustified because China's soccer
association is not a commercial enterprise. Others, however, argued that the notice was
unnecessary because the criminal law already made clear that the conduct could be
sanctioned. Interview 2003-73.
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sponse both to a specific question from deputies to the congress and to
general criticism from deputies that the Procuratorate was failing to take
3 37
enough action to fight corruption.
Subsequent to the Supreme People's Procuratorate's notice, police
in Beijing detained Gong, a senior referee, leading to media speculation
regarding the nature of the charges against him.3 3 8 Commentators noted
that the Procuratorate's decision was not binding on China's courts and
questioned whether the courts would reach a similar decision; 339 although other observers doubted that China's courts would disagree in
such a high-profile case. 3 40 Once again, academics criticized the media
for violating the criminal law's principle that courts should determine
guilt and contended that the media had forced legal authorities to become involved in the case.3 41 Yet most media were supportive of the
Procuratorate's decision, with CCTV-5, the national sports network, airing a program that largely supported the Procuratorate.3 4 2 At the same
337. Interview 2003-116; Interview 2003-133.
338. See, e.g., Heishao? Heishao! [Black Whistle? Black Whistle!], Qianlong Xinwen
Wang [Qianlong News Web], Apr. 22, 2002, available at http://www.qianlong.com/3050/
2002-4-29/42@213943.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Gong Jianping Is
Formally Detained, supra note 334. Reports claimed that police originally informed
Gong's family that he was being charged with commercial bribery, but that the local
procuratorate changed the classification of the suspected crime after doubts were raised
regarding whether an individual could be charged pursuant to article 163. Black Whistle?
Black Whistle!, supra; Zhao Liaoliao, Gong Jianping Shexian Zuiming Qiaoding, Nanyi
"Zhongfa" Yingshe Falfi Loudong [Gong Jianping's Suspected Crime Is Fixed, the
Difficulty of"Heavily Punishing" Exposes a Hole in the Law], Zhongguo Zuqiu Bao [China
Soccer News], Apr. 4, 2002, available at http://dailynews.tyfo.com/news/sports/insoccer/
block/html/2002040400259.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
Zhao, Gong Jianping's Suspected Crime Is Fixed].
339. See, e.g., Black Whistle? Black Whistle!, supra note 338; Tao Lan, Qi Wen
Zhongguo Zuqiu De "Heishao" Neng Ding Shenme Zui [Seven Questions Regarding the
Difficulty of Fixing the Crime for the "Black Whistles" of Chinese Soccer], Beijing
Qingnian Bao [Beijing Youth Daily], Apr. 9, 2002, at http://www.qianlong.com/3050/
2002-4-9/98@194172.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Zhao, Gong Jianping's
Suspected Crime Is Fixed, supra note 338.
340. See Tao, supra note 339 (noting that observers commented that if procuratorate
brought charges against referee, odds were remote that court would find that no crime
existed).
341. Id. Much of the speculation and discussion regarding how the referee would be
charged took place after his detention but prior to the procuratorate bringing formal
charges. See, e.g., id. (discussing what steps procuratorate should take); GongJianping 15
Tianhou Huizai Naer? Bei Jiancha Yuan Pibu Kenengxing Zuida [Where Will Gong
Jianping Be in 15 Days? The Chances Are Greatest That He Will Have Been Detained by
the Procuratorate], Beijing Zuqiu Bao [Beijing Soccer News], Apr. 8, 2002, available at
http://www.sportsonline.com.cn/GB/channel2/507/3076/3077/20020408/76043.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that police had detained Gong for twenty
days and speculating as to likely next steps by procuratorate); Zhao, Gong Jianping's
Suspected Crime Is Fixed, supra note 338 (speculating as to likely charges after police
detained Gong).
342. Interview 2003-133.
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time, some in the media questioned why no one had been charged with
3 43
paying bribes to Gong.
In December 2002, after months of media speculation first as to
whether the police would turn the case over to the procuratorate, and
then as to whether the procuratorate would act on the recommendation
of the police, the procuratorate in Beijing's Xuanwu District filed suit
against Gong, charging him with accepting bribes in a commercial enterprise, a violation of Criminal Law article 163.3 44 Significant secrecy surrounded the decision, however, with Gong's lawyer telling the media that
he only learned of the charges after the procuratorate leaked the news to
345
a reporter.
In January 2003, the Xuanwu District Court in Beijing held a fourhour trial and, in an oral decision issued at the conclusion of the trial,
found Gong guilty of accepting bribes in violation of articles 93, 383, 385,
34 6
and 386 of the Criminal Law, sentencing him to ten years in prison.
The court found Gong guilty of corruption by a state official-a more
serious offense than that with which he had been charged by the
procuratorate-and in so doing implicitly rejected the procuratorate's interpretation of the criminal law. The court made no mention of article
343. See, e.g., GongJianping Dingxing Lfishi WeiJueding Shangsu, Chen Peide Song
Weiping Buyu Biaotai [Gong Jianping's Crime Is Fixed, Lawyer Has Not Yet Decided
Whether to Appeal, Chen Peide and Song Weiping Are Not to Be Found], Beijing Yule
Xinbao [Beijing Star Daily], Jan. 30, 2002, available at http://www.sportsonline.com.cn/
GB/channel2/507/3076/3077/20030130/135576.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (reporting journalist's attempts to contact alleged bribing party after Gong
decision).
344. Li Ge,Wang Bing Sanjian GongJianping, Beijing Xuanwu Jiancha Yuan Jieshou
Gong An [Wang Bing Sees Gong Jianping Three Times, Beijing Xuanwu Procuratorate
Accepts Gong Case], Zhongguo Xinwen Wang [China News Web], Dec. 13, 2002, at http:/
/www.sportsonline.com.cn/GB/channel2/507/3076/3077/20021213/128455.html
(on
file with the Columbia Law Review); Xinhua, "Heishao" Gong Jianping Bei Tiqi Gongsu,
Shexian 9 Bi Shouhui Leiji 38 Wan Yuan [Charges Are Brought Against "Black Whistle"
Gong Jianping, Suspected of 9 Bribes Totaling 380,000 Yuan] (Dec. 27, 2002), at http://
news.xinhuanet.com/nsports/2002-12/26/content_671412.htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
345. Zhao Liaoliao, Gong Jianping An Xian Fali Zhenkong, Lfishi Wucong Dezhi
Anjian Jincheng [Gong Jianping Case Sinks into Legal Emptiness, Lawyer Is Unable to
Obtain Any Information on Progress], Zhongguo Zuqiu Bao [China Soccer News], Dec.
30, 2002, at http://www.sportsonline.com.cn/GB/channel2/507/3076/20021230/
130945.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The court was reported to have
established a special propaganda team to handle the case. Sifa Jiguan Quebao Wanwu
Yishi, Liutao Renma "Shihou" GongJianping [Judicial Organs to Guarantee Nothing Goes
Wrong, Establish Six Groups "Waiting For" GongJianping], Renmin Wang [People's Daily
Online], Jan. 9, 2003, at http://www.sportsonline.com.cn/GB/channel2/507/3076/
20030109/132620.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
346. Interview 2003-116; see also GongJianping's Crime Is Fixed, Lawyer Has Not Yet
Decided Whether to Appeal, Chen Peide and Song Weiping Are Not to Be Found, supra
note 343; Tian Yu, Xinhua, Xuanwu Renmin Fayuan Yishen Panchu Gong Jianping Youqi
Tuxing Shinian [Xuanwu People's Court in First Instance Trial Sentences GongJianping
to Ten Years] (Jan. 29, 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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163 in its decision, even though much of the debate at trial focused on
article 163, and articles 383, 385, and 386 were not
the applicability of
7

even discussed.

34

The court permitted only two journalists-one from CCTV and one
from Xinhua-to attend the trial, apparently in an attempt to manage
coverage of the case.3 4 8 Reports on the case from CCTV and Xinhua
were identical, and neither discussed the details of the court argument or
pointed out the discrepancy between the charges filed against Gong and
the court's decision. 34 9 Other media carried the Xinhua report verbatim;
there was virtually no media commentary on the case once the court announced its decision, strongly suggesting that propaganda authorities
had barred the media from reporting further on the case other than by
350
reprinting the Xinhua report.
Although recognizing that China's courts have the power to find a
defendant guilty of an offense not alleged by the procuratorate, including
one more serious than the charged offense, Gong's appeal focused on
the lack of discussion or debate at trial regarding the more serious offense. This, he contended, violated his right to defend himself in court:
How could he be sentenced to ten years in prison for an offense that was
347. Interview 2003-116. Courts in China are authorized to find a defendant guilty of
a crime different from that charged by the procuratorate. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan
Guanyu Zhixing Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa Ruogan Wenti De
Jieshi [Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Some Questions Concerning the
Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law of People's Republic of China] art. 176
(Sept. 8, 1998); Li Shuming, Gaojian Gaofa Sifa Jiehsi Dajia, "Heishao" Gong Jianping
Panxing Taizhong [The Judicial Interpretations from the Supreme People's Court and
Supreme People's Procuratorate Are in Conflict with Each Other, the "Black Whistle"
Gong Jianping Was Sentenced Too Heavily], Waitan Huabao [Bund Pictorial], Feb. 19,
2003, available at http://cul.Sina.com.cn/s/2003-02-19/28818.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Li, Judicial Interpretations]. The broad discretion
courts in China have to make such changes, and the absence of specified provisions
regarding procedures courts should follow when finding defendants guilty of a more
serious crime, has drawn criticism from some academic and media observers. See, e.g., Li,
Judicial Interpretations, supra (stating in commentary on Gong case that court "should go
through certain procedures" and provide both parties with time to prepare, and
comparing procedures in China to those in Japan). The court may, however, have taken
account of the controversy over Gong's status when it assigned him a relatively light
sentence; given the size of the alleged bribes, 370,000 yuan, Gong could have been
sentenced to death.
Although the Supreme People's Procuratorate consulted the Supreme People's Court
before issuing the original interpretation, the court apparently later came to the view that
it was preferable to find that Gong was a state official than to find that he had accepted
bribes in a commercial enterprise. Interview 2003-133.
348. Zhongguo Diyi "Heishao" Jin Shang Fating, Fayuan Zheng Kaiting Gongkai
Shenli [China's First "Black Whistle" Goes to Court Today, Court Will Hear the Case in
Public], Renmin Wang [People's Daily Online],Jan. 29, 2003, at http://www.sportsonline.
com.cn/GB/channel2/507/3076/20030129/135533.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
349. Interview 2003-116.
350. Id.
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not alleged by the prosecution and that was not discussed at trial?3 5 ' The
appeal was rejected without a hearing. Once again, the media carried
only very short reports stating that the Beijing Intermediate Court had
affirmed the Xuanwu court's decision.
There is general consensus-from the media and from legal observers-that media pressure played a major role in forcing the procuratorate
to act against Gong, and in Gong's eventual sentence. 35 2 Observers also
argued that media attention resulted in more severe punishment than
would have otherwise been meted.3 5 3 Yet in one crucial respect the media's demands for action went unheeded: Despite Gong's conviction, no
3 54
one was charged with paying him bribes.
For Gong, however, it appears that media influence resulted not only
from coverage of his case, but also from the lack of coverage. The media
were relatively free to report on the case while charges were pending,
including speculating on possible punishments for Gong and describing
his alleged crimes in detail. Although most of this coverage was critical of
Gong, as the trial approached some media began to question the
procuratorate's handling of the case, highlighting, for example, Gong's
lack of access to his lawyer. At trial, however, and in particular following
Gong's trial, media coverage was terminated. Hence the media were free
to "supervise" Gong and other referees, but they were not permitted to
3 55
supervise the court proceedings.
351. Id.
352. See Interview 2003-4; Interview 2003-5; Interview 2003-7; Interview 2003-14;
Interview 2003-15. The media may have succeeded in applying pressure in two distinct
ways: pressuring the procuratorate to bring charges, and then demonstrating the weakness
of the charges the procuratorate filed.
Numerous other reports suggest how the media have impacted decisions to bring
charges, or have brought criminal activity to the attention of the relevant authorities. For
example, media reports described how local newspaper articles in Wenzhou forced
prosecutors to bring charges of abuse against the son of an elderly woman, despite an
initial reluctance because some saw the case as simply a moral-not legal-dispute.
Zhang, Guarded, supra note 137. One I-angzhou newspaper claimed that it had gone a
step further, helping ten criminal suspects surrender to the authorities in the course of a
single year. In one such case, the relationship between the media and legal authorities
became further muddied when a reporter for the paper defended one of the suspects in
court. The paper claimed that as a result of such advocacy, the defendant received a
lighter sentence than he would otherwise have received. Lao Yue, Yizhang Baozhi Yinian
Duncu 10 Ming Fanzui Xianyiren Zishou, YulunJiandu Zhangxian Fazhi Weili [One Paper
Cau~es 10 Criminal Suspects to Surrender in One Year, Popular Opinion Supervision
Makes Clear the Strength of Rule of Law], Fazhi Pinglun Zhoukan [Legal System
Commentary Weekly], Nov. 28, 2001 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). A reporter for
the paper cited the case as an example of the media and law enforcement agencies
successfully working together. Id.
353. Interview 2003-59.
354. Id.
355. Gong's subsequent death in prison from cancer in July 2004 resulted in another
wave of reports on his case, many of them sympathetic to him. For a collection of articles,
see http://sports.sina.com.cn/z/gjpqs/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2004) (website devoted to
Gong Jianping); see also Wen Ye & Tang Lei, Gong Jianping Meiyou Daizou De Yiwen
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This case reflects a characteristic of many cases in China that receive
extensive media coverage. Extensive publicity, in particular when combined with widespread internet discussion, can transform a case that is
not politically sensitive into one of concern to Party officials. The widespread publicity surrounding Gong's case transformed it from one in
which the media enjoyed broad freedom to report into a case in which
Party officials barred further media discussion. The change may have resulted partially from a desire to protect the procuratorate and court from
criticism of their handling of the case, but the fact that the case received
so much attention, and generated strong feelings in the media and online, also appears to have played a role in the decision to ban additional
reporting.
3. Who Has the Right to "Beat a Rat"? - Not all claims of media influence come in criminal cases; numerous civil and administrative cases likewise have attracted widespread media attention. In 1995, the Sichuan
Province Technical Supervision Bureau found that the Jiajiang County
Color Printing Factory was producing counterfeit trademarks; among the
alleged forgeries were copies of copyrighted packaging for mosquito-killing tablets produced by another Sichuan company, Caihong Electrics
Group. 35 6 The Technical Supervision Bureau fined the factory, seized its
equipment and products, and closed the factory. 3 5 7 Although there was
little dispute that the factory had been producing counterfeit products,
the factory brought suit against the bureau pursuant to China's Administrative Litigation Law claiming that the bureau lacked jurisdiction to
impose administrative penalties for the production of fake trademarks. 358 Although most academic observers argued that the law was
clear and the supervision bureau lacked jurisdiction,3 59 others noted
[Doubts That Gong Jianping Did Not Take with Him], Xinwen Zhoukan [China
Newsweek], July 22, 2004, available at http://sports.sina.com.cn/c/p/2004-07-22/
18451016823.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (complaining that Gong was
prosecuted while others involved in scandal were never punished).
356. Benbao Qunian 8 Yue Zai Quanguo Shuaixian Baodao De "Jiajiang Dajia An"
Zuori YouleJieguo [There Was an Outcome Yesterday in the "Jiajiang Fighting Fakes Case"
That This Newspaper Was the First Paper Nationwide to Report on in August of Last Year],
Chengdu Shangbao [Chengdu Commercial News], Apr. 9, 1996, available at http://
www.rainbow-china.com/cn-version/news/mtbd9.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
357. Liang Zhiping, Shuzhai Yu Shehui Zhijian [Between the Study and Society] 275
(1998) [hereinafter Liang, Study and Society].
358. Wei, Journalism and Communication Law, supra note 44, at 115 (citing article
from Xinwen Jizhe [Shanghai Journalism Review]); Ye Shan Xian Shui, Fa De
Gongzhengxing Bu Yin Meiguangdeng Er Fangshe Guangmang [The Fairness of Law Does
Not Radiate Light Because of the Magnesium Light], Zhongguo Faguan Wang [China
Judge Web], Nov. 15, 1998, at http://www.jc.gov.cn/personal/ysxs/spzj/spzj6.htrn (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Ye, Fairness] (web posting).
359. See, e.g., Xu Xun, Fating Xinwen De Jiazhi Quxiang [Trends in the Values of
Courtroom News], 1998 Xiandai Chuanbo [Contemporary Broadcasting] No. 1, at 78
(stating that it was "clear beyond dispute" that the supervision bureau lacked jurisdiction).
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that any fake product by definition fails to meet national quality
36 0
standards.
The local court accepted the case, rejecting arguments from the defendant agency that the court should not permit the case to be filed.
Prior to a decision by the trial court, representatives to the Sichuan Provincial People's Congress, one of whom was also the chairman of the
board of Caihong, intervened. 36 1 The representatives were furious that
the court had accepted the case and demanded that the provincial people's congress investigate. The congress subsequently passed a resolution
requesting information from the Sichuan Province High People's
Court. 36 2 The people's congress deputies were reportedly outraged that
"black and white" had been reversed in the case. How, they asked, could
a counterfeiter use the law to fight against an agency fighting counterfeit363
ers-how could the law enforcers become defendants?
The media soon joined in, with commentators suggesting that it was
beyond comprehension how a producer of fake goods could use the law
to argue that it was being unfairly punished. Focus entered the fray, running a program on the case titled, "The Person Fighting Fakes Becomes
the Defendant." At the same time, other media reports questioned how a
person who was guilty of producing fake products could dare to bring a
suit against the government and argued that the court should not have
accepted the case. 364 As one paper declared, producers of counterfeit
goods were like rats crossing the street-they could be beaten by
3 65
anybody.
The Sichuan High People's Court requested guidance from the Supreme People's Court regarding how the case should be handled. 36 6 The
Supreme People's Court considered the matter and concluded that the
supervision bureau had the authority to punish the factory.3 67 Yet the
Supreme People's Court did not issue a formal interpretation or reply to
the lower court; instead, it acted via a telephone call to the Sichuan High
People's Court. 368 The Sichuan High Court then issued a decision finding that the technical supervision bureau acted correctly, and the media
declared victory.3 69 Although there was disagreement over the merits of
the underlying legal issue, there was little dispute that the media, com360. See, e.g., Interview 2002-2 (stating that fake products by definition fail to meet
national quality standards).
361. Liang, Study and Society, supra note 357, at 275.
362. Id.
363. Ye, Fairness, supra note 358.
364. How to View Popular Opinion Supervision, supra note 281.
365. Wei, Journalism and Communication Law, supra note 44, at 115 (citing article
from Xinwen Jizhe [Shanghai Journalism Review]).
366. Interview 2002-13.
367. Interview 2002-1.
368. Interview 2002-2; Interview 2002-13.
369. Wei, Journalism and Communication Law, supra note 44, at 115 (citing another
article from Xinwen Jizhe [Shanghai Journalism Review]).
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bined with the intervention of the local people's congress, played a crucial role in the case. As one commentator noted, media pressure meant
that it was impossible for the court "to issue a decision that followed the
3 70

law."

4. Sun Zhigang: Popular Opinion and the Internet. - On March 17,
2003, Sun Zhigang, a 27-year-old graphic designer, was detained by police
in Guangzhou when he failed to produce a temporary residence permit.
Three days later Sun was dead, apparently beaten to death by fellow inmates in a detention center for migrants. Sun's death would have gone
unnoticed, and those responsible for his death unpunished, had it not
been for his family's appeals to the media for help. On April 25, Southern
Metropolitan Daily, a paper owned largely by the Guangdong Province
3 71
Communist Party Committee, ran an extended report on the case.
The Southern Metropolitan Daily report was posted to internet portals on
3 72
the same day, ensuring that news of the Sun case spread nationwide.
3 73
Web chatrooms soon filled with indignation.
370. Liang, Study and Society, supra note 357, at 277 (arguing that the media was
one-sided and decided the case based on morality, not law, turning the judge into the
defendant and the media into the adjudicator); see also How to View Popular Opinion
Supervision, supra note 281 (commenting that media supervision "interferes with the
court's independence"). One academic familiar with the case stated that a majority of the
judges in the Supreme People's Court Administrative Law Division were of the view that
the defendant agency did not have the jurisdiction over the matter. Interview 2003-162.
371. Geng Fen et al., Zhi Que Yi Zhang Zanzhuzheng Yi Daxue Biyesheng Jing Zao
Duda Zhisi [Only Missing a Temporary Residence Permit, College Graduate Is Beaten to
Death], Nanfang Dushi Bao [Southern Metropolitan News], Apr. 25, 2003 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). The paper apparently faced significant obstacles in printing the
report. Later accounts said that the paper had "overcome all sorts of difficulties" in order
to publish the article. See Guangdong Sun Zhigang An Dashi Ji [Chronicle of Events in
the Guangdong Case of Sun Zhigang], Dongfang Wang [Dongfang Online], June 9, 2003
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Chronicle of Events]. For an overview
of the entire case, see id. For a discussion of Sun's father's efforts to bring the case to light,
see Dai Hongbing & Wan Qin, Sun Zhigang Guhui Zuo Huijia, Qi Mu Huozhi Zhenxiang
Tongbuyusheng [Ashes of Sun Zhigang's Bones Return Home, Mother Deeply Grieves
When Told the Truth], Wuhan Wanbao [Wuhan Evening News], June 13, 2003, available
at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/20006-13/14431167415.shtml (on file with Columbia Law
Review).
372. See Chronicle of Events, supra note 371; Zi Yue, Shei Wei Yige Gongmin De Fei
Zhengchang Siwang Fuze [Who Will Take Responsibility for the Abnormal Death of a
Citizen?], Nanfang Dushi Bao [Southern Metropolitan Daily], Apr. 25, 2003, available at
http://past.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/212/10857/10859/
(on file the Columbia Law
Review); see also Zhang Conxing, Caifang Sun Zhigang An Chi Bimengeng, Zhongguo
Jizhe Lianming Piping Fayuan [Denied Access When Covering the Sun Zhigang Case,
Chinese Journalists Jointly Criticize the Court], Lianhe Zaobao [United Morning News],
June 11, 2003, available at http://www.zaobao.com/special/china/others/pages/
sunzhigang070603.html (on file the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Zhang, Denied
Access] (noting that "waves of protest swamped the web" after article appeared).
373. Renmin Wang De Yi Da Tese [A Big Special Characteristic of People's Daily
Online], Sohu [Sohu]
(Sept. 28, 2003), at http://news.sohu.com/12/44/
news213794412.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see, e.g., Jin Xiuwen, Sun
Zhigang An: Shi Shei Zai "Zhuanglongzuoya"? [Sun Zhigang's Case: Who Is Pretending
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The Guangdong Province Communist Party Propaganda Department banned reporting on the case following the Southern Metropolitan
Daily article and an accompanying editorial. Reports continued to circulate, however, including numerous stories that were posted to the official
Xinhua and People's Daily websites. 374 Although there was a lull in reporting on the matter by national papers, in part due to the SARS outbreak
that was dominating news in China, reports on the case continued to circulate. On May 13, Xinhua and other news outlets announced that, following the intervention of a number of provincial and national Party
37 5
leaders, authorities had detained thirteen suspects.
to Be Both Deaf and Dumb?], Renmin Wang [People's Daily Online], May 4, 2003, at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/30/20030504/984197.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Mo Ke, Sun Zhigang Zhi Si De "Houxu Baodao" Huibuhui
Buliaoliaozhi? [Will the "Follow-Up Report" on the Death of Sun Zhigang End Without an
Ending?], Renmin Wang [People's Daily Online], Apr. 30, 2003, at http://
past.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/212/10857/10859/
(on file with the Columbia Law
Review); Pan Fengliang, Bu Jinjin Yao Huan Sizhe Yige Qingbai [Not Only Should the
Innocence of the Dead Be Re-Established], Renmin Wang [People's Daily Online], Apr.
30, 2003, at http://past.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/212/10857/10859 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Shi Fei, Huan Baixing "Heise Shuzi" De Zhiqingquan [Return the
Right to Know the Truth About the "Black Data" to the People], Renmin Wang [People's
Daily Online], Apr. 30, 2003, at http://past.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/212/10857/
10859/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
374. See, e.g., Renmin Wang Wenzhang Huyu Chengli Duli Diaochazu Diaocha Sun
Zhigang Feizhengchang Siwang [Article on People's Daily Online Asks for Independent
Investigation into the Abnormal Death of Sun Zhigang], Boxun Wang [Boxun Online],
May 10, 2003, available at http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2003/05/
200305101152.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Daxuesheng Ming Sang
Shourong Suo Houxu: Jiashu Zhuiwen Siyin Lian Zao Pengbi [Follow-Up Report on the
Death of a College Graduate in a Detention Center: Relatives Run into Blocks in Seeking
the Cause of the Death], Bejing Qingnian Bao [Beijing Youth Daily], Apr. 28, 2003 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review); Renming Wang Qiche Pindao Zhubian Wang Yisan:
Wangluo Meiti De Fazhan Li Bu Kai Chuangxin [People's Daily Online Auto Channel
Editor Wang Yisan: The Development of Internet Media Cannot Be Separated from
Creative Work] (Dec. 18, 2003), at http://auto.sohu.com/2003/12/18/50/
article217075061.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
375. Chronicle of Events, supra note 371; Deng Xinjian, Sun Zhigang An 13 Ming
Xianfan BeiJipu [13 Suspects in the Sun Zhigang Case Are Detained], Fazhi Ribao [Legal
Daily], May 14, 2003, available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/misc/2003-05/14/
content 27220.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Shen Xuan, Jianjue Chaqing
Sun Zhigang Bei Guyi Shanghai Zhisi An [Make a Thorough Investigation into the Case of
Intentional Harm to Sun Zhigang], Nanfang Ribao [Southern Daily], May 13, 2003 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review). For accounts noting the intervention in the case by top
Party leaders, see, e.g., Sun Zhigang An Zuori Kaishen, Yangshi Yaoqing Falfi Zhuanjia
Tantao Anjian [Court Session for Sun Zhigang Case Begun Yesterday, CCTV Invites Legal
Experts to Discuss the Case], Nanfang Dushi Bao [Southern Metropolitan Daily], June 6,
2003, available at http://www.southcn.com/news/gdnews/gdtodayimportant/
200306060118.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Lin Wei, Sun Zhigang An 13
Ming Yifan Bei Daipu [13 Suspects in the Sun Zhigang Case Are Arrested], Zhongguo
Qingnian Bao [China Youth Daily], May 14, 2003, available at http://www.cyol.com/zqb/
gb/zqb/2003-05/14/content_- 662528.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Shen,
supra; Sun Zhengyi & Liu Tingting, 2003 Nian Zhongguo Xinwen Ye Huiwang [A Review
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News of the arrests might have resulted in the case receding from the
spotlight had it not been for the coordinated efforts of reporters at central media outlets and a number of legal experts and lawyers. One day
after the arrests, on May 14, three young law professors filed a petition
with the National People's Congress charging that the regulations governing the "custody and repatriation" system for detaining migrant workers and sending them back to their home provinces violated the constitution and requesting that the Congress investigate.3 7 6 At least three major
central papers-China Youth Daily, Workers Daily, and Legal Daily-covered the petition in detail, and again news spread nationwide via the internet. The China Youth Daily article, whikh ran on a Thursday, was followed on Monday morning by an article in Legal Daily. Reporters and
lawyers involved in the case viewed the timing as crucial, as they perceived
a need for the story of the challenge to the regulations to be "stirred up"
3 77
In
before propaganda authorities returned to work from the weekend.
addition, print journalists worked together with internet news providers
to highlight the case,3 78 ensuring that newspaper reports were posted to
the internet news portals almost immediately after publication. At the
same time, participants in internet chatrooms continued to discuss the
case.
Once the three national papers reported on the case, the press nationwide soon joined in, not only continuing to demand justice for Sun
but also highlighting similar abuses at detention centers elsewhere. 3 79 A
of China's News Industry in 2003], Zhonghua Xinwen Bao [China News Journal], Jan. 7,
2004 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Tang Jianguang, Sun Zhigang Siwang
Zhenxiang [The Truth of the Death of Sun Zhigang], Xinwen Zhoukan [China
Newsweek] ,June 12, 2003 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Tang, Truth
of the Death]; see also A Big Special Characteristic of People's Daily Online, supra note
373 (stating that opinion expressed on the internet forced the authorities to act); Lin
Chufang & Zhao Ling, Renmin Wang Wenzhang Zengjia Le Zhenpo Sun Zhigang An De
Juexin [Article Published on People.com Increases the Resolve to Solve the Sun Zhigang
Case], Nanfang Zhoumo [Southern Weekend], June 5, 2003, available at http://
www.people.com.cn/GB/news/8410/20030606/1010138.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (same).
376. Yu Jiang et al., Guanyu Shencha "Chengshi Liulang Qitao Renyuan Shourong
Qiansong Banfa" De Jianyishu [Proposal to Examine the "Measures for the Custody and
Repatriation of Vagrants and Beggars in Cities"], Fali Sixiang Wang [Legal Thought
Web], May 14, 2003, available at http://www.law-thinker.com/show.asp?id=1959 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review); see also Chronicle of Events, supra note 371; Cui Li et al.,
Toushi Sun Zhigang Zhi Si Yinfa "Gongmin Shangshu" Shijian [See Through the Incident
of "Citizens Submit a Written Appeal" as a Result of Sun Zhigang's Death], Wen Cui [News
Digest], May 26, 2003, available at http://news.hnol.net/gb/content/2003-05/26/
content_1989937.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
377. Interview 2003-118.
378. Interview 2003-149.
379. See Yin Guoan, Sun Zhigang An Weihe Yizhi Pa Jian Yangguang? [Why Is the
Sun Zhigang Case Continually Afraid of Sunshine?] (June 8, 2003) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (stating that "only the rage of the entire nation's media" caused
central authorities to pay attention to Sun's death).
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second petition filed by a different group of law professors the following
week ensured that the matter stayed in the news. 380 The focus on the
custody and repatriation system for detaining migrant workers appeared
to preempt any attempts by authorities to argue that Sun's killing was an
381
isolated case.
Qiao Yanqin, a nurse at the medical clinic of the detention center
where Sun Zhigang died, and seventeen others were charged in connection with Sun's death.3 8 2 As the trial approached, reports circulated in
the print media and on the internet challenging the prosecution's case,
and a People's Daily article criticized the lack of information regarding
crucial facts. 383 Critical reports of the trial itself were rarer-the result of
CPD instructions that ordered the media to use only Xinhua reports on
the trial proceedings. 384 In addition, although hundreds of journalists
sought to cover the story, the three Guangzhou courts that heard the
cases permitted reporters from only five media outlets to attend the trials.
The courts also banned recording and notetaking by the few journalists
3 85
who were allowed to observe.
380. He Weifang et al., Tiqing Quan Guo Renda Changweihui Jiu Sun Zhigang An Ji
Shourong Qiansong Zhidu Shishi Zhuangkuang Qidong Tebie Diaocha Chengxu De
Jianyishu [Proposal Submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress on Initiating Procedures for a Special Investigation into the Sun Zhigang Case
and the Implementation of the Custody and Repatriation System] (May 22, 2003) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review); see also Chronicle of Events, supra note 371.
381. At least ten other detainees had been killed in the same detention center in the
prior three months, with no compensation paid to the victims' families. Interview 2003118; see also Tang, Truth of the Death, supra note 375 (reporting that fifty-eight people
died in same detention center during four-month period in late 2002 and early 2003, and
that three others died in detention center during four days surrounding Sun's death).
382. Si Erqi, Sun Zhigang An Yizhufan Bei Pan Sixing Qita 11 Ming Anfan Fenbie Pan
Xing [Prime Culprit in Sun Zhigang Case Sentenced to Death, Other 11 Accomplices Are
Separately Sentenced], Dayang Wang [Dayang Online], June 10, 2003, at http://
news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-06-10/02341153232.shtml
(on file with the Columbia Law
Review). In addition, a total of twenty-three officials received administrative sanctions as a
result of the case. Sun Zhigang An Sheji De 23 Ming Guangzhou Zhengfu Guanyuan Shou
Chufen (Mingdan) [23 Guangzhou Government Officials Involved in the Sun Zhigang
Case Receive Disciplinary Action (Name List)], Yangcheng Wanbao [Yangcheng Evening
News], June 9, 2003, at http://news.tom.com/Archive/1002/2003/6/8-53712.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
383. Hao Hong, Sun Zhigang An Hai Neng Zou Duo Yuan? [How Much Further Can
Sun Zhigang's Case Proceed?], Renmin Ribao-Huadong Xinwen [People's Daily-East
China News], May 30, 2003 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The article also noted
that the case received special treatment from the authorities, and wondered whether it
would result in significant changes to the way in which cases outside media scrutiny are
handled. Id.
384. Interview 2003-133; Interview 2003-136; Interview 2003-138.
385. Chronicle of Events, supra note 371 (reporting that there was media criticism of
courts for failing to allow journalists to attend trials); He, Viewing the Development, supra
note 299 (criticizing courts for failing to allow journalists to attend trials); Ruhe Qu
Shixian Fading De Quanli? [How to Implement Rights Fixed by Law?] Uune 8, 2003) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (same); Yin, supra note 379 (arguing that the
restrictions on the media violated Chinese law, which provides that trials should generally
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Most reports following the trial appeared to observe the ban, but the
media were not fully compliant. Websites protested the ban on reporting, with reporters from five central media oudets signing an online open
letter criticizing the restrictions. 38 6 Some reports published after the trial
openly questioned the evidence at trial, arguing that Sun's injuries could
not have been inflicted solely by the defendants' fists, as the
procuratorate charged, suggesting that Sun had already been beaten by
the police before he arrived at the detention center. 38 7 Likewise, online
media wondered why a videotape of the beatings that was said to exist was
3 88
never produced as evidence.
Qiao, who allegedly instructed the other detainees to beat Sun, was
sentenced to death in June, less than three months after the initial incident.38 9 Another defendant-who argued that he had been detainedjust
hours before Sun and that he participated in the beating of Sun because
he was told he would be killed if he did not do so-was sentenced to
fifteen years in prison. 390 Academics and journalists sought to question
whether Qiao's punishment was excessive and the result of media influ39 1
ence, but they were stymied by the CPD ban.
Following the trial, China's State Council announced that it was rescinding the regulations governing custody and repatriation. Although
be public, and noting that the media were instructed only to use officially prepared
accounts of the trials). The courts tried the eighteen defendants simultaneously, in three
separate trials.
386. Chronicle of Events, supra note 371; see also Zhang, Denied Access, supra note
372 (discussing protest and noting that such direct criticism of national authorities is rare).
387. Interview 2003-133.
388. See, e.g., Sun Zhigang Shengming De Zuihou 72 Xiaoshi [Sun Zhigang's Last 72
Hours], Sanlian Shenghuo Zhoukan [Sanlian Life Week],June 16, 2003, available at http:/
/www.lifeweek.com.cn/2003-06-18/000015706.shtml
(on file with the Columbia Law
Review); Tang, Truth of the Death, supra note 375. The implication of the reports was
clearly that Sun had been beaten before arriving at the detention center, and others either
participated in the beating or had ordered it. A number of the defendants argued that
they were told they would be killed if they did not beat Sun. See Sun Zhigang's Last 72
Hours, supra; Tang, Truth of the Death, supra note 375.
389. Xinhua, Twelve People Sentenced for Beating Death of a Young Man (June 10,
2003), at http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/66584.htm
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review). A second defendant, who was accused of leading the beating, was
sentenced to a suspended death sentence, while sixteen other defendants received
sentences ranging from three years to life in prison for their roles in the beating or for

dereliction of duty. Id.
390. Interview 2003-162.
391. Interview 2003-104. Prior to the court decision, commentators had suggested
that a death sentence would be excessive. See, e.g., Wuyu Rensheng, Yulun Daiti Falfi?
Sun Zhigang An De Yixie Mangdian! [Did Popular Opinion Take the Place of Law? A Few
Blind Spots Regarding the Sun Zhigang Case!] (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(stating, in Netease chatroom posting, that if media pressure resulted in death sentence, it
will be sign that "our people's courts have once again put on another clumsy show"); He,
Viewing the Development, supra note 299 (warning of risk of media pressure leading to
excessive punishment); see also Pomfret, supra note 182 (reporting on ban on coverage of
Sun Zhigang case).
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government statements noted the change was being made to reflect developments in China since the regulations were originally promulgated,
the link to the Sun case was clear. Under new regulations, which went
into effect on August 1, 2003, the custody and repatriation system was
replaced by the Measures on the Administration of Aid to Indigent Vagrants and Beggars. The new rules were designed to shift local authorities' focus from punitive detention of migrant workers to providing assistance to those in need of support. 392 Pressure for the change resulted
not merely from media coverage, but also from the coordinated effort by
lawyers, academics, and journalists to expose problems in the system, with
the explicit goal of forcing changes to the regulations. The role of the
internet was also important: One person involved in the case noted that
the case would never have resulted in such a rapid official response had
not it been for the popular rage that was expressed on the internet, in
3 93
particular in internet chatrooms.
Although certain crucial officials in the central government were
likely predisposed toward altering the custody and repatriation system,
media pressure-in particular internet news and chatroom discussions39 4
propelled the issue to the forefront of public and Party-state attention.
Many academic observers agree that media pressure played an important
role in causing changes to the regulations, noting that it was the first case
in which the media could clearly be said to have forced a change to
China's legal system. 39 5 The success of the media's reports also reflected
the ability of lawyers, academics, and the media to frame their concerns
as consistent with leadership goals-in particular those of newly appointed President HuJintao-of protecting migrant workers, strengthen396
ing the legal system, and reducing official abuses.

392. People's Republic of China State Council, Chengshi Shenghuo Wuzhuo De
Liulang Qitao Renyuan Jiuzhu Guanli Banfa [Rules for the Help and Management of
Vagrants and Beggars in Urban Areas] art. 3 (Aug. 1, 2003); see Xinhua, WenJiabao Qian
Guowuyuan Ling Chengshi Liulang Qitao Renyuan Jiuzhu Banfa Gongbu [Wen Jiabao
Signs State Council Decree Announcing Measures to Assist Urban Vagrants] (June 22,
2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
393. Interview 2003-148; see also Wang, Internet Media, supra note 276 (stating that
without coordinated efforts of online media, Sun's death would have gone largely
unnoticed); Wang Yi, 2003 Nian Wangluo Yulun De Jiazhi [The Value of Internet Public
Opinion in 2003], NST Xueshu Luntan [NST Academic Forum], Jan. 22, 2004, at http://
phorum.nst.pku.edu.cn/showthread.php?threadid=652 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing coordinated efforts of print and online media).
394. See Interview 2003-162 (stating that media benefited from existing desire within
government to address problems in custody and repatriation system); Interview 2003-168
(stating that change would not have occurred had it not been supported by central Partystate officials).
395. See, e.g., Interview 2003-133.
396. See Keith Hand, Narrative of the Sun Zhigang Incident 3-4 (n.d.) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting how arguments were framed as
consistent with goals of the leadership).
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Yet the media's ability to push for policy changes in the Sun Zhigang
case may also have been the product of an unusual and isolated period.
The SARS outbreak facilitated the media's ability to influence the case.
The papers involved were able to take advantage of the fact that, at the
height of the outbreak, the CPD stopped issuing regular instructions on
topics other than SARS; the department was entirely focused on managing reporting of the SARS crisis. 39 7 In addition, for much of the period
the CPD was operating with a limited staff, a factor that made it more
difficult to monitor the media.
Central authority discomfort with the role of the media-and public
opinion-in the Sun Zhigang case was demonstrated by the imposition of
a three-month ban on critical reporting on the courts, police, and
procuratorates. The CPD imposed the ban in early July 2003, shortly after the Sun case. The media's actions in the Sun case were not the sole
factor; the media's criticism of the police in May and June also played a
role.3 9 8 Nevertheless, the widespread media attention on the Sun case
appears to have been an important determinant. The existence of subsequent reports suggested that either the CPD chose to overlook transgressions, or it faced difficulties enforcing the ban. Discussion on the Sun
case continued, although criticism of the handling of the case was muted.
3 99
But critical reports about the legal system and police persisted.
397. Interview 2003-137; see also Interview 2003-151 (stating that reporting on Sun
Zhigang case was the product of a "special time" resulting from SARS outbreak); Interview
2003-160 (commenting that critical reports in media increased during and just after SARS
outbreak).
398. Interview 2003-160.
399. In July 2003, for example, Southern Weekend ran a story asking the question, "How
Many More Times Will They Be Sentenced to Death?," highlighting the plight of
defendants who had been tried and sentenced to death four times by the same court.
Following each of the first three trials, the Hebei Province High People's Court reversed
the convictions. In describing the case, the article implicitly criticized the fact that legal
procedures were not followed in the case, as well as criminal procedures in general that
result in cases being sent back for retrial, instead of being dismissed, when a higher court
finds insufficient evidence to support a conviction. The paper apparently skirted the
temporary ban on criticism of the courts by praising the Hebei Province High People's
Court, which had sent the case back for retrial three times and which had held a fair and
open hearing on the fourth appeal. See Guo Guosong, Sanci Sixing Sanci Daoxia Liuren
[Three Death Sentences, Three Times Saved from Below the Knife], Nanfang Zhoumo
[Southern Weekend], Aug. 10, 2000, available at http://www.chinamonitor.org/article/
case/33.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Similarly, in July and August 2003, a
coordinated effort by lawyers, academics, and the media-many of whom had worked
together on the Sun Zhigang case-publicized the case of Sun Dawu, a rural entrepreneur
accused of violating the criminal law by borrowing funds from his company's employees
after local banks refused to grant the company loans. Sun was released from detention
following the media outcry. See, e.g., He Xiang, Sun Dawu Beibu Zhi Hou [After the
Arrest of Sun Dawu], Xinwen Zhoukan [China Newsweek], July 21, 2003, available at
http://www.chinanewsweek.com.cn/2003-07-25/1/1889.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (noting difficulties that Sun Dawu's lawyer encountered attempting to see his
client).
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Although the biggest immediate effect of the Sun case was the
change to the regulations, the case may also represent a watershed in the
development of the internet's influence on both the courts and governance. The case suggests the possible emergence of the internet as a force
distinct from traditional media. Both the speed with which news spread
and the influence of online discussion of the case went beyond what
would have been possible in traditional media alone.
Subsequent cases have replicated the role of online media and internet chatrooms in the Sun Zhigang case. In August 2003, the Bund
Pictorial,a new Shanghai paper, highlighted the decision of the Liaoning
Province High People's Court to change the sentence of a well-connected
local gangster, Liu Yong, from death to life imprisonment. The report
referred to the decision as a "dangerous precedent" and hinted that the
reduction in his sentence stemmed from Liu's connections to local officials. 40 0 The article led to a wave of reporting on the case, in both the
print media and online, including widespread speculation regarding why
the sentence was reduced, as well as media attacks on legal experts who
40 1
had accepted payments in exchange for legal opinions on Liu's behalf.
Once again China's internet chatrooms filled with expressions of outrage
regarding the court's handling of the case, and many demanded Liu's
execution. 40 2 China Youth Daily declared that the provincial high court
400. Li Shuming, Dui Shenyang Heibang Toumu Liu Yong Gaipan Sihuan De Zhiyi
[Questioning the Change from Death Sentence to Suspended Death Sentence for Liu
Yong, Boss of Shenyang's Underground Society], Waitan Huabao [Bund Pictorial], Dec.
18, 2003, available at http://gb.chinabroadcast.cn/41/2003/12/18/116@25100.htm (on
file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Meiti Zhiyi "Liu Yong Gaipan" An Shi Yulun
Guannian De Yida Tupo [Media's Questioning of Liu Yong's Amended Sentence Is a
Breakthrough in the Concept of Public Opinion], Renmin Wang [People's Daily Online],
Aug. 29, 2003, available at http://news.tom.com/1002/2003829-406657.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (discussing the initial report). Liu's sentence was technically
changed to death with a two-year reprieve. In practice, such a sentence is almost always
equivalent to life in prison.
401. See Lin Chufang, Shenyang Liuyong An Gaipan Diaocha, Lijie Gongzhong De
Zhiyi [Investigation on the Amendment of the Judgment in Liu Yong's Case in Shenyang,
He Understands the Questioning of the Public], Nanfang Zhoumo [Southern Weekend],
Aug. 28, 2003, available at http://cn.news.yahoo.com/030828/55/lrtk6.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review); Shenyang Hei Shehui Laoda Liu Yong Mei Si [Liu Yong, the
Godfather of Shenyang's Black Society, Did Not Die], at http://news.sohu.com/76/77/
news212297776.shtml (last visited Aug. 25, 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review);
Media's Questioning of Liu Yong's Amended Sentence Is a Breakthrough in the Concept
of Public Opinion, supra note 400; Jiekai "Liu Yong" An Zhenxiang [Uncover the Truth of
Liu Yong's Case], Qianlong Wang [Qianglong Online], Dec. 18, 2003, available at http://
www.qianlong.com/2955/2003/12/18/183@1771342-I.htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review); Liu Yong An Gaipan Lingyou Bieqing? [Were There Special Reasons for the
Amended Sentence in Liu Yong's Case?], Xinwen Zhoukan [China Newsweek], Sept. 4,
2003, available at http://news.tom.com/1002/200394-410775.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
402. See, e.g., Liu Yong, the Godfather of Shenyang's Black Society, Did Not Die,
supra note 401.
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should be required to explain the reasons for its decision. 40 3 The media
coverage led to written instructions from Party leaders, apparently directed to the Supreme People's Court.40 4 In December 2003 the Supreme People's Court intervened, deciding to retry the case itself pursuant to provisions in China's criminal procedure law that permit a retrial
when the Supreme People's Court finds an error in a lower court decision. 40 5 The court reinstated the death sentence, and Liu was executed
within hours of the Court's announcement.
Similarly, extensive coverage of the BMW case 406 led to expressions
of outrage in the print media and on the internet. 40 7 Reports stated that
internet postings regarding the case had reached record numbers. Sina,
for example, reported that it had received more than 200,000 web postings on the case, exceeding even the number received regarding the
SARS crisis. 40 8 In January 2004, Party officials announced that the case
was being investigated, 40 9 banned further reporting on the case, and ordered websites to remove coverage and discussions of the case. 4 10 In contrast to the Liu Yong and Sun Zhigang cases, however, an investigation by
the Heilongjiang Province Communist Party Political-Legal Committee
into the BMW case upheld the original verdict. 4 11 In rejecting widespread public demands for the driver, Su Xiuwen, to be resentenced, the
403. Media's Questioning of Liu Yong's Amended Sentence Is a Breakthrough in the
Concept of Public Opinion, supra note 400; see also Wang, Internet Media, supra note 276
(discussing impact of online media and web chatrooms in case).
404. Chen Jieren, Shenyang Heishehui Liuyong An Mingri Chongshen [The Case of
Liu Yong, from Shenyang's Underground World, Is to Be Retried Tomorrow], Jianghuai
Chenbao [Jianghuai Morning News], Dec. 17, 2003, available at http://news.Sina.com.cn/
c/2003-12-17/01571357363s.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Yu Zhou,
Chongshen Liu Yong Yu Lingdao Pishi [The Retrial of Liu Yong and the Leaders' Written
Instructions], Hong Wang [Rednet.com], Dec. 21, 2003, available at http://
news.rednet.com.cn/Articles/2003/12/502434.htm
(on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
405. Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [Criminal Procedure Law of
the People's Republic of China] art. 205 (1996).
406. See supra Part I.F.2.
407. See, e.g., Chen Pokong: Quan Zhongguo Dou Rang Baoma Gei Zhuang Le
[Chen Pokong: All of China Was Hit by a BMW], Boxun Wang [Boxun Online], Jan. 17,
2004, available at http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/yuanqing/2004/01/200401170
833.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that case would not have come to
light without the internet).
408. Hit Rate on the Web for the "BMW" Case Ranks First, Exceeds SARS, supra note
277.
409. Harbin: Reinvestigation into BMW Traffic Offense, People's Daily Online, Jan.
14, 2004, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2004-01/14/content_298769.htm (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
410. Mark Magnier, China Clamps Down on Web News Discussion, L.A. Times, Feb.
26, 2004, at A4.
411. See "BMW Case" Verdict Upheld, China Daily, Mar. 29, 2004, at http://
wwwl.china.org.cn/english/China/91593.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see
also Baoma Zhuangren An Fucha Jieshu [The Review of the BMW Case Is Concluded],
Xiaoxiang Chengbao [Xiaoxiang Morning], Mar. 29, 2004, at http://xxcb.rednet.com.cn/
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panel appeared to send a message that popular opinion would not always
be able to dictate the outcome of criminal cases.
5. StirringJustice. - Media declarations of their influence may be
self-serving, but judges and legal academics support media claims that
coverage of court cases has significant effect, in particular in criminal
cases. Most cases go unreported in the media, 4 1 2 so the total number of
cases in which the media exerts some impact is probably small compared
to the total number of cases in China. Nevertheless, the impact of the
media does appear to extend beyond a handful of high-profile cases.
Judges and academic observers confirm that public media coverage
of criminal cases may produce heavier sentences-including, in some instances, death-than otherwise would be assigned. 413 A Beijing district
court judge attending a conference at Beijing University commented that
there are many cases in which media involvement influences outcomes
and that media coverage often has a negative effect on the fairness of
proceedings. 4 14 Judges note that they are more likely to pay close attention to a case, 4 15 and in some cases are more likely to assign a heavy
sentence, 4 16 if a case is the subject of media coverage. Judges also comment that, where there has been public reporting of a case, they must
4 17
take account of public opinion.
Defense lawyers likewise say media coverage of criminal cases generally harms defendants. According to defense lawyers, press coverage
Articles/04/03/29/445609.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that the
investigation was carried out by the provincial political-legal committee).
412. Interview 2002-13.
413. See Interview 2002-6; Interview 2003-64; Interview 2003-70. The effect is likely to
be particularly significant where media coverage results in a written instruction from Partystate superiors. Interview 2003-70. The sentence assigned is vitally important in China,
where virtually all cases brought to trial result in convictions. The impact of the media in
this regard may, to a limited degree, be akin to that of lawyers. Although provision of
lawyers in the criminal process may not result in an increased number of acquittals, there is
limited evidence that lawyer participation results in lighter sentences. See Liebman, supra
note 145, at 253 (discussing effect of lawyers in criminal cases).
414. Zan Aizong, Xinwen Jiandu Yu Sifa Gongzheng [News Supervision and Judicial
Fairness], Guangming Ribao Wang [Guangming Daily Online], Apr. 10, 2000 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
415. See Interview 2003-36; Interview 2003-43; Interview 2003-45; Interview 2003-78;
Interview 2003-157.
416. One judge, who explained that judges are more likely to give heavier sentences,
also emphasized that judges would still follow the law in doing so. Interview 2002-12; see
also Interview 2002-13 (stating that, although media generally have little influence on civil
cases, public reporting can result in court paying more attention to a case). Additionally,
judges confirm that the administrative rank of the media carrying the report makes a
difference: Onejudge on a provincial court said that judges were much more likely to pay
attention to a report in a central government paper than in a provincial paper, and that a
local paper report would have little influence. Interview 2002-12. Judges comment that
they believe the media are most able to influence courts at the local level, and are less able
to influence higher-ranking courts. See, e.g., Interview 2002-12.
417. Interview 2002-12.
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often leads to heavier sentences, as courts attempt to "manage the emotions of society. '4 18 Defense lawyers accordingly almost always attempt to
avoid media coverage of pending cases. 4 19 Similar trends are apparent in
the procuratorate, where media coverage may affect whether or not to
420
bring a case.
Media impact in civil and administrative cases is less pronounced but
appears significant nonetheless. Judges draw a distinction between media
influence in criminal and civil cases, noting the influence is likely to be
more significant in criminal cases, where public opinion may affect how
the court views the defendant's "dangerousness" 421 and where emotional
media reports have greater potential to produce public outrage. Party
leaders may also be more likely to intervene and pressure judges in criminal cases as a result of a perception that such cases are more likely to
affect the Party's concern for social stability. Still, numerous reports describe how the media affected outcomes in civil and administrative
cases. 422 Such reports often involve cases in which individual media outlets have claimed success in winningjustice for aggrieved individuals, frequently after allegedly unfair decisions in courts of first instance. For example, Sui Xiang received compensation for the loss of her two hands
after reports on Focus and in Legal Daily, and her award of 1.67 million
42 3
yuan was exactly the same amount that Focus had reported as her lOSS.
Difficulties in obtaining court decisions, sparse reasoning in available
opinions, and frequent lack of media follow up to original claims of injustice make it difficult to measure the correlation between media reports
and actual outcomes. 42 4 This is particularly true in cases in which initial
418. Interview 2003-72; see also Interview 2003-25.
419. Interview 2003-25. In rare cases, however, media coverage may help to reduce
sentences, in particular where media coverage portrays a particularly sympathetic view of
the defendant. See, e.g., Interview 2003-72 (discussing case in which mother killed her
violent son, and contending that media coverage clearly led court to order suspended
death sentence, rather than death, for mother); Interview 2003-74 (describing case in
which son who murdered his parents was not given death sentence after sympathetic media
coverage).
420. Interview 2003-68; Interview 2003-75. Defendants with media connections may,
however, be able to use such ties to their advantage. For example, defendants who bring
reporters to court with them have succeeded in pressuring the procuratorate to
compromise regarding the charges against the defendant. Interview 2003-101.
421. Interview 2002-12; Interview 2002-41.
422. See, e.g., Zhong Yuanlin, Sanji Jianchayuan Jianzhi Kangsu, Cuxin Yisheng
Zhong Pan You Zui [Three Levels of the Procuratorate Persist in Filing an Objection to
Suit; Hard-Hearted Doctor in the End is Found Guilty of a Crime], 1999 Xin Yixue [New
Medical Studies) No. 9, at 541 (discussing impact of Focus in medical malpractice case).
423. Jiang, Legal Concepts, supra note 316. The exact match between Sui Xiang's
award and the Focus report may also have been due to Focus learning of the award in
advance of the court's announcement. Nevertheless, the attention the case received from
both Legal Daily and Focus appears to have resulted in the rapid resolution of the case.
424. The media may be more likely to carry follow-up reports in cases in which
coverage has had an effect, and are less likely to pursue a matter where they have run into
significant opposition or have been told to stop reporting on the issue. Interview 2002-1.
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media coverage results in a ban on further discussion of the case. Additionally, it may be difficult to distinguish cause and effect. In the black
whistle case, for example, initial media coverage of the scandal apparently stemmed largely from the media itself, but as the case progressed,
the one-sided nature of the coverage may also have been the result of
official management of the media. Attempts by at least some in the media to argue on behalf of the referee, Gong Jianping, were stymied by
editors who were concerned that doing so would offend the
procuratorate and Xinhua.
Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that the phenomenon of media impact on judges and courts extends to a wide range of
cases. 425 This impression is supported by lawyers who actively seek media
assistance. Lawyers state that in civil cases media presence plays a positive
role in forcing judges to comply with the law and legal procedures, or in
42 6
compelling courts to accept cases that they would otherwise avoid.
Lawyers also comment that maintaining good relations with the media is
important, particularly when representing weak or disadvantaged clients
who are in disputes with locally influential persons or individuals, 42 7 and
journalists and lawyers both state that lawyers often seek outjournalists to
428
assist with cases.
The media's effect also depends on the type of coverage it uses. Although there is extensive coverage of legal cases in local papers, most
reports are factual; local judges say that local media are generally more
interested in obtaining news than in affecting outcomes. 42 9 Local media
coverage in "routine" cases often has little effect. 43 0 Local journalists
state that they generally avoid editorializing and instead report only on
the arguments in, and facts of, pending cases. 43 1 Nevertheless, some local judges complain that local journalists clearly try to influence the out425. See Zhao, Alienation of Media Supervision, supra note 161 (arguing that media
reports, in particular those using emotional language, are hard for courts to ignore,
especially because of their influence on officials, and that courts sometimes have no option
but to listen to media).
426. See, e.g., Interview 2003-72 (discussing case in which media scrutiny resulted in
courts strictly following legal procedures).
427. See, e.g., Interview 2003-25 (describing cooperation with media to help
disadvantaged parties to litigation); Interview 2003-50 (discussing use of media to highlight
claims prior to filing suit); see also Zhang Dong & Guo Weiqun, Tingshang Hao Fengcai,
Gongfu Zai Tingwai-TanJingji Anjian De Caozuo [Good Demeanor in Court, Hard Work
Is Outside the Courtroom-Discussing the Stirring Up of Economic Cases], 2000
Zhongguo Lfishi [Chinese Lawyer) No. 11, at 58 (describing how news media can be
effective way to "solve problems through public opinion supervision").
428. Interview 2003-24; Interview 2003-62; Interview 2003-72. In addition, lawyers
assist the media by providing informal legal advice to journalists regarding potential
stories, in part in order to maintain good relationships with the media. Interview 2003-72.
429. Interview 2003-20. Local journalists say that the need to maintain good working
relationships with the courts prevents them from engaging in critical reports. See infra
Part II.E (discussing court management of media coverage).
430. Interview 2003-20.
431. Interview 2003-23.
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come of pending cases, in particular when a news organization itself is a
4 32
party.
Media influence has drawn heavy criticism, in particular from legal
academics and judges. Critics comment that in many cases the media
chao, or "stir up," public opinion, creating a sensation in order to increase
their effect and boost sales. Commentators have condemned "media adjudication," 43 3 accusing the media of being one sided in many cases on
which they report. 43 4 Critics state that although media coverage may resolve matters, its effectiveness demonstrates that "the rule of man remains
more powerful than the rule of law."'4 35 Rather than signaling a new role
for public opinion in ensuring court fairness, the media are continuing
to play the extrajudicial roles that they have played since 1949. Critics
either blame the traditional role of the media in Chinese society since
4 36
1949 for popular views that the media have the power to decide cases,
or contend that7 China's media are returning to Cultural Revolution-style
43
adjudication.
432. Interview 2003-20.
433. Wei, Popular Opinion Supervision, supra note 233; Yu Leiyan, Jingti Ling
Yizhong Baquan [Be on the Alert for Another Type of Hegemony], Xinhua Wang Hunan
Pindao [Xinhua Web Hunan Channel], Apr. 5, 2001, at http://www.hn.xinhua.org/news/
2001-4-5/0145183801.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Yu, Be on
the Alert]; see also Liu, Draft Proposals, supra note 221 (summarizing criticism of
excessive media involvement); Wang, Objectivity and Subjectivity, supra note 321
(summarizing academic criticism of media interference in pending cases). One online
report stated that although the media in Hunan Province played an important role in
exposing corruption, in many cases the media issued "decisions" before a person was
actually tried, violating the principle in the revised Criminal Procedure Law that a
defendant is presumed innocent prior to trial. Liu Hui, Meiti Shenpan Beihou De Renzhi
Laoyin [The Stamp or Rule by Man Behind Adjudication by the Press], Xinhua Wang
at http://
Hunan Pindao [Xinhua Web Hunan Channel], Apr. 5, 2001,
(on file with the Columbia Law
www.hn.xinhua.org/news/2001-4-5/0145183907.htm
Review); see also Fan Tingliao et al., Yulun Jiandu Yu Falfi Yishi [Popular Opinion
Supervision and Legal Consciousness], Xin Chuanbo Zixun Wang [New Broadcasting
Information Web], June 5, 2001 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting that
media's own lack of legal consciousness is responsible for view that the press is an
adjudicator); Yu, Be on the Alert, supra (stating that behind media adjudication is "media
hegemony" and criticizing the media for condemning suspects as guilty before trial).
434. Cai, Media Adjudication, supra note 323; Huang, New Model, supra note 44; Ye,
Fairness, supra note 358; see also Cheng, Supervision, supra note 164 (stating that media
tend to "blindly follow the prevailing wind" in reporting); Yu, Be on the Alert, supra note
433 (stating that media, in their drive to expand their audiences, often simply echo what
others are stating).
435. Ye, Fairness, supra note 358 (accusing Focus of also using "popular logic" to
influence case); see also Liang, Study and Society, supra note 357, at 277 (stating that
media substituted morality for law in the Jiajiang Color Factory case).
436. See Chen, Not Enough, supra note 142 (stating that the public must recognize
that the media are neither decisionmakers nor administrative bodies).
437. See Cai, Media Adjudication, supra note 323 (comparing current media
coverage of criminal cases to media's role in Cultural Revolution); Huang, New Model,
supra note 44 (arguing that some in Chinese media continue to operate as they did during
Cultural Revolution, using words in media to determine guilt); see also Wei, Journalism
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In the ZhangJinzhu case, critics agreed with Zhang's assessment that
he was executed by the media. 43 3 They contended that the facts showed
that Zhang was not intentionally seeking to harm his victims and thus
should not have been sentenced to death. 43 9 Additionally, a report by a
Guangzhou public security bureau official argued that media coverage of
criminal cases, including the Du Shugui case, has often been unfair and
biased against defendants, in particular in prosecutions of police wrongdoing. 440 In the Jiajiang Color Factory case, academics criticized the behavior of the courts and the press. Critics noted the necessity of permitting wrongdoers to use the legal system to protect their rights4 4 ' and
argued that the media, in particular Focus, had turned a complex legal
44 2
question into a "simple question of moral right and wrong."
Judges often protest that media reports are generally concerned only
with ethics or morality, not with law, and that it can be very difficult for a
court to issue a decision contrary to media views. 44 3 They note that media influence on judges is most pronounced at the local level. 444 Judges
comment that even when they desire to resist media pressure, they are
unable to do so. "Every time courts try to resist, they lose," noted one
judge;4 45 when the media have a different view of the truth from the
courts, the media's view wins. 446 Party leaders are likely to pressure
courts, either indirectly or directly through written instructions, to resolve the case in line with the media's view. 4 4 7 Although acknowledging
and Communication Law, supra note 44, at 114 (arguing that recent phenomenon of
media adjudication may have its roots in Cultural Revolution era class struggle); Tong
Dahuan, Yulun Jiandu De Beizhuang Liliang [The Solemn and Stirring Force of Popular
Opinion Supervision], Nanfang Dushi Bao [Southern Metropolitan Daily], Apr. 11, 2002,
available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paperl787/6216/615428.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (equating media supervision, in particular criticism of
individuals, to Cultural Revolution era "big character posters").

438. See Zha Qingjiu, Anhui "Yanjiusheng Yuhai An" Yinfa Zhenglun, Meiti Shi
Jiandu Haishi "Chaozuo" [Anhui "Case of Graduate Student Running into Harm" Results

in Debate, Is the Media Supervising or Is It "Stirring"?], Fazhi Ribao [Legal Daily], Feb. 22,
2001, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/46/20010222/401624.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).

439. See Wang, Objectivity and Subjectivity, supra note 321; see also Yang Shuwen,
Falfi Zhongyu Minfen [Law Is Stronger than Popular Rage], Nanfang Zhoumo [Southern
Weekend], Mar. 24, 2000, available at http://www.jc.gov.cn/personal/ysxs/fnsxl/
fnsx721.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (criticizing media influence in criminal
trials and arguing that crimes should be fixed by law, not media).

440. Sun, Thoughts, supra note 7.
441. Ye, Fairness, supra note 358.
442. He, Two Questions, supra note 297; see also Interview 2003-45 (arguing that in
covering cases, media simply substitutes their view of right and wrong for that of the
court); Yu, Be on the Alert, supra note 433 (criticizing media for appealing to ethics, not
law).
443. Interview 2003-45.

444.
445.
446.
447.

See Interview 2003-33; Interview 2003-43.
Interview 2003-19.
Id.
Interview 2003-45; Interview 2003-70.
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problems in the courts,judges argue that the media are just as corrupt as
those in the courts and that journalists are often ignorant of the law.44 8
Some in the media have not taken kindly to such criticism, arguing,
for example, that it is laughable to state that the media have the power to
convict. If reporters had such power, they argue, "this would be a much
cleaner country," with no corruption or injustice. 4 4 9 Journalists involved
in the ZhangJinzhu case argued that they had simply reflected "popular
rage" and in doing so acted primarily to make Party-state leaders aware of
the case. As one journalist who covered the case commented, although
Zhang's sentence may have been heavy, media coverage was accurate,
and thus "if the court was influenced, that was up to them." 450 Others
paint heroic pictures of the journalists who reported on the case, noting
that they persisted in the face of death threats; journalists, they proclaim,
must be "utterly fearless" in order to fight corruption. 45 1 Journalists
claim that they are less corrupt, better educated, and more concerned
with fairness than are courts.4 52 Accordingly, they believe journalists are
actually more likely to evaluate cases correctly. Journalists also blame
courts for failing to cooperate with the media or allow open coverage of
court activities. 45 3 They argue that media supervision is essential to maintaining any semblance of fairness in the legal system. In a system in
which courts are often closely linked to local political and economic interests, it may be exceedingly difficult for ordinary people to win lawsuits
against such interests: As one journalist commented, "if people rely on
45 4
ordinary judicial paths, they can't win."
Observing the impact of public reports in individual cases is far easier than demonstrating the media's impact on court development across
a range of cases. Some in the media have argued that numerous cases
nearly identical to those they report on go unresolved, or result in unfair
decisions, because absent media coverage courts feel little pressure to follow the law. Nevertheless, media coverage of egregious cases may play a
role in pressing for changes to the courts-and to the legal system more
generally-even if at the same time the media's influence may be leading
455
courts to block media coverage.
448. Interview 2003-55; see also Interview 2003-45 (stating that media coverage often
forces judges to ignore the law).
449. Chi, supra note 317; see also How to View Popular Opinion Supervision, supra
note 281 (quoting procuratorate official as stating that media supervision is "weak
supervision" that only has limited impact on court independence).
450. Interview 2003-160.
451. Tang, Discussing Popular Opinion Supervision, supra note 310.
452. Interview 2003-4; Interview 2003-22; Interview 2003-48; Interview 2003-52; see
also Interview 2003-73 (arguing that there are few limits on power of courts in China);
Interview 2003-136 (commenting that difference between commercialized media and
courts is that "if you privatized the courts, all the judges would be unemployed").
453. See Lao, supra note 352.
454. Interview 2003-46.
455. See infra Part II.E (discussing restrictions on journalists' ability to cover court
proceedings).
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Recent examples demonstrate that media coverage, although damaging to many defendants, may boost legal awareness and apply public pressure for reform that extends beyond a single case. In the Sun Zhigang
case, extensive media coverage resulted in orchestrated trials in which the
defendants had little chance of being acquitted, but coverage also
demonstrated that channeled public opinion can be a factor leading to
changes in the legal system. The Sun Zhigang case also marked the first
instance of significant public discussion of mechanisms for reviewing unconstitutional laws and regulations. Similarly, media outcry in late 2002
over a case in which a married couple was detained for watching pornographic videos in their home led to extensive media discussion of privacy
rights, as well as to punishment of the police officials responsible for raid456
ing the couple's home.
B. Internal Publications
Public news reports are just one of the weapons in the arsenal of
journalists seeking to affect judicial outcomes. Internal publications are
another weapon. As Part I discussed, most major Party papers in China
publish internal editions, confidential reports circulated to officials of a
certain rank. This section discusses in greater detail the importance of
these internal editions in bringing potentially sensitive matters to the attention of Chinese officials, and in particular the use of internal editions
to affect court cases.
Internal publications are an important tool for supervision by traditional Party media. The media use such accounts to report on matters
that cannot be published or broadcast publicly as a result of the subject
matter's sensitivity, because of media fears of reprisals by targets of cover45 7
age, or because such reports have been blocked by interested parties.
456. The same paper that broke the story regarding the couple, the HuashangNews in
Xi'an, similarly touched off national discussion regarding the role of defense lawyers when
it ran an article describing how a Shaanxi lawyer had won a stay of execution for a client by
seeking out in person a judge of the Supreme People's Court. Interview 2003-13.
457. Interview 2002-10; Interview 2003-75; see Chen Jie, Neican Yinqi Zhongyang
Guanzhu [Internal Reports Attract the Attention of the Center], Renmin Wang [People's
Daily Online], Jan. 28, 2002 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Chen,
Internal Reports] (recounting that journalist covering a story of needle stabbings in
Tianjin first wrote article in internal report and deferred writing public report until suspect
had been arrested so as to avoid causing public panic); Chu Aizhong, Huyu Xinwen Lifa,
Baozhang Yulun Jiandu Quanli [Calling Out for News Legislation, Protect the Rights of
Popular Opinion Supervision], Renmin Wang [People's Daily Online], Mar. 6, 2002, at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/7501/7516/20020306/680521.html
(on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that internal reports are used where the media
cannot immediately expose a matter); Zhu, Discussing Opportunities, supra note 150
(arguing that internal reports should be used to obtain the views of government leaders in
certain cases); Interview 2003-117 (commenting that eighty percent of all reports blocked
from broadcast on Focus are submitted as internal reports).
Hebei Daily, the Party paper for Hebei Province, states on its website that the purpose
of its internal publications is to provide information to government and Party leaders
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Internal reports are of particular importance in informing Party-state
leaders of alleged misconduct by officials above county rank or where the
subjects of potentially critical reports possess significant power. 45 8 The
media also use internal reports to highlight new problems, to avoid reporting excessively negative news in their public editions or broadcasts,
to complaints
or to highlight the failure of government actors to4 respond
59
from both individuals and the media themselves.
There is no rigid division between topics suitable for public reports
and those appropriate for internal reports. In some cases, journalists simultaneously write articles for public and internal reports, and the two
may feed off each other to put pressure on Party officials to intervene in a
case. For example, during the black whistle scandal, the Xinhua reporter
who covered the story supplemented public articles with internal reports. 4 60 During May 2003, Xinhua issued internal reports regarding the
Sun Zhigang case. 46 1 Internal reports may pave the way for public reporting by making relevant officials aware of an issue in advance of public
broadcast or publication, thereby allowing officials the opportunity to in462
form the media if they do not approve of broadcast or publication.
Thus public media coverage of a local government cover-up of the 2001
Nandan mining disaster 4 6 3 -widely regarded as a successful example of
the media exposing official malfeasance-was preceded the day before by
464
an internal report regarding the incident.
regarding new circumstances, new problems, important news, problems in implementing
Party policies, the views and demands of the masses, and the general trend of thought in
society. Internal Reference Develops Use as Eyes and Ears, supra note 76.
Not all information in internal reports is sensitive; in many cases, internal reports are
filled with information that the media either feel compelled to provide or believe leaders
want them to provide, regardless of the sensitivity of the content. Interview 2003-168.
458. Interview 2002-10; Interview 2003-75; see, e.g., He, Internal Reports, supra note
37 (commenting that lower-ranking officials fear public reports, while higher-ranking
officials fear internal reports).
459. Interview 2003-4; Zhu, Discussing Opportunities, supra note 150 (arguing that
internal reports should be used to avoid too many negative or critical reports in public
media and to maintain "overall direction" of propaganda).
460. Tao et al., supra note 330; see Yang Ming, Hei Shao [Black Whistle] 1 (2002).
461. See Interview 2003-170 (stating that Xinhua issued internal report in Sun case);
Dai & Wan, supra note 371 (quoting Sun Zhigang's father as thanking central media that
issued internal reports in case).
462. Interview 2003-4; see also Internal Reference Develops Use as Eyes and Ears,
supra note 76 (stating that one purpose of Hebei Daily's internal report is to obtain views of
leaders when paper is not sure how to proceed in covering story).
463. See supra note 260.
464. The reporters who broke the story publicly by posting an article on the People's
Daily website, Renmin Wang, filed an internal report to the central government on the
incident one day before publishing the story online. Zheng et al., supra note 122;
Interview 2003-3; Interview 2003-10. Although the reaction to the internal report was
unclear, it appears likely that the internal report paved the way for the public reports. See
Chen, Internal Reports, supra note 457 (stating that internal reports can help expand the
space for public opinion supervision by the media); Zhu, Discussing Opportunities, supra
note 150 (arguing that internal reports should be used before publishing critical reports in
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Some observers and journalists comment that internal reports are
not as effective as public reports, despite the more sensitive content of
internal reports. Party officials can respond only to a small portion of the
written internal reports, and only the highest-ranking publications or programs can be sure that their internal reports will reach central Party leaders. Party officials, like the public, have more information sources than
they did a few years ago and may rely less on internal reports than they
did in the past. Moreover, officials may feel greater pressure to respond
where a publication or broadcast has placed the issue in the public domain. Targets of internal reports may use connections within the Partystate hierarchy to resist pressure from internal reports and to dissuade
higher-level government officials from acting. 4 6 5 By contrast, where an
issue has already become public it may be more difficult for higher-level
officials to ignore the matter. 4 66 Thus, journalists at both People's Daily
and CCTV comment that critical public reports are significantly more
influential than their internal reports. 467 At Focus, for example, while
nearly all problems raised in public reports are solved, most issues raised
in the program's internal reports are never addressed. 4 6
Others disagree, however, commenting that internal reports continue to be the most important route for the news media to inform and
affect decisions by Party-state leaders. 469 In contrast to public reports,
internal reports appeal directly to Party leaders: While only a fraction of
all internal reports are likely to grab the attention of leaders, when they
do so, results are often immediate. Internal reports may also transform
otherwise minor cases or disputes into items of major concern for Party
officials.
the public media, so as to allow the relevant authorities time to carry out an investigation);
Hunan Ribao Qungong Bu [Hunan Daily Mass Work Department], Fahui Dangbao Yulun
Jiandu Youshi, Lewei Qunzhong Paiyou Jienan [Develop the Strength of Party Papers in
Popular Opinion Supervision, Happily Eliminate Worries and Solve Difficulties for the
Masses] (Mar. 1996) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Hunan Daily Mass
Work Department] (describing how Hunan Daily first published an internal publication
regarding complaint from reader who had lost his job in local government after being
involved in fight, and then, after municipal leaders confirmed that contents of complaint
were correct but failed to resolve problem, published complaint as letter in public edition
of newspaper).
465. In general, if the target of a critical report blocks coverage by appealing to Partystate officials or to editors, the publication concerned will not be able to publish either a
public report or an internal report. Interview 2003-3.
466. See Interview 2002-7.
467. Interview 2003-114; Interview 2003-117.
468. Interview 2003-117.
469. See Interview 2003-67; see also Wang, Special Role, supra note 77 (discussing the
continued importance of internal reports despite the increased availability of public
information). The effectiveness of internal reports may also depend on the individual
journalist writing the report. Well-connected or well-known journalists at key Party media
outlets may be able to ensure that their internal reports reach specific Party leaders; other
journalists may find it difficult to ensure that their reports are even included in their
publication's internal reports.
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Internal reports are an important mechanism for informing leadership at each level of the Party-state of sensitive cases and for affecting
individual case outcomes. 470 At certain legal periodicals, most internal
reports are concerned with pending cases. 47 1 Internal reports for nonspecialist publications or programs also concern court cases. 472 Although
the frequency with which such reports are issued varies depending on the
media outlet, internal reports appear to be at least as important a route
for influencing cases as public reports. 4 73 Indeed, these reports may be
more effective: In some cases, newspapers that do not generally report
publicly on pending cases will report internally on pending cases they
47 4
view as problematic.
The media send internal reports on pending cases to local or national leaders, depending on the nature of the case and the media outlet
responsible for the internal report. For example, some Xinhua internal
reports are sent directly to the very highest level of the Party-state. 47 5 Internal reports from Legal Daily are circulated to the top officials of the
Ministry of Justice and the Party's Central Political-Legal Committee. Internal reports of Democracy and Law, a national legal magazine, are forwarded to the Central Political-Legal Committee and also to the politicallegal committee of the province concerned. 476 Provincial media internal
reports on cases are sent to provincial leaders and officials responsible for
legal matters. Internal reports attracting Party-state officials' interest
often result in written instructions from such officials, either directing
that the case be handled in a certain way or simply stating that the case
477
0
should be "emphasized."
470. Interview 2003-3.
471. Id.; Interview 2003-73. Although media reports describing the use of internal
reports to affect outcomes in court cases are scarce, there are occasional discussions of the
use of such reports. See, e.g., Zhang Huiwen & Zhu Xiaofeng, Qingnian Huajia Gaodao
Zhongguo Meixie [Young Painter Sues China Fine Arts Association], 1997 Zhongguo
Lfishi [Chinese Lawyer] No. 10, at 5 (describing internal report by GuangmingDailyin case
by artist against China Fine Arts Association).
472. Preparing internal reports on pending cases is also an important aspect of the
work ofjournalists stationed at the local level for Xinhua and the China News Agency, the
two national news agencies. See Interview 2003-31.
473. See Interview 2003-3 (stating that internal reports are important mechanism for
affecting cases); Interview 2003-14 (commenting that internal reports, including
influential internal reports of Xinhua and People's Daily, fiequently discuss individual
cases); Interview 2003-26 (stating that internal reports remain extremely effective).
474. For example, People's Daily generally only reports publicly on cases after courts
have issued a decision; if the paper wishes to highlight a problem with a pending case, it
does so via an internal report. Interview 2003-67.
475. Interview 2003-3.
476. Id.
477. Interview 2003-45; Interview 2003-97. The fact that an internal report is
distributed does not guarantee success. The volume of such reports makes it impossible
for all to receive attention from leadership; as one observer commented, there are too
many problems for leaders to issue instructions regarding every problematic case.

20051

WATCHDOG OR DEMAGOGUE?

Journalists most often write internal reports about cases where a first
instance court has issued an opinion that the journalist believes is unfair.
Most reports are thus written with a particular outcome or goal in mind.
In many instances, journalists learn of the case from the aggrieved party.
Generally in such cases, the journalist's aim in writing an internal report
is to pressure the appellate court to reverse or alter the decision, or to
make the Supreme People's Court aware of the case in the hope that the
court will review or intervene in the case. 478 When such reports are effective, often the case is retried. 479 In other cases, journalists may use internal reports to report on cases that have been filed but that have languished without court action. The media also use internal reports to
report on pending cases they deem particularly important, where they are
concerned that the court handling the case may not do so fairly or where
initial public reporting on the case has failed to have the desired
48 0
effect.
Judges and lawyers comment that internal reports can be extremely
influential. 48 1 Judges explain that internal reports are often more effective than public reports because they are more likely to be read by, and
result in instructions from, Party officials. 482 Judges receiving such an
instruction are under enormous pressure to resolve the case as instructed. 483 Although journalists argue that they use internal reports to
force courts to decide cases fairly, judges contend that internal reports
often are a mechanism for parties with connections or relationships to
484
journalists to influence outcomes.
The media also use internal reports to address inaction by
procuratorates. For example, when the ProcuratorateDaily first learned of
alleged criminal activities by the head of the public security bureau in a
municipality in Shanxi Province, it reported on the case in its internal
edition. As a result, the official was arrested. The case was subsequently
reported in the public version of the paper. 4 85 Internal reports may also
Interview 2003-3; see also Interview 2003-166 (stating that in 1997 CCTV reports resulted
in seventy-three written instructions from members of Politburo).
478. Interview 2003-3.
479. Id.
480. Interview 2003-4; Interview 2003-31. In other cases, journalists may publish
internal reports on pending cases first, then follow up such reports with public reports.
481. Interview 2003-20; Interview 2003-33; Interview 2003-45; Interview 2003-65;
Interview 2003-72.
482. Interview 2003-20; Interview 2003-89.
483. Interview 2003-3. Whether or not an internal report generates an instruction
depends in part on the media outlet that has produced the report, with reports by People's
Daily and Xinhua most likely to result in intervention by Party-state leaders. At People's
Daily, for example, approximately half of all internal reports result in instructions from
senior officials. Interview 2003-67; see also Internal Reference Develops Use as Eyes and
Ears, supra note 76 (noting that 22 of 465 articles published in internal reports of Hebei
Daily in 1998 resulted in "important instructions" from central or provincial leaders).
484. Interview 2003-20; Interview 2003-45.
485. Wang, Supervise, supra note 146.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105:1

influence lawmaking. Reporters state that one goal of what they write in
internal reports is to bring certain issues to the attention of leadership
and to suggest legal or policy changes.
Internal reports have one additional advantage over public reports
for journalists, in particular those engaging in critical reporting: A 1998
Supreme People's Court interpretation regarding defamation states that,
unlike other forms of news reporting, internal reports prepared for "leaders" are immune from liability for defamation. 48 6 Journalists comment
that they use internal reports to write more detailed analyses of cases than
they can in public reports, or where they do not have sufficient evidence
to back up the claims in their reports. 4 87 Thus internal reports may provide both legal and political cover to journalists.
C. Formal Referral Mechanisms: Mass Work Departments
The importance of internal reports reflects the persistence of the
media's close ties to the Party-state despite commercialization and expanded editorial autonomy. The role of many media outlets in receiving
popular complaints and referring them to other government actors further underscores the media's position as a Party-state institution. Commercialization has altered and, in some cases, weakened this role, but for
many media outlets, especially newspapers, receiving and forwarding
complaints remains an important corollary to public and internal reporting. Even at outlets where formal referrals have lessened in importance,
the system has facilitated other forms of media influence.
At the national, provincial, and local levels, most major Party newspapers and many Party magazines have departments responsible for receiving and addressing citizens' complaints, known as mass work departments, or qunzhong gongzuo bu. 48 8 Akin to the letters and visits offices, or
486. Zuigao Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Mingyuquan Anjian Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi
[Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the Trial of Cases Concerning the Right
of Reputation] (Sept. 15, 1998); Shiping: Neican Jingcheng Zhengju? [View: Can
Internal Reports Be Evidence?], Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], Mar. 28, 2002, available at
http://www.hotiong.com/newsv2/2002-03-28/2/260012.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (criticizing company for suing for defamation when reporter issued internal
report stating that banks should refrain from issuing loans to the company due to its poor
financial conditions).
Another aspect of internal reports may also shield reporters from retribution by local
officials: In the case of most internal publications by national media, local government
officials will not be of high enough rank to view the reports. Interview 2003-4.
487. Interview 2003-4; Interview 2003-15.
488. Many television and radio stations have similar departments, although with
different names: At Chinese Central Radio, for example, the department is known as the
"listeners' work department." Interview 2003-5. For a discussion of the working of the
mass work department at one local radio station, see Datong Shi Guangbo Diantai
[Dadong Municipality Radio Station], Fahui Houshe Zuoyong, Jiaqi Dangqun Qiaoliang
[Develop Use as a Mouthpiece, Strengthen the Bridge Between Party and People], at
http://www.dtzc.gov.cn/szdhl6.htm (last visited June 16, 2003) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). Commercialized or mass-market publications generally do not have mass

20051

WATCHDOG OR DEMAGOGUE?

xinfang,489 that exist to receive and process complaints at most levels of
the Party-state and at most central government and Party departments,
490
mass work departments handle both letters and visits from individuals.
Traditionally, mass work departments manage relations between the media and readers. Mass work departments both serve as an official
ombudsman and help to inform Party-state leaders of trends in popular
opinion, particularly popular grievances. Although they lack legally prework departments, Interview 2003-26; Interview 200346; Interview 2003-52; Interview 200380, although they may have other mechanisms, such as telephone hotlines, for fielding
complaints and receiving news tips from readers.
489. Work of the mass work departments is considered to be a form of letters and
visits work, and in many areas is directly coordinated with the local letters and visits offices
and committees of the government and Party, with representatives of media mass work
departments serving as members of the local Party letters and visits committee. For
example, a report on the activities of the Hunan Daily Mass Work Department in 1995
described how, in addition to working on certain articles for the paper, most members of
the department were engaged in "letters and visits work." Hunan Daily Mass Work
Department, supra note 464; see also Fu Changbo, Qingting Duzhe Husheng, Weihu
Duzhe Quanyi-2002 Nian Benbao Qunzhong Gongzuobu Laixin Laifang Chuli Gongzuo
Zongshu [Listen to the Readers' Voices, Uphold Readers' Interest-Summarizing This
Newspaper's Mass Work Department's Handling of Letters and Visits in 2002], Renmin
Ribao [People's Daily], Jan. 9, 2003, at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/8203/
774307.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing "letters and visits" work of
People's Daily Mass Work Department). For a discussion of the role of letters and visits
offices, see Thomas P. Bernstein & Xiaobo Lu, Taxation Without Representation in
Contemporary Rural China 177-86 (2003) (discussing letters and visits offices, including
mass work departments); Tianjian Shi, Political Participation in Beijing 107 (1992)
[hereinafter Shi, Political Participation] (discussing letters and visits offices in Beijing).
For a discussion of the lodging of complaints in rural areas, see generally Kevin J. O'Brien
& Lianjiang Li, The Politics of Lodging Complaints in Rural China, 1995 China Q. 756
(discussing strategies for pursuing complaints in rural areas). Visiting media offices,
especially those in Beijing, is often part of a strategy of visiting the letters and visits offices
of various state entities. See, e.g., Zhao Zhigang & Zhao Lin, Yongyi Zhisi Nfijiaoshi,
Zhongshen Panjue Shuo Wuzui, Shizhe Changyi Yi, Jiuquan Ke Mingmu? [Medical
Treatment Kills a Female Teacher, Final Judgment Says There Is No Crime, It Is Too Late
for the One Who Had Died, Can She Close Her Eyes in the Netherworld?], Zhuozhuo
Huafa Wang [Zhuozhuo Huafa Web], at http://www.zzhf.com/detail.asp?id=219 (last
visitedJune 17, 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing how complainant
sought redress from various government departments and media outlets before attracting
attention of ProcuratorateDaily).
490. Mass work sections have existed at major newspapers since the 1950s and may be
among the largest departments at major newspapers. See Nathan, supra note 32, at
156-57. Mass work sections closed during the Cultural Revolution, and were reopened in
the early 1980s as part of efforts to renew the press's role as an investigative arm of the
Party-state. Id. at 183; see also Won Ho Chang, Mass Media in China 106-08 (1989)
(discussing People's Daily's Mass Work Department and its practice of referring readers'
letters to government and Party departments in 1980s); Shi, Political Participation, supra
note 489, at 111-15 (discussing role of mass work departments as forum for citizen
complaints). Mass work departments were particularly active immediately after the
Cultural Revolution, in particular in handling appeals and claims by those who had
suffered during the Cultural Revolution. Interview 2003-114; Interview 2003-170.
Discussion of mass work departments has been largely absent from recent Englishlanguage scholarship on the Chinese media.
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scribed roles, the mass work offices, in some respects, serve in a position
similar to a state ombudsman in other nations-in particular in Scandina49 1
via-with broad powers to investigate citizens' complaints.
The number of complaints that media outlets receive can be massive,
with high-ranking media receiving the largest number of letters and visits. 492 The large volume of such appeals reflects the view of many that an

appeal to the media is an effective route to having a grievance addressed.
Indeed, some in the media complain that their readers or viewers have
excessively high hopes with respect to the media's ability to provide assistance; the result is that the media receive far more appeals for assistance
than they can handle. 49 3 Specialist publications often receive complaints
relating to areas of perceived expertise-in particular complaints regarding topics on which they previously reported. For example, after Democracy and Law published a report exposing excessive detention by police
and the procuratorate, others with similar grievances inundated the mag494
azine with complaints.
The precise ways in which mass work departments operate vary from
publication to publication. In general, complaints received are first vet491. Cf. Walter Gelihorn, Ombudsmen and Others (1966) (discussing role of
ombudsmen in nine countries); 1 William Wade et al., Administrative Law: The Problem
of Justice, 353-60 (1991) (discussing role of ombudsman in Sweden).
492. See, e.g., Interview 2003-3 (stating that People's Daily receives hundreds of letters
a day); Interview 2003-4 (reporting that Workers Daily receives up to 1,000 letters a day);
Interview 2003-108 (stating that many people bring complaints to finghua Shibao, even
though it lacks mass work department, because the paper is subsidiary of People's Daily and
is perceived to be influential); Chan, supra note 125, at 38 (noting that Focus receives more
than one thousand letters a day, many of which are complaints about local wrongdoing);
Fu, supra note 489 (stating that People's Daily received 102,300 letters and 1,432 in-person
visits in 2002, with seventy percent of the letters and ninety-five percent of the visits coming
from persons carrying out "popular opinion supervision" or seeking assistance); Gengduo
Xuanfa Qunzhong Laixin [Select and Send out More Letters from the Masses], Hebei
Ribao [Hebei Daily], at http://www.hebnet.net/mag10/nl/colart10885.html (last visited
June 16, 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that Hebei Daily on average
receives 2,100 letters and more than 800 visits a year); Hunan Daily Mass Work
Department, supra note 464 (stating that in 1995 the Hunan Daily mass work department
received more than 11,000 letters and 900 visits, and solved more than 300 problems).
Reliance on letters, and the large volume of letters received, is not a new phenomenon.
People'sDaily received some 30,000 to 50,000 letters a month during the 1980s. The paper
published a selection of letters in a daily eight-page internal publication; many of these
made complaints against government policy or highlighted alleged illegal conduct. Hood,
supra note 37, at 41.
493. See Cai, Calling Out, supra note 227 (reporting comments by host of show on
national radio that far more people come to station every day with complaints than can
possibly be addressed); Sheng Cheng, Ganga De Bujin Shi Meiti [It Is Not Only the Media
Who Are Awkward], Zhongguo Qingnian Bao [China Youth Daily], July 4, 1998, at 6,
available at http://www.cyd.com.cn/cyd/zqb/pwk/qsp/9238AQQ204.htm (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (reporter for China Youth Daily stating that people come long
distances to file complaints with paper and that many ordinary people trust only media,
not other departments).
494. Interview 2003-3.
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ted, and then, if deemed appropriate for further action, handled in one
of three ways. 49 5 First, a very small number of popular complaints are
deemed appropriate for further investigation and potential coverage as a
news item either internally or in a public edition. In these cases, complaints are referred to reporters for further investigation. 496 Second, a
few letters may be selected for publication, either in the public edition or
in an internal publication. 49 7 Third, the mass work department may refer
the matter directly to a responsible government or Party actor, with a
request that such authority look into the matter and take appropriate
498
steps to address the complaint.
Complaint referrals are the most significant aspect of the work of
mass work departments, and they highlight the degree to which reporters
may be able to use their position to influence Party-state actors even absent publication. The frequency with which the media forward complaints and their effectiveness in doing so varies from publication to publication and from journalist to journalist. Some national papers select
495. These are rough categories, and are not necessarily mutually exclusive. At
People's Daily, for example, a report on the mass work department noted that complaints
may be "publishedas letters, may be referred for publication in the paper's internal report,
or may lead to reports in the public edition of the paper. See Zhao & Wang, supra note
121 (summarizing work of People's Daily mass work department during the first half of
2001).
496. Interview 2003-3; Interview 2003-; Interview 2003-5; Interview 2003-114;
Interview 2003-170; Hood, supra note 37, at 41. At Legal Daily, the mass work department
in some cases refers complaints to lawyers for comment prior to deciding on whether the
paper should undertake further investigation. Interview 2002-5.
497. Interview 2003-3 (commenting that certain letters are collected and published in
internal report); Interview 2003-4 (same); Interview 2003-114 (same); see also HunanDaily
Mass Work Department, supra note 464 (stating that, in 1995, 109 letters out of 11,000
received were selected for publication in newspaper, while small number that reflected
particularly serious questions not appropriate for publication were collected and
forwarded to relevant Party-state leaders); Fu, supra note 489 (reporting that People's Daily
Mass Work Department published 327 internal reports in 2002 and published 31 public
articles based on complaints received); Select and Send Out More Letters from the Masses,
supra note 492 (describing selection of letters by Hebei Daily for publication in internal
report).
498. Interview 2002-5; Interview 2002-10; Interview 2003-41; Interview 2003-97;
Interview 2003-109; Interview 2003-114. Such referrals are more common than either of
the first two mechanisms for handling complaints. At People'sDaily, for example, the mass
work department refers approximately twenty percent of all letters received to other Partystate, actors; the remainder are generally discarded. Interview 2003-170; see also Fu, supra
note 489 (describing handling of complaints by People's Daily Mass Work department);
HunanDaily Mass Work Department, supra note 464 (stating that in case of problems that
can be solved locally, letters are sent directly to local authorities). Media with expertise in
particular areas, such as law, are likely to have greatest effect when referring matters that
relate to their expertise. Interview 2002-5. The mechanism by which the mass work
departments handle complaints appears largely similar to that in place in the 1980s,
although the frequency with which complaints are forwarded appears to have decreased.
Cf. Nathan, supra note 32, at 156-57 (describing mass work sections of newspapers in early
1980s, and noting that "[a]ll letters are supposed to be either answered or passed on to
relevant party or government offices for action").
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complaints they believe should be addressed and forward these to local
authorities with a cover letter requesting a reply within twenty or thirty
days. 4 9 9 Provincial papers may forward reader complaints to the relevant
50 0
government departments along with a request for a timely response.
In some cases the cover letter explicitly states that the paper will publicly
report on the matter if no reply is received; 50 1 in other cases the threat of
publication is implicit. Papers may also refer complaints directly to Partystate leaders50 2 or may refer criminal matters to the relevant
5 03
authorities.
At many papers, decisions regarding whether to forward complaints
are left to individual journalists. Reporters state that they do this in some
cases where they have no intention of reporting; indeed, journalists use
referrals most often when they believe a complaint is serious and should
be addressed, but they do not view publication as likely, often because the
matter is not newsworthy. 50 4 The fact that a matter is referred does not
mean that the problem detailed in the complaint is solved. Recipients
frequently ignore referrals, but in some cases they either reply in writing
or visit the paper to discuss the matter.50 5 Response rates vary depending
on the media outlet forwarding the complaint. At Workers Daily, for example, about twenty-five percent of forwarded complaints are answered, 50 6 and at People's Daily, approximately forty percent.5 0 7 Where
499. Interview 2003-4; Interview 2003-97; Fu, supra note 489 (reporting that People's
Daily Mass Work Department referred 251 complaints to local or central government, or
Party departments, and referred additional 700 complaints to letters and visits departments
at other government or Party departments in 2002).
500. Interview 2003-22.
501. Interview 2003-5.
502. Zhu, Discussing Opportunities, supra note 150.
503. See Legal Supervision and Popular Opinion Supervision Prove Effective
Together, supra note 152 (recounting that media in Shaoxing refer any information
relating to crimes turned up through their letters and visits offices to local procuratorate).
504. Interview 2003-4; Interview 2003-73.
505. Interview 2003-4.
506. Interview 2003-165. A response does not mean that the problem has been
solved; in many cases, the response may state that the relevant authority will look into the
matter. Id.
507. Interview 2003-170; see also Fu, supra note 489 (reporting that fifty percent of
the referrals from the People's Daily Mass Work Department during 2002 received responses
by the end of the year). The percentage of referrals that result in replies has declined in
recent years. Compare id. (reporting a fifty percent response rate in 2002), with Wang
Baoyuan, Bixu Zhongshi Due Zhongdian Laixin De Diaocha Chuli-1994 Nian Benbao
Qunzhong Gongzuo Bu Fahan Huifu Qingkuang Fenxi [Attention Must Be Paid to the
Investigation of Important Letters-The Analysis of Responses to Inquiries Made by the
Mass Work Department of This Newspaper], Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], Aug. 14, 1995
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting seventy-eight percent response rate in
1994), and Wang Baoyuan, Yue Lu Gui Jing E Min Dengdi Zhongshi Xinfang Gongzuo
(Binzhoubei Toutiao Jingsai) [Guangdong, Shandong, Guangxi, Beijing, Hubei, Fujian,
Etc., Emphasize Letters and Visits Work (Binzhou Cup Headline Contest)], Renmin Ribao
[People's Daily], Nov. 5, 2000, at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/1865/
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reporters believe a complaint is particularly worthy of attention, they may
50 8
follow up with a telephone call if the initial referral is not answered.
Although television stations often do not have formal "mass work departments," many undertake similar roles via telephone complaint lines
linked to specific television programs. For example, a television journalist for an investigative news program on a local television station commented that the program's main goal is to solve problems raised by viewers, regardless of whether the program does so through a segment on the
show or informally. 50 9 Because the station does not have a mass work
department or a formal letters and visits office, most viewers' grievances
are transferred to the program. In many cases the program attempts to
solve problems even when airing a segment on the matter is unlikely,
often by calling the government department responsible for the matter in
a deliberate attempt to frighten relevant officials with the prospect of the
problem being exposed on television.5 10 Problem-solving television
shows, the journalist said, are a new form of letters and visits work:
Whereas in the past citizens with grievances would have raised them to
letters and visits offices, they increasingly turn directly to the media for
assistance. 5 11 Similarly, at CCTV, journalists may forward viewer complaints to local authorities, although the journalists themselves are un51 2
likely to follow up unless they intend to broadcast a story on the item.
Not all media refer complaints to government actors, 513 and those
that do so may employ different strategies. Journalists at local papers
transfer letters to other branches of local government, but they may lack
the formal power to request responses. 5 14 Publications with a particular
focus refer complaints to affiliated departments. For example, both the
newspaper China Women's News and the affiliated magazine Women of
China refer complaints to the letters and visits offices of national or local
5 15
women's associations.
A range of interests appear to inform decisions to refer cases to other
government actors. Papers may believe that continuing to refer letters
helps to preserve market share, as readers may be attracted to papers that
refer letters. Some journalists may do so to address what they perceive to
300328.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting eighty-seven percent
response rate in 1999).
508. Interview 2003-22.
509. Id.
510. Interview 2003-65. The program also transfers some written complaints to
government departments, although doing so is generally ineffective. Id.
511. Legal Report forwards many of the letters it receives to relevant central
government departments, although the program rarely receives responses. Interview 200383; Interview 2003-86.
512. Interview 2003-166.
513. See, e.g., Interview 2003-3 (stating that national legal magazine generally does
not forward complaints to other government departments).
514. Interview 2003-24.
515. Interview 200-10.
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be genuine grievances. In other cases, papers or individual journalists
may refer cases for much more bureaucratic reasons. Papers may keep
track of referrals because they consider them to be an important part of
their role as a Party institution. 516 Journalists may also forward complaints primarily in an effort to assuage complainants, especially those
who visit in person, with little expectation that doing so will have signifi5 17
cant effect.
Specialist legal publications, as well as national papers such as People's
Daily, refer complaints to courts, 5 1s but judges do not perceive media
referrals as a major source of pressure. 5 19 This may be due to the fact
that the primary effect of referrals appears to be to put pressure on authorities to address or solve problems and resolve disputes that have not
yet entered formal legal procedures. In addition, many such referrals relate to relatively minor complaints; major complaints are dealt with via
internal or public reports. But the lack of pressure on judges may also
reflect the fact that law-related referrals are more likely to go directly to
local government leaders, or to the local Party political-legal committee,
rather than to the courts.
Mass work departments appear to be declining in importance, with
some papers eliminating or changing the names of such departments to
deemphasize their role as a complaints bureau. 520 Some journalists comment that the volume of complaints received is decreasing;5 2' at People's
Daily, for example, the number of complaints has fallen by nearly half in
recent years. 5 22 At the same time, journalists are less likely to attempt to
516. See, e.g., Fu, supra note 489 (describing work of the People's Daily Mass Work
Department as an effective means of implementing Jiang Zemin's theory of "three
represents").
517. Interview 2003-3; Interview 2003-83; Interview 2003-101. In some cases,
government department letters and visits offices refer complainants to the media, perhaps
reflecting the belief that the media may be more effective in addressing problems,
Interview 2003-81, or perhaps in an attempt to shift the burden of responding to the
complaint elsewhere. In particular, letters and visits offices of various government entities
refer complaints to media affiliated with that department or institution. Interview 2003-10.
518. Interview 2002-5; Interview 2003-170. At People's Daily, all complaints regarding
courts in a particular province are forwarded to the relevant provincial high court
approximately once a month. Interview 2003-170.
519. Interview 2003-20.
520. Interview 2003-26; Interview 2003-39; Interview 2003-44; Interview 2003-170. At
Workers Daily, for example, the department has been renamed the "Law Department," and
it increasingly focuses on legal reporting instead of referral of complaints. Interview 20034.
521. Interview 2003-67; Interview 2003-73.
522. Interview 2003-114; see also Fu, supra note 489 (reporting that number of
complaints People's Daily Mass Work Department received in 2002 was lower than in
previous year). Compare id. (reporting 102,300 letters received in 2002), with Renmin
Ribao Qungongbu [People's Daily Mass Work Department], Zaixian Zhencheng-'97 Zhi
Duzhe [Present Sincerity Again-Dedication to Readers in '97], Renmin Ribao (People's
Daily], Jan. 6, 1997 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that People's Daily
received more than 200,000 letters in 1996).
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mandate responses, and recipients of transferred complaints appear increasingly willing to ignore such letters. 523 The decreasing influence of
mass work departments may stem from the recognition by targets of referrals that the media rarely follow up on referred complaints; absent a public or internal report, referrals are likely to produce little additional pressure on the target.
Some in the Chinese media argue that mass work offices are a relic
of the past, and that the media should not serve as government complaints offices. 524 The decrease in complaints may also reflect increasing
use of the courts by those with grievances.5 25 Some journalists say that
they increasingly find themselves not only referring complaints to other
526
actors, but also providing legal advice to persons who visit their offices.
The media, including official Party papers, may also be placing less emphasis on referrals as they face increased financial pressures: Forwarding
hundreds or thousands of complaints may be less crucial to maintaining
market share than writing a few public reports. The decline in appeals to
mass work departments might also be a result of the widening range of
media outlets. It is possible that individuals are focusing their appeals on
new media, in particular television and commercialized media, because
they perceive them to be as or more effective than the traditional Party
print media. Additionally, commercialization is encouraging new mechanisms for receiving and handling complaints, most notably through tele5 27
phone hotlines, which may not be as conducive to formal referrals.
The decline of mass work departments may reflect a system that is
gradually moving toward more formalized methods of dispute resolution.
Nevertheless, some commentators argue that mass work departments
523. Interview 2003-26; Interview 2003-67; Interview 2003-170.
524. See, e.g., Cai, Calling Out, supra note 227 (stating that media are not letters and
visits offices, and "are certainly not" Party discipline offices or government inspection
departments).
525. See Interview 2003-114.
526. See, e.g., Interview 2003-3; Interview 2003-39; see also Zhou Hanxiang, Tisheng
Shehui Xinwen Fuwuxing De Youxiao Tujing [An Effective Route for Increasing the
Service Quality of News About Society], 2002 Xinwen Zhanxian [News Frondine] No. 12,
available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper79/8079/765030.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing Wenzhou Daily's role in providing "legal aid" to readers).
At Women of China, for example, journalists respond to each of the more than seven
hundred letters they receive every year; many of these responses include specific advice
regarding how to resolve the complaint. Interview 2003-10.
Other journalists refer complaints directly to lawyers, rather than to government
departments. See Interview 2003-50; Interview 2003-60 (commenting that Shanghai
television station does not have mass work department, but that its daily law program has
telephone hotline that answers legal questions and in some cases refers callers to local
legal aid center); see also Zhou, supra (describing referral of readers' complaints to
lawyers). At Shanghai Radio, for example, complaints from listeners are referred directly
to law firms. Interview 2003-99. Likewise, journalists at mass-market papers in Sichuan
have worked with local law firms to highlight the problems of migrant workers from
Sichuan outside the province. See Interview 2003-24.
527. See Interview 2003-24; Interview 2003-44; Interview 2003-108.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105:1

continue to play an important role in the overall functioning of the media, contending that such work helps maintain public confidence in the
media and is an integral part of their supervision work, 528 or that solving
reader complaints helps to sell papers and boosts popular trust.5 29 The
continued use of referral mechanisms also demonstrates the degree to
which the media are able to use their position as an arm of the Party-state
to boost sales at the same time as they resolve grievances.
The commercialized media's role, in particular in investigative television shows and viewer and reader complaint hotlines, increasingly resembles the role Western media play in highlighting viewer and reader complaints. China's media, nevertheless, remain distinct from their Western
counterparts in important respects. The Chinese media's longstanding
role as an official check on other arms of the Party-state, the continued
financial and editorial links to the Party-state, and the continued reliance
leadership places on the media mean that investigations by or referrals
from the media carry official weight. China's media have both institutional and financial interests in continuing to serve as government complaints bureaus, and their historical role and continued existence have
facilitated their ability to appeal directly to public views.
D. Informal Influence: Journalists as Problem Solvers
In addition to reporting in public or internal publications, or referring complaints through mass work departments, reporters also act to influence disputes and solve problems informally-meaning without the
explicit authority of their publication or program. Journalists seek to use
their positions to apply pressure, even when they have no intention of
writing a story or referring a complaint through formal channels. Reporters who do so may be using their positions to assist friends and acquaintances, or in return for payments by interested parties. But some journalists also assume more activist roles, seeking to influence outcomes and
resolve problems. For these journalists-in particular for the relatively
small number ofjournalists specializing in legal reporting and working at
media outlets with a central Party-state rank-obtaining redress and solving problems is an important goal, independent of the news value of particular cases or disputes. For journalists specializing in legal reporting or
those assisting friends or contacts, informal mechanisms may be more
effective than referrals through mass work departments or public or internal reports.
Reporters sometimes act to influence outcomes even when they see
no news value in a matter, or where they have no intention of writing a
report. 5 30 A phone call from a journalist to a court inquiring into the
status of a particular case may help resolve longstanding delays, in partic528. See Zhu, Discussing Opportunities, supra note 150.
529. See Interview 2003-22.
530. See Interview 2003-5; Interview 2003-87; Interview 2003-117.
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ular where local interests have resulted in a case not being brought to
trial for an extended period. Sometimes journalists contact courts because doing so is the most effective means of influencing them; in other
cases they do so because they do not have time to write articles about all
531
worthy complaints.
Examples of the media acting to solve problems and pressuring government actors by threatening coverage are widespread. Programs such
as Legal Report telephone local courts to inquire about cases, with such
calls carrying an implicit threat of coverage of the case on the program.5 3- 2 Commercialized papers such as Southern Weekend likewise forward complaints they receive, along with an attached request for an interview, even when the likelihood of actually writing a story is remote. 53 3 In
Shanghai, reporters for the Shanghai Television Station forward letters or
telephone complaints to government offices in an attempt to apply pres534
sure to government actors to address concerns.
The importance many lawyers place on maintaining good relations
with journalists underscores the role that reporters can play in affecting
outcomes when acting informally. As one academic commented, a lawyer
who lacks media contacts cannot be an effective lawyer. 535 Lawyers state
that they seek out journalists, in particular those from powerful central
media, to intervene informally. Thus, for example, a legal aid lawyer
faced with an intransigent local court sought assistance from a reporter at
Focus; a letter from the reporter enquiring about the status of the case
resulted in the long-delayed case coming to trial and victory for the lawyer's client. 53 6 Another legal aid lawyer commented that those representing the disadvantaged "must use the media" if they are to obtain results
favorable for their clients. 5 - 7 In some cases the media need not become
directly involved in order to have an effect: In one case, a party won a
favorable outcome simply by displaying an envelope from People'sDaily to
538
the court.
In many cases journalists intervene on behalf of personal contacts.5 3 9
Yet these efforts are not attempts simply to affect outcomes on behalf of
friends; journalists also intervene when they become aware of particularly
egregious cases. 540 These journalists argue that their only motivation is
531. See Interview 2002-3.
532. Interview 2003-87.
533. Interview 2003-46.
534. See Interview 2003-60.
535. Interview 2002-1.
536. Interview 2002-4. In other cases, lawyers may simply take their clients to CCTV's
offices, in the hope of attracting the interest of Focus. See Interview 2003-12.
537. Interview 2003-107.
538. Interview 2003-115. The court had allegedly accepted a case over which it lacked
jurisdiction in order to assist a local party. Id.
539. See Interview 2003-3; Interview 2003-9; Interview 2003-83; Interview 2003-87.
540. See, e.g., Interview 2003-87.
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their own conscience. 54 1 Many journalists, and in particular reporters
who frequently cover legal issues for national media, see their role as being that of problem solvers. 5 42 Their aim is to resolve problems, regardless of whether doing so results in an article for publication or a program
for broadcast. 543 Thus journalists comment that in many cases they will
first seek to resolve the problem without publication by contacting relevant local officials. Although it is rare for such informal discussions to be
effective, when problems are resolved journalists will usually agree not to
5 44
report on the matter.
Journalists also informally collaborate to apply pressure in difficult
cases. They do this where they perceive a significant threat of obstruction
or retaliation from the targets of their investigations or where they believe a phone call alone will be ineffective. Groups of journalists, especially from national papers, travel in teams, delivering an amplified threat
of exposure. In cases where such threats go unheeded, multiple journalists may agree to publish critical reports on the same subject on the same
54 5
day.
The existence of activist journalists who use their roles to pursue
their own vision of social justice is not an entirely new phenomenon.
Such activism is an outgrowth of a system in which journalists have long
played investigatory roles separate from their positions as news gatherers
or disseminators; it is no coincidence that such journalists are largely
found at traditional central media, such as Workers Daily, Legal Daily, and
China Youth Daily. Journalists at more commercialized papers may explicitly disavow such activism; one journalist commented that reporters at
Southern Weekend "are real journalists," because they focus only on covering news. 546 Yet these roles are not unique to the media. Such activist
journalism parallels the expansion of activist lawyering, in particular by a

541. See, e.g., Interview 2003-136 (arguing that "conscience" of reporters is significant
factor in many cases in which media exposes wrongdoing or injustice).
542. See Interview 2003-4; Interview 2003-83.
543. See, e.g., Interview 2003-39; Interview 2003-73; Interview 2003-75; Interview 200383. One journalist commented that reporters are not concerned with potential loss of
income due to loss of fees for individual articles because solving problems is an important
aspect of their job. Interview 2003-3.
544. Interview 2003-3; Interview 2003-4. Major Party media are more likely to discuss
disputes with their targets before publication, in part because they face less financial
pressure to generate news. Commercialized papers are unlikely to consult with the targets
of negative reports prior to publication, and journalists at such papers are less likely to view
themselves as problem solvers. Interview 2003-3.
545. Interview 2003-3; see also Interview 2003-22 (describing similar activities by
journalists at provincial papers). Journalists from provincial papers also cooperate in
applying pressure with journalists from national papers, in particular when cases are being
appealed to national authorities. Interview 2003-22.
546. Interview 2003-3.
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small number of legal aid clinics, and of activism by government-linked
NGOs.

5 47

Journalists, however, appear to have greater influence than others
who take risks to seek redress for individuals or to highlight social
problems. Journalists' ability to act informally is the product of their status: It is the potential impact of media coverage that gives weight to their
exposure threats. This is particularly true forjournalists from media with
central Party-state rank; when such journalists visit local areas, local officials perceive the journalists to be central government officials. 5 48 Although media links to the Party-state make such influence possible, they
also explain why journalists choose to act informally. A telephone call
may be less effective than publishing a public article or writing an internal report, but it may also be easier in a system in which journalists encounter numerous obstacles prior to publication. Thus journalists sometimes use informal channels when they know that the sensitivity of a
subject will block any attempt to write about the matter. 549 Media links to
the Party-state facilitate informal influence by journalists; such links may
also necessitate informal routes for those journalists seeking to apply
pressure in difficult cases.
E. Court Management of the Media
In addition to general obstacles that the media encounter at the local level, reporters have increasingly faced restrictions on their ability to
cover courtroom proceedings. 550 Court regulations state that most trials
should be open to the public and the media, 551 but the regulations also
include a list of exceptions, ranging from cases involving state secrets to
cases involving the privacy of individual litigants. 552 The regulations declare that the media may attend trials that are open to the public but add
that journalists wishing to report on court cases must obtain the permission of the court hearing the case. No further details regarding the reasons a court may or may not deny such permission are provided. 55 3 In
practice, the provisions give courts broad discretion to deny reporters access to trials and force many journalists to seek approval from courts
before reporting on a particular case. The increase in defamation litiga547. See generally Liebman, supra note 145, at 277-80 (explaining that expansion of
China's legal profession and rights embodied in its substantive law has allowed some
lawyers to use their experiences representing clients as basis for advocacy).
548. Interview 2003-155.
549. Interview 2003-24.
550. See Xu, Media-Judicial Relations, supra note 19.
551. Zui Gao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Yange Zhixing Gongkai Shenpan Shizhu De
Ruogan Guiding (No. Fa Fa 1999-3) [Regulations of the Supreme People's Court on
Strictly Implementing the System of Public Trials (No. Fa Fa 1999-3)] art. 1 (1999) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
552. Other exceptions include cases concerning juveniles, commercial secrets, and in
some cases divorce. Id. art. 2.
553. Id. art. 11.
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tion over the past decade has also included a small but noteworthy phenomenon in which courts and individual judges sue members of the media for critical reports.5 5 4
As media attention to legal matters has increased, courts have become more sophisticated in media relations. One judge summarized the
situation by explaining that courts originally had no interest in the media. Once coverage grew, courts sought ways to avoid coverage. Today,
coverage, in part to avoid excessive
courts pay more attention to directing
5 55
media influence on pending cases.
Local courts often have close working relationships with local papers.
Judges know the media will seek to report on cases. Thus in many cases
courts prefer to provide journalists with information rather than allowing
them to seek information on their own. 556 Local courts frequently contact local journalists regarding cases they believe are noteworthy or that
they want to publicize. 5 57 Yet in cases where judges believe the media's
views of the case are incorrect, they may seek to prevent the media from
reporting. 55 8 Some courts bar reporters-in particular nonlocaljournalists-from attending court proceedings, sometimes by requiring "permits" that are difficult or impossible to obtain or by requiring that the
journalists obtain written permission from higher courts; others attempt
to keep hearing times secret. 5 59 Journalists from influential central media, including CCTV, explain that some local courts refuse to allow them
to cover cases or interview court personnel without approval from the
Supreme People's Court. 560 Those journalists who are allowed to attend
554. Xu, Media-Judicial Relations, supra note 19.
555. Interview 2003-20; see also Interview 2003-63 (commenting that courts are
paying increasing attention to managing media coverage); Xu, Responsibility of the Media,
supra note 29 (stating that only two reactions courts have to media coverage are anger and
fear). Other government departments have likewise emphasized the importance of
maintaining good relations with the media. See, e.g., Feng Lin, Yunnan Shengzhang: Bu
Dongde Yu Meiti Jianhao Guanxi Bushi Hege Zhengfu [Governor of Yunnan: A
Government That Cannot Establish Good Relations with the Media Is Not a Qualified
Government], Zhongguo Xinwen Wang [China News Web], Jan. 14, 2003, available at
http://news.sohu.com/2004/01/14/81/news2l8548147.shtml (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (discussing emphasis on media relations by governor of Yunnan Province); He
Zhanjun & Cao Zhiheng, Xinhua, Xinjiang GonganJiguanJianli Xinwen Fayanren Zhidu,
Meiyue Juxing Yici [Xinjiang Police Establishes a Media Spokesperson System, Press
Conferences Will Be Held Once a Month] (Jan. 15, 2004), available at http://
7
news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-01/15/content_12 8118.htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (discussing police plans to have monthly press conferences).
556.
557.
relations
558.
559.

Interview 2003-20.
Id. Some local courts have propaganda departments; in other courts media
are handled by the court's research office.
Id.
Interview 2003-140; Interview 2003-143.

560. Interview 2003-160. Such permission is rarely given, and journalists have been
told that they may not report on the existence of such impediments. Id.
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court proceedings may be forbidden from writing notes during the
5 61
proceedings.
Journalists agree that courts have become more concerned with
managing the flow of information to the media, 5 62 and some journalists
comment that they are increasingly wary of offending or upsetting judges
by writing critical reports. 56 3 As one journalist at a central paper noted,
5 64
"If we are going to overturn a court decision, we must be very careful."
In some local courts, for example, journalists are not permitted to contact judges directly-formerly a common practice-but must instead go
through the court's research office. 5 6 5 Journalists comment that if they
report negatively on a local court, the court will retaliate by denying them
leads regarding future cases. 566 The media's reliance on the courts for
information makes local media less likely to supervise, or report critically
on, local courts. 5 6 7 Reporters complain that courts rely increasingly on
arguments of judicial independence to prevent reporters from covering
cases, and that the courts are restricting the media while at the same time
5 68
issuing statements welcoming popular opinion supervision.
Courts may also require officials to screen articles. In some areas,
courts require that all local reports on cases be reviewed by court officials
prior to publication. 569 Although courts may not have the formal power
to demand review of reports prior to publication, their ability to deny
access to the courts is a significant incentive for journalists to cooperate.
Journalists may also be concerned that failure to heed such requirements
will result in complaints to the local propaganda department. Even when
they are not formally required to do so, journalists may send articles on
major cases to the courts for review in advance of publication. 5 70 In ma561. Interview 2003-129; Interview 2003-140.
562. Management of media coverage of court proceedings is not new; propaganda
authorities have long managed media coverage of individual cases to deliver particular
messages. Increased media coverage of cases, however, does appear to be making media
management of legal coverage more important.
563. See, e.g., Interview 2003-109.
564. Interview 2003-114.
565. Interview 2003-23. Journalists do not perceive such restrictions as attempts to
reduce ex parte contacts but rather as attempts to insulate judges from scrutiny. Increased
difficulty obtaining information from courts has led some journalists to rely more heavily
on lawyers for leads and information regarding interesting cases. Id.
566. Interview 2003-24; Interview 2003-39. The threat of such reprisals can result in
significant financial pressure on journalists, who are paid based on the number and
prominence of articles they write, and who may be fined or have their bonuses reduced if
they fail to report on a story covered by a rival paper. Interview 2003-24; Interview 2003-39.
567. See Interview 2003-20; Interview 2003-39; Interview 2003-80; Interview 2003-109.
568. Interview 2003-48; Interview 2003-160; Interview 2003-164.
569. Interview 2003-30; Interview 2003-36; Interview 2003-49; see also Interview 200365 (stating that judge will ask to review articles ifjudge is aware of them in advance).
570. Interview 2003-39.
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jor cases courts also frequently provide local papers with the text of the
571
article to be run.
Some courts may forbid local media from writing on court decisions
until after the courts have issued decisions 57 2 or may require the media to
publish articles on certain cases. Thus, for example, under rules announced shortly after the Sun Zhigang case by the Guangdong Province
Propaganda Department and the Guangdong Province High People's
Court, the news media are banned from reporting on a case prior to the
court announcing its decision. The media are permitted to report on
publicly decided cases, but they are forbidden from writing opinions that
5 73
differ from the views of the court.
Many law-oriented television programs and television news items on
legal matters are prepared in cooperation with courts, police, or
procuratorates.5 74 Courts may also use publications to boost their own
profile or defend courts from criticism. For example, ninety percent of
articles in the daily People's Court News are written by judges. 575 During
the Sun Zhigang case, the paper carried an article on the topic of public
trials, largely aimed at rebutting criticism of the courts for not permitting
57 6
the media to attend the trial.
A desire to maintain and improve judges' images, as well as to avoid
excessive media influence, motivates court management of media coverage. As one judge commented, increased media impact on public perceptions of the courts has resulted in increased emphasis on court propaganda. 577 Courts not only attempt to affect media coverage; they also
explicitly require judges to engage in "propaganda work" designed to improve the image of the court. Judges in many courts must engage in a
certain volume of "propaganda work" each year, work designed to boost
the court's reputation, and therefore the reputation of the court's leaders. 578 Such work can take the form of written summaries of cases for the
571. Interview 2003-49; Interview 2003-93. Likewise, articles in the national legal
press may actually be written by government entities, including the courts. Interview 200373.
572. Interview 2003-36; Interview 2003-80; Interview 2003-93.
573. Xu, Checks, supra note 31. Journalists have criticized the rules as violating their
freedom of speech. Id.
574. Interview 2003-49; Interview 2003-57.
575. Interview 2003-158.
576. Id.
577. Interview 2003-20. In Shanghai, for example, courts now have official
spokespeople to handle interactions with the media and propaganda departments that
oversee media coverage of the courts. Interview 2003-63.
578. Interview 2003-78; see also Zheng FaJi Shanghai Shi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Fazhi
Xuanchuan Gongzuo [Reporting on the Legal System Propaganda Work of Shanghai
Municipality High People's Court], Fazhi Ribao [Legal Daily], Dec. 19, 2001, at 2, available
at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2001-12/19/content_29164.htm
(on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (noting requirement that each court in Shanghai engage in
positive propaganda work, and describing steps taken to increase media understanding of
court work). The Supreme People's Court also requires lower courts to publicize their
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court's research department or of articles about cases for the media.
Judges receive credit for positive articles about their cases that run in the
media and may receive cash bonuses for writing articles in academic journals or for generating positive coverage of the court in major papers. 5 79
Judges also have incentives to seek positive coverage of their cases in order to improve their own chances of promotion 580 and thus may also seek
to develop relationships with individual journalists in order to receive
58
favorable coverage of their cases. '
work, Interview 2003-89, and intermediate courts collect and review press reports on lower
courts in their jurisdiction in order to evaluate lower courts' propaganda work. Interview
2003-20; see also Hao Lili, Xiao Yang Zhixin Quanguo Fayuan Xinwen Xuanchuan
Gongzuo Zuotan Hui Zhichu [Xiao Yang Sends Letter to Give Direction to National Court
News Propaganda Work Meeting], Renmin Fayuan Bao [People's Court News], Aug. 8,
2002, available at http://www.law.com.cn/pg/newsShow.php?Id=2052 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (reporting on written comments from Supreme People's Court
President Xiao Yang stating that propaganda work is important aspect of court work that
cannot be separated from adjudication work, and that courts should work together with
media and strictly implement regulations regarding reporting on the courts in order to
increase respect for, and trust in, the law).
579. Interview 2003-78; Interview 2003-85.
580. Interview 2003-78.
581. Interview 2003-111. The report of the Propaganda and Education Department
of the Shaanxi High People's Court quoted at the start of this Article provides an example
of the degree of emphasis courts place on managing media coverage. See supra text
accompanying note 2. The report noted that the courts themselves had published more
than four hundred articles in a variety of newspapers and news services in the first ten
months of 2002. Shaanxi Province High People's Court, supra note 2. The report also
provided statistics on television news, broken down by the administrative rank of the
broadcasting station. Id. The Propaganda and Education Department added that it had
succeeded in "improving leadership and management of coverage of major cases;" that
there had been no negative exposes in the media regarding major cases; and that the total
number of negative reports on the Shaanxi courts had decreased by seventy percent
compared to the previous year. Id. The department attributed this decrease to their
efforts in working and communicating with the media to avoid negative reporting, noting
that the department had either managed or "entrusted others to manage" sixteen
potential negative reports by media ranging from CCTV and Xinhua to a variety of
provincial media. In so doing, they succeeded in "protecting the reputation and image" of
both the courts and the judges. Id. The report also noted that the department had issued
thirteen different notices and regulations on "court propaganda work," had improved the
system of news spokespersons for, and news conferences by, courts, and had improved
management of reporters seeking to interview court personnel. Likewise, by "strictly
inspecting reporters' drafts," the department succeeded in "avoiding false news and
malicious stirring-up [of stories]." Id.; see also Chen Haifa &Ji Tianfu, Henan Fayuan Dui
Xinwen Xuanchuan Gongzuo Tichu Yaoqiu [Henan Court Raises Requirements for Media
Propaganda Work], Henan Fayuan Wang [Henan Court Online], Apr. 4, 2003, at http://
hnfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=847 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing court propaganda work in Henan Province, and noting need for courts to
cooperate with media to create "positive public opinion environment," increase respect for
and trust in law and courts, maintain good image of courts, and reduce number of negative
reports); Fayuan Sixiang Xuanchuan Gongzuo Huiyi Zai Zhuhai Zhaokai [Court Thought
Propaganda Work Meeting Opens in Zhuhai], Dayang Xinwen [Dayoo News], Aug. 13,
2001, at http://dailynews.dayoo.com/content/2001-08/13/content189779.htm (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on national meeting of court propaganda
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Media management of news coverage is most significant in first instance courts. This is due both to local media being primarily interested
in cases in local courts and to the fact that there is less potential for critical reporting on higher-ranking courts. As with other targets of media
criticism, at least some in China's courts are demonstrating that they are

adept at resisting scrutiny. Regardless of whether doing so serves the interests of judicial fairness or is merely an attempt to protect vested local
or institutional interests, the ability of courts to manage media coverage
demonstrates that media coverage of the courts is not a one-way street

and that increased media scrutiny may also lead to reduced court
transparency.
III.

INFLUENCE, INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION, AND IMPACT ON
COURT EVOLUTION

Lack of transparency makes assessing the impact of increased media
scrutiny of the courts difficult. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that
China's media have become an important force in the Chinese legal system: Each of the four mechanisms that Part II examines demonstrates
that media influence can be extremely effective, an impression that is
backed up by courts' emphasis on managing media coverage. When media outlets, particularly those of a high administrative rank, decide to
cover a story, coverage often has a significant impact on other institu582
tions, including the courts.
As Parts I and II show, three primary factors explain the media's increased ability both to influence other decisionmakers, including the
courts, and to resolve problems. First, the media's traditional function as
both the mouthpiece and the eyes and ears of the Party-state provides it
with a direct route to influence Party-state officials. The historical reliance of Chinese officialdom on the press at each level meant that as conflicts between the media and the courts began to emerge in the 1990s,
the media started from a position of strength. The four mechanisms discussed in Part II share a common characteristic: Media pressure stems in
significant part from the media's ability to affect the opinion of leaders at
the relevant level of the Party-state. 58 3 Judges comment that the most
workers and noting that the meeting emphasized the importance of maintaining the
primacy of positive news); Li Xiaojing, Shi Zhongyuan Zhaokai Quanshi Fayuan Xinwen
Xuanchuan Gongzuo Huiyi [Municipal Intermediate Court Holds Citywide Meeting on
Court News Propaganda Work], at http://www.gzcourt.org.cn/court_info-detail.jsp?type=
2&code=29 (last visited June 30, 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
cooperation between courts and media in Guangzhou).
582. Few journalists or legal professionals dispute this claim, although some
journalists protest that they are ineffective, and that their ineffectiveness and the
obstructions they face in reporting demonstrate the need for legislation kranting
journalists legal powers and protections that would make it easier to expose wrongdoing.
583. See Can Media Supervision Push Forward Judicial Fairness?, supra note 162, at
12 (arguing that views in newspapers are understood as being views of Party); Jiang, Legal
Concepts, supra note 316 (stating media have big effect in part because they speak with an
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noteworthy effect of media coverage is to bring particular cases to the
attention of higher-ups, who in turn exert influence on courts. 584 Judges
do not fear seeing their names in print; rather, they fear their "leaders"
seeing their names, or the names of their courts, in print. Commentators
note that if a news report does not attract the attention of the relevant
leaders, be they local or national, the report is unlikely to produce resuits. 585 Thus the Dahe News coverage in the Zhang Jinzhu case led to
instructions from the provincial party secretary; media coverage resulted
in the Supreme People's Court intervening in the Jiajiang Color Factory
case; and Sui Xiang, the eight-year-old girl who lost both hands, won her
case after officials at the Supreme People's Court took notice. Similarly,
internal reports are effective because they are read by high-ranking officials-authorities made arrests in the Sun Zhigang case only after receiving written instructions from Party leaders5 86-and both formal referral
official voice). As one journalist commented, all forms of pressure are the same at the end
of the day because in all cases courts "fear their leaders." Interview 2003-3. Some in China
have also explicitly linked increased media supervision of the courts to increased Party
supervision over the courts. See, e.g., Li Fujin, Shenpan Fangshi Gaige Zhong Yingdang
Chuli Hao Jiandu De Sige Guanxi [Four Supervision Relationships That Should Be
Handled Well in the Course of Trial Method Reform], Dongfang Fayan [Eastern Legal
View], at http://www.dffy.com/faxuejieti/ss/200311/20031118145746.htm (last visited
June 6, 2004) [hereinafter Li, Four Supervision Relationships] (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (arguing that media supervision should join with supervision by Party and
people's congresses to report to Party committees, people's congresses and other
government departments on criticism regarding courts).
584. See Interview 2003-20; Interview 2003-63; see also Wei, Popular Opinion
Supervision, supra note 233 (noting that important function of media is to make leaders
aware of issues in society, so that they may adjust their policies); Zhao, Alienation of Media
Supervision, supra note 161 (noting that one effect of media coverage is to bring issues to
attention of high-ranking "leaders").
585. See Interview 2003-26; see also A Discussion on the Media and the Judicial
System, supra note 211 (stating that media have power to resolve issues because media are
an arm of government); Huang, Popular Opinion Supervision, supra note 135 (stating that
matters are resolved when media bring issues to attention of government leaders); Tong,
supra note 437 (stating that media supervision is effective only when stories attract the
attention of government leaders); Ye, Fairness, supra note 358 (quoting Focus director as
stating that program operates under special conditions, because it receives the support of
government leaders); Zan, supra note 414 (quoting editor of China Economic Times as
stating that Focus is effective because central government leaders pay attention to it). One
commentator, writing on the trial ofJiang Yanping in Hunan, argued that media coverage
has two types of influence. First, media reports influence Party-state leaders and cause
them to "emphasize" a case or issue. Second, such reports directly affect judges, who feel
compelled to satisfy public opinion in high-profile cases. Ai Yezi, Xinhua, Xinwen Meiti
Ying Yifa Jinxing Yulun Jiandu [News Media Should Carry Out Supervision in Accordance
with Law] (Apr. 5, 2001), at http://www.hn.xinhua.org/news/2001-4-5/0145184114.htm
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
586. See Liu Wujun, Sun Zhigang De Xuezhe Shangshu Yu Lingdao Pishi [The
Scholars' Appeal and the Leaders' Written Instructions in the Sun Zhigang Case] (June 20,
2003), at http://www.house2008.com/article.asp?articleid=4106 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (questioning whether case ever would have been resolved without instructions
from Party leaders).
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of cases and informal routes of influence may succeed because of the
implied threat that the media will make others aware of the subject
matter.
The Chinese press is not unique in fielding complaints from readers
or viewers, or in its ability to exert influence by bringing particular cases
or problems to the attention of officials. Yet in China the media's role as
an information gatherer for the state amplifies this influence. The media's authority is also strengthened by a system in which courts, like other
administrative actors, continue to be subject to direction from Party-state
authorities regarding the handling of particular cases or matters. Although judges comment that the frequency with which local, provincial,
or national Party-state leaders intervene in individual cases has decreased
in recent years, such intervention continues to be an important route of
influence, and its continuing existence underscores the media's power to
affect disputes by bringing them to the attention of higher-ranking officials. The influence of individual Party-state leaders also contributes to
the media's power: In a system in which a written instruction from a
provincial Party secretary or deputy secretary can force courts to reach a
particular outcome, the media need only attract the attention of one wellplaced Party-state official to have an effect.
Second, media commercialization has amplified the media's role in
both generating and reflecting public opinion. There appears to be increasing room for views of the public in media "public opinion." The
broader range of topics, increased volume of available news, and loosening of content control has meant that the media are increasingly airing
popular views in public. Popular complaints that in the past might have
been aired in internal reports, or not aired at all, are now exposed in
public editions; Party-state leaders continue to learn of such matters from
the media but increasingly do so at the same time as other readers. The
media's influence as a Party-state actor does not render public opinion
irrelevant; rather, the media's ability to generate public opinion, their
ability to reach a large portion of the population directly, and their claim
to represent popular views strengthen their ability to exert influence
within the Party-state. Market pressures lead the media to reflect public
opinion, as papers find that venting public anger at corruption and other
social problems helps to boost market share. At the same time, commercialization may lead to a greater media role in generating, or "stirring58 7
up," public opinion.

587. Ding Xiaolu, Wang Lijun Bei Gaoshang Fating Zuixin Neimu [Most Recent
Inside News Regarding the Suit Against Wang Lijin], 2000 Renmin Gongan [People's
Public Security] No. 1, at 14; cf. Sun, Thoughts, supra note 7 (discussing influence of
media on popular views and increased media choice in subjects of reports). In both the
Sun Zhigang case and the black whistle case, it was not simply the facts of the incident, but
rather a combination of the facts and the resulting popular outcry that resulted in
leadership intervention.
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Increased attention to public opinion is not, however, only a product
of commercialization. Greater coverage of popular grievances is also consistent with attempts by the Party-state to derive legitimacy from responding to popular grievances. Popular outrage over a particular case may
pressure authorities to act, but responding quickly also furthers state interests in appearing to be responsive to popular concerns. In addition,
the media continue to play important roles in creating public support for
Party decisions. The media are a mechanism both for affecting Party
decisionmaking 588 and for justifying such decisions ex post facto. In law,
the media and individual journalists manifest these roles by attempting to
draw attention to cases or problems in addition to the Party's use of the
media to deliver messages regarding particular cases after decisions have
5 89
been reached.
Measuring public opinion in China is difficult; the media's claims to
speak for the public must be viewed with skepticism. In cases in which
the media claim to reflect popular views, the media may in fact reflect the
views of educated elites, of the media outlet itself, or of particular Partystate individuals or institutions. It appears, however, that there is more
substance to the media's claims to reflect "public opinion" today than in
the past, and a significant portion of the media's influence on leadership
does appear to stem from their ability to reflect public views, or at least
59 0
from the perception that they do so.
Third, incentives to individual journalists augment these first two factors, suggesting that the roles, and in some cases ideals, ofjournalists also
partially explain media influence. A significant volume of critical reporting appears to be the work of idealistic journalists, or journalists "with
conscience." Observers and journalists note the importance ofjournalists
who pursue stories because of their desire to redress injustice, often skirting permissible limits and risking harm. 59 1 Even assuming that journalists will overstate the degree to which idealism plays a role, it does appear
that in many cases journalists are pursuing nonfinancial goals. In doing
so, they are continuing a tradition, stemming back at least to the early

588. For a similar argument that social organizations, often with close links to the
Party-state, may increasingly be affecting state policy, see generally Tony Saich, Negotiating
the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China, 2000 China Q. 124 (noting
state-linked social organizations "can have considerable impact on the policy-making
process, indeed more than if they were to try to create an organization with complete
operational autonomy").
589. The role of the media in both creating and reflecting popular views in criminal
cases also demonstrates that it would be a mistake to see these views as inherently counter
to the interests of the Party. Both the public and the Party appear to have an interest in
seeing corrupt local officials punished, even where doing so may be in tension with legal
standards or procedures.
590. See Interview 2003-131 (commenting that media are an important route for
influencing public views, but also that media exert influence by reflecting public views).
591. See, e.g., Interview 2003-136; Interview 2003-141; Interview 2003-142.
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1980s, of journalists using their positions to pursue political or social
59 2
objectives.
The journalists interviewed for this Article are not representative of
journalists nationwide; those willing to speak to a foreign academic about
their roles are likely to be better educated and politically more liberal
than many of their colleagues and to portray themselves as idealists. Nevertheless, the expansion of a class of journalists consciously using their
positions to pursue ideals or goals, and in some cases to push for social or
legal change, is noteworthy and demonstrates that the increase in critical
59 3
reporting does not stem solely from commercialization.
This Part examines the implications of the media's role for our understanding of law and dispute resolution in China. It begins with an
analysis of the relationship between the media's role and trends in Partystate governance. Against this institutional backdrop, this Part then turns
to an evaluation of the implications of the media's role for the development of China's courts; debates regarding whether media reporting on
the courts should be restricted; and the possibility that courts, like the
media, may be developing expanded areas of autonomy, relatively free of
direct Party interference.
The Chinese media may be a force for transparency, but media supervision also reinforces Party influence on court decisionmaking. The
media are increasingly able to stir up and reflect public opinion, at times
in ways that affect Party decisionmaking, but propaganda authorities continue to be able to restrict public debate, limiting the impact of individual
cases. Media scrutiny reflects increased relevance of courts and law in
China, but media influence also suggests that an increase in the volume
of litigation has not necessarily been mirrored by an increase in the authority of the courts. The media's success in asserting their newfound
autonomy may, however, be an important model for the courts.
A. Competition Among Institutions: Supervising the Party and the Public
The media's reliance on official links to exert influence demonstrates that court-media relations must be understood against the background of broader institutional structures. This section argues that the
media's role in exposing wrongdoing reflects a central policy of encouraging various Party-state institutions to "supervise" wrongdoing by other
Party-state actors. Thus the media's role in public opinion supervision is
one element of broader trends toward controlled supervision, wherein
Party-state institutions are encouraged to address wrongdoing and popular grievances, but in which the Party maintains the ability to shut off
excessive criticism. Although the Party-state has long encouraged vertical
supervision, where central and provincial authorities supervise and pun592. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
593. A range of financial and personal interests may also affect incentives to report on
particular matters. See supra Part I.D.
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ish abuses at lower levels of the Party-state, in particular within the same
administrative hierarchy, the media's role reflects the expansion of horizontal supervision by Party-state institutions. Institutions of the same
rank are increasingly seeking to expand their oversight over each other.
In addition, the growth of media supervision shows that oversight is no
longer simply a question of curbing local abuses.
1. Centralized Competition. - Tensions between the courts and the
media reflect rival claims to being fair arbiters of disputes. Although
some justify the media's right to cover court proceedings on the need for
transparency, 59 4 journalists also frequently contend that they are more
likely to report and resolve disputes than the courts. 59 5 In this regard,
friction between the media and the courts is one aspect of more general
competition among official actors in the Chinese political and legal system, where numerous institutions now assert their right to "supervise"
other actors. 596 Thus China's media engage in public opinion supervision, people's congresses argue for expanded "people's congress supervision," including the right to investigate and supervise individual court
decisions, 59 7 courts and the procuratorates argue for 'judicial supervision," and the Party's discipline commissions engage in "supervision by
the Party."
594. See, e.g., Li, Four Supervision Relationships, supra note 583 (noting role of
media supervision in improving transparency); Wang, Two Swords, supra note 259 (noting
that popular opinion supervision not only ensures transparency, but also guarantees free
speech and "right-to-know" rights of individuals); Xiao Yang Points Out Need, supra note
123 (noting comments by Supreme People's Court president regarding role of popular
opinion supervision in ensuring transparency).
595. For example, one journalist commented that it is impossible to obtain a fair
result in local courts without media assistance. Interview 2003-73. Another stated that
judges who understand law will not be affected by the media-but that many courts fail to
understand law. Interview 2003-86.
596. The courts are not alone in complaining of excessive media influence.
Advocates of a greater role for people's congresses in supervisory work complain that the
media are often ineffective, but nevertheless attract much more attention from the public
than does the (presumably) more effective supervision work conducted by people's
congresses. See Lu Qifen, Fahui Yulun Jiandu Zuoyong Tigao Pingyi Gongzuo Shixiao
[Increase the Supervision Work of the Media, Enhance the Effect of Appraisal Work], at
http://www.jxrenda.gov.cn/jxrd/jxrd/0103/3.htm (last visitedJan. 18, 2003) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (stating that supervision by people's congresses is "the highest
form of supervision" and stating that supervision by media often fails to go into depth);
Zheng Xiang, Ganyu "Jiandu," Haiyao Ganyu Xuanchuan 'Jiandu" [Dare to "Supervise,"
but Also Dare to Publicize "Supervision"], Zhongguo Renda Xinwen [China NPC News],
Jan. 31, 2002, at http://www.npcnews.com.cn/gb/paper7/13/class00700005/
hwz197664.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (complaining that people often
bring complaints to media instead of to relevant-level people's congress, and blaming this
phenomenon on lack of understanding people's congresses' role, and failure of people's
congresses to publicize their supervision work).
597. Judges and lawyers complain about the increasing frequency with which local
people's congresses intervene in cases, often to help private parties who have connections
to individual representatives. See Interview 2003-20; Interview 2003-40.
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The emergence of a range of institutions engaging in (and sometimes competing to engage in) "supervision" reflects both an acknowledgement of the need to crack down on corruption and wrongdoing,
especially by official actors, and uncertainty over the proper mechanism
for doing so without undermining confidence in Party rule. The various
departments or institutions exposing malfeasance all justify their actions
by the need to address problems elsewhere. Implicit in these claims appears to be general agreement that the system is rotting but that others
are to blame. Yet problems permeate all of these supervisors, including
the media. Indeed, it is the media's links to the Party-state that make
them vulnerable to many of the same problems as the actors they supervise. 598 The media justify their role in part based on the perceived need
for an external actor free of the problems plaguing China's government.
In reality, the media suffer from many of the same problems that undermine the effectiveness of law and governance in China: corruption, lack
of ethical standards, rapid commercialization, lack of legal knowledge,
and lack of oversight.
In addition, the media are often affiliated with sectoral, institutional,
or local interests. Hence the People's Court News eschews critical reporting
on the courts, and from time to time responds on behalf of the courts to
critical reports in other publications. Papers affiliated with local governments, central government departments, or the military routinely publish
articles advancing the interests of their supervising departments or institutions. Thus it would be a mistake to view the media as distinct from
other institutions. Although the media may be developing an institutional identity, in many cases their interests are closely linked to those of
the government or Party institutions or departments with which they are
affiliated. In such cases, court-media tensions may reflect tensions between the courts and the institutional interests that the media represent.
Exposing wrongdoing and punishing malfeasance may be an appropriate role for each of the competing Party-state institutions, but doing so
may also reflect an attempt by each institution to enlarge its influence
and role. Increasingly, governance in China is characterized by competition among a range of actors and institutions for authority and influence
within the constraints of Party rule. 59 9 This story of institutions competing for power, including the power to supervise each other, is not surprising in a system where institutional positions are fluid. The formal legal
system itself can be viewed as a forum for such conflicts. Litigants, law598. See Liu, Draft Proposals, supra note 221 (noting that media often defend
interests of industries or localities with which they are affiliated, and in some cases even as
defenders of corruption).
599. Cf. Wu Xiaoliang, Xin Yilun Sifa Gaige Quanmian Qidong [A New Round of
Judicial Reform Gets Started], Caijing [Caijing Magazine],Jan. 8, 2004, available at http://
www.chinajudicialreform.com/info/newsdetail.php?newsid=910&PHPSESSID=ef8948f78
76defa4b1b1038f3777e15 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Wu, New
Round] (noting that external supervision of courts often resembles administrative
interference).
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yers, the media, judges, procuratorates, and people's congresses all seek
to influence the outcome of individual cases, and a significant degree of
ambiguity exists over which institution has the final authority to resolve
cases.
Institutional competition appears to be part of a central Party-state
strategy to grant both authority and, in the case of the media and lawyers,
financial incentives to various actors to reveal and punish wrongdoing.
Even if each of the institutions is flawed, the goal appears to be to tolerate
and encourage a certain amount of exposure of wrongdoing by and
within each institution, at least at the local level. In a system in which
many participants lack competence and in which corruption and institutional protectionism undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the
Party-state, encouraging a range of actors and institutions-the courts,
the procuratorates, people's congresses, Party disciplinary organs, lawyers, and the media-to "supervise" each other may be the most effective
way of addressing problems that undermine the system while at the same
time mitigating development of external checks. Thus the media's
problems of malfeasance, corruption, and lack of ethical standards do
not necessarily undermine their effectiveness in influencing other actors.
Recognizing that numerous Party-linked organizations and institutions compete within the political-legal system demonstrates that media
oversight is not solely a mechanism for Party interference in law. Party
influence permeates all of the institutions competing for position in the
Chinese system, and the press is one of many Party institutions. Moreover, the Party is not monolithic, and the media's views do not necessarily
represent those of the Party; the media may serve a range of interests.
The Party continues to play a significant role in overseeing and limiting the actions of all Party-state institutions, and it defines the contours of
the playing field on which other institutions compete. The growth of media supervision, and in particular of internet news, suggests that the Party
is facing increasing difficulties in controlling criticism. Yet even if excessive public criticism cannot be preempted, it can generally be silenced.
The same is true of Party relationships to other institutions: Criminal or
Party disciplinary investigations can be cancelled, courts can be ordered
to decide cases in particular ways, and people's congresses can be limited
in their ability to carry out investigations. The fact that the Party propaganda authorities permit criticism does not mean that such authorities
cannot stop criticism; the Party continues to routinely intervene once a
matter has percolated for a certain period. Yet the diversity of Party views
and goals may also explain the inconsistent application of Party policy.
China, or at least the central Party-state, appears to be striving to
establish a system of controlled transparency. This approach is perhaps
best reflected in the central authorities' reaction to the SARS outbreak:
Central authorities both called for greater transparency and issued instructions to China's media regarding how the outbreak should, and
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should not, be reported. 60 0 The need for greater openness is acknowledged, but it is also viewed with trepidation.
2. Local-CenterDynamics. - The media's role also reflects the dynamics, and perhaps evolution, of local-center relations in China. The media's ability to expose and criticize wrongdoing at the local level reflects a
policy of permitting wrongdoing to be exposed and of blaming most
wrongdoing on abuses at the local level. Media criticism of local abuses,
in the courts and elsewhere, supports the myth that problems of corruption and wrongdoing are largely confined to the local level. Likewise, the
greater ability of higher-ranking media to report on abuses at the local
level, and of local media to criticize wrongdoing outside their local jurisdictions, reflect the degree to which administrative rank and institutional
power continue to determine both the targets of criticism and the person
or institution who does the criticizing.
Yet the media's role, and in particular the media's interaction with
courts, suggests new complexities in local-center relations in three respects. First, some in the media have shown an increased willingness to
target systemic failings-thus suggesting that problems are not simply
due to wayward local officials. For example, in the Sun Zhigang case the
media highlighted problems in, and indirectly challenged the legality of,
the national system of custody and repatriation. Likewise, Southern Weekend's critique of procedures that permitted a defendant to be sentenced
to death in four consecutive trials-with the judgments in the first three
reversed on appeal-called into question nationwide procedures regarding the handling of capital cases. Increasingly, media of provincial or
local rank have been willing to criticize provincial-level authorities in
other provinces. Although not critical of central authorities, the broadening range of criticism suggests that the media may increasingly play a
role in exposing systemic problems.
Second, court reactions to media coverage suggest that some courts
may be beginning to challenge the presumption that all local actions that
protect local interests are examples of illegitimate local protectionism. As
Liao Fan has written, the term "local protectionism" is uniformly taken to
be pejorative in China; where local interests conflict with those of the
center, it is presumed that the center is correct. 60 1 The ability of courts
to respond to media coverage, in particular by blocking or impeding reporting, and to justify such actions based on the need to protect the fair600. Cf. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom 186-88 (1999) (noting role of open
politics, democracy, and a free press in preventing famine).
601. Liao Fan refers to this as "the hegemony ... of the center's ethical standards."
Liao Fan, Tizhinei De Boyi [Playing Go Within the System] (Aug. 25, 2003), at http://
(on file with
article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/articledisplay.asp?ArticlelD=23833
the Columbia Law Review) (critiquing draft of this Article). Allegations of local
protectionism refer not only to cases in which local authorities or courts ignore national
laws or policies, but also arise in instances where local authorities are legitimately
protecting local interests.
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ness of legal proceedings, suggests that local interests may become more
assertive in responding to accusations of local protectionism, and may be
beginning to contest the presumption that the center (including central
media) is always correct.
Third, the media's role suggests the growing importance of horizontal supervision, wherein Party and government institutions expose
problems in and malfeasance by other Party-state institutions and actors.
Such developments reflect recognition that blaming problems on malfeasance at the local level or on isolated wayward officials may not be sufficient and that top-down supervision is of limited effect, in particular
when supervision is carried out by administrative superiors. Both the Sun
Zhigang case and the BMW case generated strong popular responses because they identified problems that resonated beyond the individual
cases.
The rhetoric of popular opinion supervision may at times resemble
descriptions of the Western media's "checking value." But China is seeking to develop a system in which misuses of official power are checked by
other official powers, both horizontally and vertically, rather than by
countervailing nonstate forces in society, 60 2 and in which such checks are
aimed at lower-level officialdom, not the central Party-state. Commercial
incentives do appear to encourage some Chinese media to challenge political boundaries and may lead the media to become a force for increased transparency within and for fundamental changes to the existing
system. That many of the new roles undertaken by the media are consistent with the goals of the Party-state demonstrates that this is not inevitable. Similarly, the fact that courts are increasingly asserting their institutional interests, often in the form of claims that other Party-state actors
are infringing on courts' independence, does not necessarily mean that
courts are becoming increasingly independent or powerful.
B. Media Coverage and Court Evolution
Increased caseloads have augmented the importance of China's
courts. The media's impact on law and dispute resolution, however, suggests that greater use of the courts does not necessarily mean courts have
become more authoritative. This section examines the implications of
the media's role in the legal system for the development of China's
courts. The media's role in both pressing for transparency and, at times,
undermining the fairness of individual proceedings is not unique to
China. Commentators on both transitional and Western democratic systems have recognized that the media may threaten fairness at the same
time as they play a role in ensuring transparency and justice. 60 3 Yet the
602. Cf. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. B.
Found. Res. J. 521, 523-28 (describing importance of checking value as justification for
First Amendment protections in United States).
603. See, e.g., Edwin Rekosh, Emerging Lessons from Reform Efforts in Eastern
Europe and Eurasia, in Office of Democracy and Governance, U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev.,
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Chinese media do not fit easily into Western frameworks describing the
media's relationship to the courts. The growing relevance of law has facilitated media coverage of the courts, but courts continue to be undermined both by lack of authority and by external interference. Media
oversight of the courts, while increasing transparency, also reinforces
traditional norms of Party interference.
1. Competing to Resolve Disputes. - Despite the increased profile of
China's courts, the role of the media in the legal system demonstrates
that courts remain only one of many institutions capable of resolving disputes. Popular reliance on the media suggests both lack of confidence in
the courts, in significant part due to the belief that courts are corrupt or
controlled by local governments, and also popular recognition that
courts may not be effective or efficient. Thus, in the Sun Zhigang case,
Sun's family brought the incident to the attention of the media shortly
after his death. In the Jiajiang Color Factory case, the concerned local
people's congress representatives appealed to the media in an attempt to
prevent action by the court as soon as they were aware that the factory
had filed suit.
China is not unusual in having multiple mechanisms for dispute resolution, but China's media are unusual in using their position as an arm
of the Party-state to undertake this function. The role of the media may
thus reflect both a cause and an effect of the weakness of the courts since
1949. In a system in which courts historically played a minor role, those
seeking redress were likely to appeal to other Party-state institutions. The
continuation of appeals to such institutions, particularly the media, undermines efforts to increase the authority of courts.
The importance of the media in dispute resolution echoes the media's traditional role as a government complaints office; in fact, the Chinese media have to varying degrees since 1949 served that function. This
tradition of serving as a forum for popular complaints partly explains the
60 4
frequency with which complaints are brought directly to the media.
The institutional importance of mass work departments may be decreasing, but journalists continue to play many of the same roles. Although
some argue that popular views of the media as a government department
responsible for problem solving are mistaken, 60 5 the influence of the meGuidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality 53, 71 (rev. ed. 2002),
available at http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracy-and-governance/publications/
pdfs/pnacm007.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing impact of media in
Eastern Europe).
604. The importance, and effectiveness, of the media in resolving complaints from
viewers and readers is certainly not unique to China. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that
the volume of complaints received by the media in China continues to be extremely high
and is at least partially dependent on popular perceptions that the media are an effective
route to redress.
605. See Wang, Legal Rights, supra note 144 (noting that reporters cannot carry out
duty of supervision on behalf of government without additional legal protections).
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dia in disputes suggests otherwise. 60 6 Appeals to the media also resonate
with traditional avenues of redress in China. Efforts to attract media attention, in particular from powerful national media, reflect the hope that
the attention of a powerful individual will help win redress for individual
complainants. The importance of intervention by officials also reflects a
60 7
traditional concern, both pre- and post-1949, with substantive justice.
The roles the media play also reflect the multiple avenues of redress
that those with grievances pursue. 60 8 China's media often portray themselves as a last resort, coming to the rescue in the face of manifest injustice and official inaction. The media do, in certain cases, assume this
role. But in other cases they are an avenue of first resort, or part of a
strategy that involves appeals to a variety of state actors, including individual Party officials, government administrative departments, and the
courts.
Despite rapid increases in the volume of litigation, media involvement in disputes reflects the continuation of the tradition of popular appeals to various arms of the Party-state, and to the central government in
particular, to address perceived wrongdoings. 60 9 China's courts were re606. Cf. Chen Lidan, Lfielun Yulun Jiandu Yu Sifa Gongzheng [Discussing Media
Supervision and Judicial Fairness], Heilongjiang Ribao [Heilongjiang Daily], Mar. 7, 2002,
available at http://www.hljdaily.com.cn/gb/content/2002-03/07/content_40869.htm (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that phenomenon of aggrieved parties seeking
help from the media reflects lack of popular confidence in courts); Ding, supra note 225
(arguing that lack of fairness of courts, and particularly phenomenon of local
protectionism, drives many to seek help from media); Jiang, Legal Concepts, supra note
316 (stating that people with legal problems often pursue their cases in media instead of in
court, and that media compound the situation by assigning themselves the role of problem
solver).
607. See Yuanyuan Shen, Conceptions and Receptions of Legality: Understanding
the Complexity of Law Reform in Modern China, in The Limits of the Rule of Law in
China 20, 30-35 (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000).
608. As Martin Shapiro has observed, most conflicts are resolved outside of the courts
in most legal systems. Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis 10
(1981). Still, China was, prior to the reform era, unusual in the extremely limited role of
courts. See Lubman, supra note 24, at 251 (noting that "[f]or the first thirty years of the
People's Republic, Chinese courts essentially existed in form but not in substance").
609. See, e.g., Lubman, supra note 24, at 217-49 (discussing mediation, arbitration,
and adjudication, and noting that despite the increase in litigation, "persistent and
formidable political forces constrain the authority of the courts"); see also Donald C.
Clarke, Dispute Resolution in China, 5J. Chinese L. 245, 268-86 (1991) (discussing range
of dispute resolution institutions and actors in China in addition to the courts, including
People's Mediation Committees and administrative organs); Jerome Alan Cohen, The
Chinese Communist Party and "Judicial Independence": 1949-1959, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 967,
1003 (1969) [hereinafter Cohen, Judicial Independence] (noting that "the law
enforcement apparatus prior to the Cultural Revolution should be viewed as a single
administrative system comprised of four distinctive yet integrated departments rather than
as the Party and three separate institutions, one of which is the judiciary"); Gaibian Ganbu
Yi Quan Dai Fa, Qunzhong Bu Dong Fa He Sifa Bu Gong Zhuangkuang, Yindao Nongmin
Zuo Chu Zhi Xin "Fang" Bu Xin "Fa" Wu Qu [Changing Cadres' Use of Power in Place of
Law, the Condition of the Masses Not Understanding Law, and the Condition of an Unfair
Judiciary Leading Peasants Erroneously to Believe in "Visits" and Not "Law"], Renmin
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constituted in the reform era, but they were largely reinserted as part of
an existing Party-state bureaucracy. As a result, the courts remain one of
a number of actors that may-but do not necessarily-possess the power
to resolve a particular dispute. Those with grievances also may not distinguish between the courts and other official actors; all may be perceived as
representing the Party-state. Lack of confidence in the courts, and the
high cost of litigation, including court fees, legal fees, and time, 6 10 also
61 1
lead some to seek out assistance from the media.
The most attractive characteristic of the media to those seeking redress, however, is their ability to force others to act in ways that the courts
(as well as letters and visits offices) cannot. As discussed above, in the
judicial context, the media's effectiveness often can be traced to their
ability to appeal to high-ranking Party-state officials. Growing leadership
responsiveness to some public grievances may augment pressure on
courts to follow the views of the media. The media influence courts by
utilizing mechanisms that commentators in China and abroad have long
identified as undermining the authority of China's courts. Increased success of the media, albeit in many cases in exposing cases of injustice and
wrongdoing, also reinforces the importance of Party and government influence in and oversight of the courts, as well as popular lack of confi612
dence in the courts as either autonomous or fair decisionmakers.
2. PopularizingLaw orPopularJustice?- The media undermine court
authority not only by appealing to Party-state officials to intervene in
cases, but also by appealing to the public. China's courts are not alone in
facing populist pressures to treat criminals harshly or to reach decisions
that conform to popular conceptions of right and wrong. But such pressures are amplified in a system in which they are combined with Partystate oversight; lack of alternative media voices and an absence of other
mechanisms for venting popular opinion; and in which courts lack either
Ribao [People's Daily], July 10, 2003 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
reasons that rural residents do not trust law and courts and instead appeal to government
officials).
610. Interview 2002-7; Interview 2003-26. Media coverage is not necessarily free of
financial costs. See supra text accompanying note 161 (discussing payments to journalists
to persuade them to write stories).
611. See Interview 2003-3 (commenting that popular confidence in media stems in
part from courts' lack of power); Interview 2003-9 (stating that media are trusted more
than other arms of Party-state); Interview 2003-26 (stating that reliance on media reflects
lack of confidence in the law). On corruption in the courts, see, e.g., Can Media
Supervision Push Forward Judicial Fairness?, supra note 162, at 10 (quoting Beijing lawyer
as stating that it is difficult to win cases without some level of corruption).
612. A number of commentators in China have noted that media coverage of the
courts may be undermining confidence in the courts. See, e.g., Cai, Media Adjudication,
supra note 323; Liu, Television Programs, supra note 105. Likewise, court officials have
suggested concern that the media may also be undermining popular confidence in the
courts by reporting critically on them. See, e.g., Zhu, Courts Will Protect, supra note 223
(quoting Supreme People's Court president Xiao Yang as stating that media coverage
should benefit the image of judicial organs).
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a traditionally powerful position in the Party-state or the ability to claim to
speak or act on behalf of the public.
China's recent experience contrasts with many Western countries
where the development of judicial systems predated the emergence of a
commercialized popular press. 6 1 3 In China, courts have developed concurrently with media commercialization, and they have developed more
slowly than the media. China's courts have confronted commercialized
media that in many cases reflect and market popular conceptions of justice without having previously developed institutional authority or popular trust.
Although journalists sometimes use legal standards to highlight
wrongdoing, the media also often exert influence on the courts by appealing to popular conceptions of morality, as they did in the Jiajiang
Color Factory case. China's media are not unusual in using such populist
appeals; nor are China's courts alone in being influenced. Yet these pleas
appear to carry particular weight in a system in which courts are institutionally weak and frequently lack procedural norms governing the handling of cases; judges risk sanction if their treatment of a case is viewed as
erroneous by their superiors; and there is traditional emphasis on substantive justice. Likewise, in a system in which public debate over pending legislation is generally muted, 61 4 the media's role in voicing public
concerns regarding individual cases-whether generated by or reflected
in the media-may be of particular importance. If legislation lacks popular legitimacy, claims by the media to represent the public may have increased potency and may make it particularly difficult for courts to rely
on legal norms to resist such pressure.
Populist appeals may be further amplified in a system in which laws
are often vague, but in which views of law are often formalistic. 6 15 Laws
and regulations often fail to provide judges with clear guidelines for adjudicating disputes. 6 16 At the same time, the continuation of state-centered
formalistic conceptions of law and discomfort with legal indeterminacy
mean that a correct answer to cases is presumed to exist. Judges may look
to the views of the media for guidance as to whether their decisions will
be perceived as correct. Yet even in the absence of uncertainty regarding
the appropriate legal outcome, media coverage reinforces judges' beliefs
613. Although transitional countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere may face
similar challenges, China's experience contrasts with that of the United States and the
United Kingdom, where courts were well established prior to the emergence of a
commercialized popular press at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the
nineteenth centuries.
614. See generally William Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, Have You Eaten? Have you
Divorced? Debating the Meaning of Freedom in Marriage in China, in Realms of Freedom
in Modern China 234 (William C. Kirby ed., 2004).
615. See Pittman B. Potter, The Chinese Legal System: Globalization and Local Legal
Culture 12, 29, 31 (2001) (discussing role of formalism in Chinese legal system).
616. Cf. Interview 2003-46 (arguing that flexibility of legal standards facilitated
decision in ZhangJinzhu case).
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that they will be evaluated based on whether their superiors consider
their decisions to be in line with popular or leadership opinions-even in
situations when these views are in tension with legal standards.
The media's role in popularizing law also has positive effects on
court development. Dissemination of legal information and knowledge
by the media, in particular the specialized legal media, has played an important role in educating judges. Media attention to law may also be raising legal knowledge more generally, thus placing pressure on the judiciary to follow legal standards. The increased role of law may also provide
courts grounds to resist external pressure by providing standards judges
can point to in order to resist such pressure. In some cases, courts are
now ignoring instructions from leaders; 6 17 over time, the greater acceptance of legal rules and procedures may make it easier for them to do so.
But the popularization of law over the past decade has also arguably undermined courts' already weak claims to have unique authority to interpret and apply the law. Legal education campaigns have resulted in
greater legal consciousness and greater attention to law in the popular
media.6 18 At the same time, however, such campaigns may also reinforce
views that courts have no better claim to be applying the law correctly
than do other institutions. 61 9 Combined with widespread coverage of
court malfeasance, such efforts may be undermining attempts to distinguish courts from other actors, or to establish courts' claims to be the
appropriate forum for resolving legal questions.
3. Expanding Relevance and Expanding Authority? - Media coverage
usually has treated the courts as one of many state actors. Media coverage
of the courts often resembles coverage of other government or Party entities: The media complain about unjust actions by the police, by local
government departments, or by local party officials, just as they protest
the failure of courts to behave fairly.620 In the case of the courts, however, there is now significant debate regarding the proper boundaries of
media coverage. This change suggests the possibility that courts are beginning to distinguish themselves from other Party-state actors, and that
other Party-state actors are becoming increasingly respectful of legal
procedures.
Some in the Chinese media have begun to demonstrate increased
sensitivities toward reporting on courts. 6 21 Reporters comment that they
have become reluctant to predict the outcomes of cases, and they avoid
617. Interview 2003-164.
618. For an overview of state legal education campaigns, see Publicity and Rule of Law
in China, China L., Aug. 2003, at 54, 54-59.
619. Liao, supra note 601.
620. See, e.g., Interview 2003-4 (stating that newspapers, like public, view courts as
just another government entity).
621. The existence of established procedures in the courts may facilitate media
coverage: As one journalist noted, difficulties reporters face in covering the courts are not
as significant as those they face when reporting on other state actors. Id.
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6 22
referring to defendants in criminal cases as "criminals" prior to trial.
Journalists contend that reporting on active cases has become more fact
based. Media are increasingly careful to base their reports on proceedings in court, to include arguments from all parties, and to avoid bias in
favor of one party. 62 3 Some journalists say they now wait until a court of
first instance decision before they report on a case. 6 24 Others add that
they view coverage of courts as distinct from coverage of other government entities, and they are more careful to avoid attempting to influence
6 25
outcomes when they are covering the courts.

Yet increased media sensitivity to legal procedures does not necessarily reflect recognition that courts deserve more respect than other government actors, or that court procedures are fundamentally different
from those of other institutions. 6 2 6 Although there is less discussion of
media interference with other government actors than with the courts,
there is debate as to whether the media should wait for other entitiesincluding Party discipline commissions responsible for investigating
wrongdoings by Party officials, procuratorates, or administrative departments-to act before publishing critical reports or exposing wrongdoing. 6 2 7 Granting the courts an initial opportunity to adjudicate disputes
may merely be one aspect of a more general concern with reducing the
volume of bad news and maintaining popular confidence in the Partystate.
Moreover, deference to courts derives in significant part from increased court attention to media management. Many who protest against
excessive media interference seem more concerned with protecting the
interests of the courts than with the fairness of court proceedings. As
Part 1I.E shows, China's courts have become attentive to their public
images, and have placed increased emphasis on controlling the flow of
information to the media. Such reactions by the courts appear primarily
to be responses to perceived infringements on courts' power. Courts do
not appear to be claiming that media coverage violates principles of how
the legal system should function, or threatens fairness to individual litigants. This shift may also reflect increased sensitivities of propaganda authorities to legal coverage. In Shanghai, for example, local propaganda

622. Interview 2003-46; Interview 2003-101; Interview 2003-102; see also Xu, Checks,
supra note 31 (discussing debates on whether restrictions on media are needed).
623. At LegalDaily, for example, internal rules state that the paper is not permitted to
write opinionated articles after a case enters judicial proceedings, although this rule may
be ignored when the paper desires to highlight unfairness in the courts. Interview 2003-73.
624. Interview 2003-10; Interview 2003-46; Interview 2003-52; Interview 2003-60.
625. Interview 2003-23; Interview 2003-39.
626. Cf. Lubman, supra note 24, at 292-93 (discussing role of Chinese courts as
"bureaucratic institutions").
627. See supra Part II.D:
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department rules bar the Shanghai media from covering cases from the
628
time they are filed until a decision is issued.
The rise in defamation litigation is also influencing media coverage
of the courts. In addition to a small number of suits courts orjudges have
brought against the media, the media have faced numerous defamation
suits for alleged inaccuracies in reporting on legal cases. These range
from overstating the crimes of convicted criminals, to misstating the facts
in tort suits, to repeating allegations raised in court. Economic self-interest increasingly affects coverage of legal matters. 62 9 In addition, criminal
sanctions that local courts have imposed on journalists have made some
wary of being too outspoken or critical.
Judges and courts are not alone in using their powers to obstruct or
limit media coverage; other government actors routinely seek to block
negative coverage or intimidate reporters. But courts may be unusual in
their use of formal legal mechanisms-most notably defamation litigation
and restrictions on coverage of cases-to do so. If increased media cautiousness in reporting on the courts is the product of courts' attempts to
impede or deter media coverage, then recent media emphasis on not
prejudging cases may be a reaction to the threat of retribution rather
than an indication of greater respect. Courts' ability to exert control over
the media may derive from courts using their existing powers and authority over courtroom procedure and litigation in new ways, rather than
from an increase in the authority of the courts.
Courts are increasingly relevant in China, but the degree to which
this reflects increased authority is ambiguous. Court relevance is reflected not only by rising caseloads, but by the perceived need to obtain
court validation for many Party decisions, in particular Party disciplinary
actions against corrupt officials. Indeed, it appears that in most cases in
which Party authorities take action against official wrongdoing, cases are
eventually turned over to the courts for the application of criminal
630
sanctions.
The fact that courts announce decisions, however, does not mean
that courts have the power either to make such decisions or to enforce
them. The acts of deciding cases, announcing decisions, and enforcing
628. Interview 2003-50; Interview 2003-60; see also Xu, Checks, supra note 31
(discussing similar restrictions in Guangdong Province).
629. Interview 2003-72 (stating that fear of defamation lawsuits is primary motivation
for general policy of avoiding opinionated coverage of pending cases). Individual
journalists are frequently required to bear part of the cost of any award against their
employer.
630. Interview 2003-118. The importance of judicial validation, or at least the
existence of courts, to Party legitimacy is not new. As Jerome Cohen noted in writing on
the development of courts in the 1950s, the inclusion of a provision regarding judicial
independence in the 1954 constitution in part "reflected the belief that acceptance as a
legitimate sovereign, at home and abroad, required not merely that major sanctions be
dispensed by courts, but also that the courts appear to be acting independently." Cohen,
Judicial Independence, supra note 609, at 1003.
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judgments remain distinct. Courts may have the power to decide and
announce decisions but may lack the power to enforce them. Or courts
may be responsible for announcing decisions but may lack the power either to decide cases or to enforce such decisions. Thus, for example, in
cases of official wrongdoing, courts announce criminal sanctions, but
such decisions generally have been made by Party discipline commissions
or senior Party officials; in many civil cases, courts have the power to hear
63
and decide cases, but lack the authority to enforce their decisions. ' In
cases of concern to Party leaders, the courts are neither the primary
factfinder nor the final decisionmaker. Hence in the BMW case, the
court's verdict was investigated and "affirmed" by the provincial Party political-legal committee.
The growth of caseloads may yet turn out to be a significant factor in
increasing the authority of China's courts, both by increasing the stature
of the courts within the Party-state and by making external interference
more difficult. Despite the expansion of caseloads, however, China's experience continues to be distinct from many other countries that have
experienced an expansion of judicial power.6 32 For example, in Argentina, the media play a significant role in highlighting injustices and forcing resolution of long-pending matters, but judicial resolution of media
investigations remains important and requires courts to exercise their
633
own power to examine and decide cases.
The fact that courts remain one of many legitimate avenues for dispute resolution in China,6 34 and may lack the authority to enforce the
decisions they make, is important in assessing China's attempts to define
631. See generally Clarke, Power and Politics, supra note 294 (discussing low
enforcement rate of Chinese civil judgments).
632. See C. Neal Tate, Why the Expansion of Judicial Power?, in The Global
Expansion of Judicial Power 27, 28-33 (C. Neal Tate & Torbj6rn Vallinder eds., 1995)
(discussing political conditions that explain the expansion of judicial power and noting
importance of democracy as characteristic of states experiencing judicialization of
politics); C. Neal Tate & Torbj6m Vallinder, The Global Expansion ofJudicial Power: The
Judicialization of Politics, in The Global Expansion of Judicial Power, supra, at 1, 1-5
(discussing expansion of judicial power in number of democracies).
633. Catalina Smulovitz, The Discovery of Law: Political Consequences in the
Argentine Case, in Global Prescriptions 249, 265 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds.,
2002) ("[A] lthough claims made through the media imply a certain distrust of the judicial
institution's ability to perform its task, it is worth noting that to be effective, the claims of
the media seem to require judicial validation.").
634. Some observers in China believe that courts should be viewed as fundamentally
different from other government actors, as is reflected by expressions of outrage over the
media's assumption of the role of adjudicator. See supra Part II.A.5. Such a view
presumes that courts are playing a particular role in the system that in fact remains
aspirational, and that might require a fundamental realignment of institutional structures.
Such views may also suggest a belief in an ideal type of court that does not exist anywhere.
See Shapiro, supra note 608, at 1 (contending that "if we examine what we generally call
courts across the full range of contemporary and historical societies, the prototype [of
independent judges applying preexisting legal norms after adversary proceedings to
achieve a dichotomous decision] fits almost none of them").
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the appropriate relationship between courts and the media. The role of
courts as one dispute resolver among many may undermine court claims
to special treatment from the media. For example, the European Court
of Human Rights has held that restrictions may be imposed on media
coverage of pending cases in order to uphold the "authority of the judiciary," defined as "the notion that the courts are, and are accepted by the
public at large as being, the proper forum for the ascertainment of legal
rights and obligations and the settlement of disputes." 63 5 If China's
courts lack the ability to make such a claim-both in actual practice and
in public perception, for in many cases courts' claims to be the proper
forum for establishing guilt and resolving disputes appear no stronger
than those of other Party or government departments-it may be difficult
for courts to justify restrictions on media coverage based on either the
premise that courts are different or that doing so is consistent with international practice.
4. Reinforced Interference. - The discussion above does not suggest
that the changes underway in China's courts or the growth of litigation
are insignificant. Courts are playing new roles in the Chinese legal system, increasingly asserting their power over disputes and growing in relevance to ordinary people. These changes appear, at least in part, to stem
from increased legal coverage in the media and awareness of law. The
growth of legal knowledge and increased relevance of courts may be important steps in China's legal development. 6 36 But it is unclear whether
these changes are distinct from developments in state-citizen relations
more generally, where evidence suggests that a greater number of complaints are being raised, and there is an increased state emphasis on highlighting the ability of official entities to resolve problems, in part to boost
confidence in the Party-state.

63 7

China's recent experience with media coverage of the courts suggests that increased media oversight will not necessarily lead to improvements in the legal system. The status of the Chinese media as significant
actors in the legal system suggests that the media may be both supporting
and subverting law and the courts. The media's impact in exposing unfairness and corruption may force greater compliance with law by the
635. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245, 274 (1979). Nevertheless,
limits are permissible only insofar as they are necessary, and the court also recognized the
important role the media play in providing information to the public on court
proceedings. Id. at 280.
636. Excessive negative coverage of the courts could, of course, also discourage use of
the courts. See, e.g., Can Media Supervision Push Forward Judicial Fairness?, supra note
162, at 10 (arguing that excessive negative media coverage of courts is undermining courts'
authority, and that openness alone will not solve all problems in courts).
637. For example, Xi Chen has found both an increase in collective complaints to
letters and visits offices in the 1990s, and a strong emphasis on the ability of letters and
visits offices to resolve received complaints. Xi Chen, The Waning Party-State System and
Rising Popular Claims to Citizenship Rights in China 1977-2002, at 5, 9-11 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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courts, and general attention to legal matters may strengthen legal consciousness and increase use of the courts. Yet the ability of the media to
affect and determine outcomes demonstrates that the media are not
pushing the Chinese system away from established patterns of Party
oversight.
The media are more vibrant and enjoy more editorial discretion
than many in the West assume. In the judicial context, however, the media's continued use of their formal position as an arm of the Party-state to
influence courts may offset benefits from expanded coverage of injustice
and increased transparency. In doing so, however, the media are not
overstepping the bounds of permissible or appropriate behavior; they are
acting in line with established norms of governance, against the backdrop
of a lack of legal or ethical norms that dictate the appropriate roles of
many actors in the system. Media involvement may be understood as impeding the development of the courts, but only if the goal of current
court development is a system in which courts play a fundamentally different role than they do today.
C. Legislating Against Transparency? RestrictingMedia Coverage
Chinese academics and commentators have looked to the West for
examples of how to address court-media relations. Many have responded
to the influence of the press by arguing for restrictions on the media. 63 8
Reliance on Western examples has played a role in transforming courtmedia relations into an issue of general concern in both legal circles and
in the media by highlighting the possible positive and negative effects of
greater media coverage of the courts. Yet such comparisons overlook crucial factors that underlie the media's impact and role in China and the
very different roles the Chinese media play from their Western counterparts. Restricting media coverage without addressing the range of influences that affects courts is likely to result in reduced transparency without
reducing interference in court decisionmaking or increasing fairness to
litigants.
Debate in China resembles discussions elsewhere regarding the
proper relationship between the courts and the media. Comparisons to
the West are not surprising: China is not the only country to experience
a period of weak courts and powerful media, or in which media critics
assail the press for attempting to influence court outcomes. 6 39 Commen638. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 322 (arguing for legal restriction on media to avoid
"media adjudication"); Wang, Objectivity and Subjectivity, supra note 321 (reporting on
scholars' calls for protection ofjudicial system from media). Such views are not universal:
Others have stated that the courts must be willing to ignore the media if they are to avoid
being controlled by it, He, Judges, supra note 29, or have criticized steps taken to restrict
the ability of the media to cover court proceedings, Xu, Fourth Wave, supra note 226.
639. For discussions of media-influenced criminal trials in the United States, see
Andie Tucher, Froth & Scum passim (1994) (examining emergence and role of the penny
press in nineteenth century U.S. criminal trials);J. Anthony Lukas, Big Trouble: Celebrity
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tators on Western systems have recognized the potential for a range of
political, commercial, and other interests to influence media coverage of
the courts. Media demands for vengeance or harsh treatment of criminal
suspects are not unique to China, nor are criticisms of the media for sensationalism and excessive interference. 6 40 Judges in China are also not
unusual in attempting to manage their media images and maintain a pos64 1
itive working relationship with members of the press.
Recent experiences in China also resemble developments in transitional nations of Eastern Europe and South America. Edwin Rekosh has
noted the tension in Eastern Europe between the role journalists may
play in exposing corruption and official wrongdoing and the possibility
that, with such reports, the "media can contribute to an erosion of public
642
confidence by perpetuating stereotypes of an ineffectual judiciary."
Discussing the media in post-Soviet Russia, Frances Foster has noted that
extensive critical reporting "eroded rather than fostered public confidence in the postsocialist Russian leadership and evolving norms, rules,
institutions, and procedures." 64 3 Similarly, in Argentina, the media have
emerged as an alternative route of redress, albeit an often imperfect
one.

644

Trials and the Good Old Days That Never Were, 12 Media Stud. J. 46, 47 (1998)
(discussing sensational media coverage of trials in nineteenth century); see also Richard L.
Fox & Robert W. Van Sickel, Tabloid Justice: Criminal Justice in an Age of Media Frenzy
53-54 (2001) (discussing high profile criminal cases in United States during twentieth
century, including the Lindbergh baby case and Sam Sheppard trial).
640. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n, An Independent Judiciary: Report of the ABA
Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence, Overview (1997), at
http://www.abanet.org/govaffairs/judiciary/rover.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting that "bashing judges has a long and distinguished tradition" in United
States).
Sensationalism in coverage of legal matters is also not new to China. The Chinese
media's role in sensationalizing "outrageous cases" dates back to the late nineteenth
century, when newspapers and other forms of public communication included discussions
of such cases. "These outrageous cases reveal the power of scandalous events to shape
entire categories of law." Melissa Macauley, Social Power and Legal Culture: Litigation
Masters in Late Imperial China 329-30 (1998).
641. See, e.g., John Seigenthaler & Robert W. Snyder, Interview with Judge Richard S.
Arnold and Judge Gilbert S. Merrit, 12 Media Stud. J. 80, 85, 90 (1998) (discussing how
some U.S. judges manage interactions with media); see also Robert W. Snyder, Interview
with Linda Fairstein, Chief of the Sex Crimes Prosecution Unit in the District Attorney's
Office of N.Y. County, 12 Media Stud. J. 92, 99 (1998) (discussing need for prosecutors to
maintain working relationships with members of press, and use of journalists to obtain
information regarding cases).
642. Rekosh, supra note 603, at 71.
643. Frances H. Foster, Izvestiia as a Mirror of Russian Legal Reform: Press, Law, and
Crisis in the Post-Soviet Era, in Russian Media Law and Policy in the Yeltsin Decade 60, 86
(Monroe E. Price et al. eds., 2002).
644. Smulovitz, supra note 633, at 252-53. As in China, judges in Argentina have
used the media to promote themselves and their positions, id. at 252, and "some
journalists... became public prosecutors and defenders of the public interest," id. at 259.
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There has been a significant amount of discussion in China, both in
legal academia and in the print media, regarding the appropriate relationship between the courts and the media. Commentators have discussed legislation or regulations that would either restrict the media's
ability to report on pending legal proceedings or limit the ability of the
media to issue commentaries or opinions on pending cases. 64 5 Although
some acknowledge the difficulty of legislating' media coverage of the
courts at a time when the relative positions of the courts and the media
are in flux646-and while propaganda departments remain responsible
for regulating the media-much discussion has assumed that legislation
can solve, or at least ameliorate, problems resulting from expanded media involvement in disputes.
Attention to legislative solutions appears at least in part to derive
from examples of foreign legal systems. Most countries regulate media
coverage of the courts. Although some Chinese commentators have
looked to the United States as an example of a system in which there are
relatively few limits on media coverage of court proceedings, 647 the
United States stands virtually alone in its approach. Indeed, given the
plethora of restrictions on media coverage of the courts in other countries, 6 48 it is logical that Chinese commentators look to those precedents
for guidance.
China may yet determine that legal regulation 649 of media coverage
of the courts is appropriate. For those who believe that current media
645. See, e.g., Wei, Journalism and Communication Law, supra note 44, at 119
(discussing restrictions on commentaries on pending cases); Xu, Media-Judicial Relations,
supra note 19 (reporting on survey of attitudes ofjudges, reporters, and lawyers regarding
when media reports should be permitted).
646. See supra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing debate concerning
"media law").
647. Although comparisons to the United States may at times seem strained, they are
frequently made by scholars, journalists, and judges in China. Indeed, in one case, the
Vice Governor of Jiangxi, who was executed for corruption, is reported to have
commented shortly before his death that his case would have had a different outcome if
the Chinese press were as free as that in the United States. Chen, Unfairness, supra note
197.
648. See, e.g., Ian Cram, A Virtue Less Cloistered: Courts, Speech and Constitutions
13 (2002) (discussing restrictions in Britain); Geoffrey Robertson & Andrew Nicol, Media
Law 423-52 (4th ed. 2002) (same); see also Cram, supra, at 204-07 (discussing Spanish
jurisprudence on media coverage of trials).
649. The lack of legal regulation reflects the fact that to date most regulation of
media content has come in the form of Party, as opposed to legal, regulation. Debate over
whether there should be legal provisions regarding media coverage is thus intertwined
with questions regarding whether law should be used to regulate the media. This may
explain the lack of regulation to date. Some who argue in favor of a delay in passing a
media law contend that any law would merely serve to restrict the media and would lock
restrictive Party-state oversight in place, thus reducing the flexibility of the media to
challenge limits regarding permissible content. See Interview 2003-14; Interview 2003-56;
Interview 2003-70; Interview 2003-79. Others argue that any legal regulation would be
better than the often arbitrary system by which propaganda departments currently regulate
the media because it would at least permit all participants to know the rules under which
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influence on the courts is excessive, however, there should be more fundamental questions. To the degree that examples from Western legal systems are appropriate, questions regarding the mechanisms by which
courts and individual judges develop the institutional ability to resist external pressures may be more relevant. 650 How have judges and courts
elsewhere developed the ability to resist external pressures, including
pressure from the media. How have norms developed that regulate relations between courts and other actors? What gives courts the ability to
resist popular or government pressures? China's judges have very strong
incentives to decide cases in ways consistent with media opinion. 6 5 1 In
contrast, judges have few incentives to resist such pressures and little protection if their decisions are viewed as incorrect by their superiors. 652 It is
unlikely that a judge would be punished for following a written instruction from a higher-ranking official to handle a case in a particular way,
even where the instruction is contrary to written law. Legislation restricting media coverage of the courts will not alter such incentives.
Uncertainty regarding the relationship of the media to the courts
may also reflect ambiguity, or debate, regarding the goals of the Chinese
legal system. In Western countries, much discussion regarding regulation
of media coverage of the courts focuses on the need to balance a variety
of interests, including fairness of individual proceedings, transparency,
and freedom of speech. 653 In the United States, balancing these interests
is carried out against the backdrop of an overarching belief in democracy. 6 54 Western discussions of the role of media coverage in criminal
they operate and might reduce Party oversight. See Interview 2003-3; Interview 2003-26;
Interview 2003-103.
650. I do not mean to suggest that Chinese commentators have ignored such
questions entirely. There is a significant discussion of court reform, and in particular
institutional reform, in legal academia in China. But there do not appear to have been
significant efforts to link such discussions to those regarding media coverage of the courts.
Although there have been suggestions that courts might be strengthened by altering their
institutional positions, there has been relatively little discfission of how courts or judges
might develop the ability to resist external pressures within the current institutional
structure.
651. See supra note 162 (discussing sanctions against judges for incorrect decisions);
cf. Wei,Journalism and Communication Law, supra note 44, at 115 (arguing that it is naive
to argue that courts should simply ignore media pressure).
652. Similar arguments exist with regard to corruption, where commentators have
observed that judges may have few incentives to reject such outside influence. See, e.g.,
He, Two Questions, supra note 297 (arguing that courts must be assured that they will not
suffer if they reject corruption).
653. See, e.g., Marc A. Franklin et al., Mass Media Law 779 (2000) (noting range of
interests involved in evaluating appropriate restrictions on media coverage of cases); Price
& Krug, supra note 255, at 27, 37-40 (discussing rival interests that must be balanced in
determining whether to close judicial proceedings to media); see also Cram, supra note
648, at I (noting that common law jurisdictions have often justified restrictions on media
by highlighting the need to "safeguard the fairness of individual proceedings").
654. See Cram, supra note 648, at 23 (noting importance of arguments based on
democracy to support relative lack of restrictions on media coverage of courts in U.S.
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trials, in both common and civil law systems, also focus on the rights of
655
criminal defendants.
There are many calls in China for courts to ensure fairness, 65 6 but
the goals being weighed may be different. It is far from clear that fairness, in particular fairness toward criminal defendants, has become a
dominant value in the Chinese legal system. 65 7 If the legal system is intended both to provide fair resolution of disputes for litigants and to further Party interests in maintaining stability, legitimacy, and control, then
media that in some cases undermine the fairness of individual proceedings are not in conflict with the goals, or norms, of the system. Media
that assume the role of adjudicators are in fact furthering state interests
in curbing abuses at the local level in a system in which curbing such
abuses is more important than using legal mechanisms to do so. Media
influence may also be less of a concern in a system in which there remains
significant uncertainty, at least from the Party-state's perspective, regarding the value of public debate on legal issues. 658 Thus it may not be in
system); see also Foster, supra note 643, at 86-87 (noting destabilizing role Russian media
played in immediate post-Soviet era raised question of whether democracy and law are
preconditions for press freedom); Bruce W. Sanford, No Contest: The Trumped-Up
Conflict Between Freedom of the Press and the Right to a Fair Trial, 12 Media Stud. J. 2, 3
(1998) ("[I]f one overarching theme is discernible from the [United States Supreme
Court's] pronouncements of the past 40 years, it is, quite simply, that judges need a
vigorous, probing, enterprising media to ensure both a criminal defendant's rights and
public confidence in our system of justice."); Price & Krug, supra note 255, at 3 (noting
that "most tie the claim . . . for unencumbered media to their role in reinforcing or
fostering democracy").
655. Cf. George P. Fletcher, With Justice for Some: Victims' Rights in Criminal Trials
149-50 (1995) (discussing focus in European Convention on Human Rights on "fair and
public hearing[s]," ard noting that "[n]o basic charter of any modern society requires the
just punishment of all criminals" and that "[t]he law demands not ajust outcome but a fair
procedure"); id. at 156 (contrasting common law emphasis on fair procedures with civil
law system's commitment to "the search for truth"); Richard Nobles & David Schiff,
Understanding Miscarriages of Justice: Law, the Media, and the Inevitability of Crisis
16-17 (2000) (discussing perceived miscarriages ofjustice in United Kingdom, and noting
that "the general conception of miscarriage of justice . . . is not injustice per se, but
wrongful conviction").
656. See, e.g., How to View Popular Opinion Supervision, supra note 281 (describing
media's role in encouraging fairness in court); Zhang Zetao, Tingshen Yinggai Yunxu You
Xuanzexing De Zhibo [Voluntary Live Broadcasting of Court Proceedings Should Be
Permitted], 2000 Faxue [Legal Studies] No. 4, available at http://www.jc.gov.cn/
personal/ysxs/fnsxl/fnsx928.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that live
broadcasting of court proceedings will help ensure that courts operate fairly).
657. The emphasis of criminal defense lawyers in China on avoiding media coverage
highlights the limited role the media play in protecting the rights of defendants in China.
Compare supra Part II.A.5 (arguing that media coverage of criminal cases in China is
generally harmful to defendants), with Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Media, Attorneys, and
Fair Criminal Trials, 4 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 61, 63 (1995) (noting that use of the media
has often been viewed as a "weapon in the arsenal" of U.S. defense attorneys).
658. Western scholars have noted that media coverage of courts encourages informed
public debate. See, e.g., Cram, supra note 648, at 10-15 (discussing such arguments). In
China, although discussion and debate of legal issues are widespread in academic and
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the interests of China's leaders to alter fundamentally the roles of either
the media or the courts.
Although the Chinese media's increasingly active role may appear to
be in tension with recent efforts to boost the position of courts, this may
be a false perspective. Challenges to court authority to resolve disputes
are problematic only to the degree that courts are viewed as the legitimate forum for resolving disputes. In a system in which Party influence
and oversight over court decisionmaking continues to be both significant
and legitimate, 6 59 there may be less concern with media influence. Protecting courts from media influence may also be unnecessary in a system
in which there are concerns regarding the capacity of courts to act fairly
or competently.6 60 Likewise, intervention that leads courts to such decisions may not be problematic if the Chinese legal system is primarily concerned with the substantive correctness of decisions, as opposed to the
6 61
procedures used to arrive at such decisions.
This discussion does not suggest that the goals underlying Western
systems' approaches to court-media relations would be inappropriate for
the Chinese system. 6 6 2 Rather, it suggests that ambiguity over the objectives of the system-and the fact that such objectives are increasingly contested-may partially explain the difficulty in determining the appropriate roles of courts and the media, in particular in a system in which both
are arms of the Party-state that are undergoing rapid development. For
specialist publications, there remains unease regarding public debate on legal issues in the
popular press, and in particular on television. Interview 2003-87. This is due in part to the
belief that encouraging too much debate on legal matters would undermine confidence in
law by suggesting that law is uncertain, or that law is easily manipulated. Id.
659. Commentators and participants in the system object to and are seeking to
change such norms, but such objections have not yet led to fundamental changes in how
the legal system is structured or operates.
660. Zhu Suli has made a similar point with regard to the role of adjudication
committees in local courts, contending that review of cases by such committees, which
often results in cases being decided by a committee ofjudges who have not heard the case,
may be beneficial in the context of China's current situation and legal traditions and
should not immediately be dismissed as violating principles of "judicial independence."
Zhu Suli, Songfa Xiaxiang [Sending Law to the Countryside] 110-14 (2000) [hereinafter
Zhu, Sending Law] (discussing positive roles of court adjudication committees).
661. Media concern with perceived substantive correctness is not unique to
developing legal systems. See, e.g., Nobles & Schiff, supra note 655, at 11 ("[T]he media
have a dominant understanding of miscarriage [of justice in the United Kingdom] that
prioritizes truth over due prcoess .... "). But in a system with little emphasis on
procedural law, the impact of such views on court decisionmaking may be more
pronounced.
662. Nor is this discussion intended to suggest that the goals of the Chinese legal
system are determined only from the top down. One significant effect of increased
discussion of legal issues and increased autonomy regarding the content of such
discussions is to encourage new uses of law and the courts, and thus greater development
of the system from the bottom up. Likewise, ambiguity over the goals of the system may
also be permitting greater experimentation by courts, lawyers, and the media, and may be
encouraging various actors in the Chinese legal system to use law to serve an increasingly
varied range of interests.

2005]

WATCHDOG OR DEMAGOGUE?

example, if fairness is understood in terms of a need to constrain judges
and officials from abusing their power, and if miscarriages ofjustice are
viewed primarily as incidents in which wrongdoers go unpunished, the
current roles of the Chinese media may be furthering these goals. In
contrast, if one goal of current legal reform is to develop the courts into
the primary forum for dispute resolution and also one that operates autonomously, the media's role may be more problematic.
Understanding media intervention as a political and institutional influence demonstrates that the media's role cannot be divorced from
broader questions regarding the direction of the Chinese legal system.
This is not to fault those in China who have looked to the West for guidance in determining whether and how to regulate the relationship between the media and the courts, but rather highlights the need to extend
such enquiry beyond technical questions such as when reporting is and is
not permitted, or whether reporters are allowed into the courtroom.
The link to broader structural questions also highlights risks in restricting media coverage of China's courts. If the ability of courts to resist
media pressure is understood as merely one aspect of courts' ability to
resist powerful interests, then restricting media coverage absent consideration of the mechanisms of influence may have little effect. Indeed, one
benefit of media oversight is that in many cases it is relatively transparent:
Judges are able to ascertain who is seeking to exert her influence and
claims. Although restrictions might reduce the ability of and incentives
to the media to stir up public opinion in order to pressure courts, restricting public media coverage may encourage wider use of internal publications, phone calls, and other less transparent mechanisms of
intervention.
Restricting media coverage would also undercut modest efforts underway to increase transparency in China's courts. Despite recent proclamations regarding the importance of transparency, most court decisions
remain inaccessible except to the parties directly involved in the case, and
the media often find access to courtroom proceedings blocked by court
officials. 663 Formalizing restrictions on the media would lend support to
those seeking to block media access.
663. See He, Viewing the Development, supra note 299. As He Weifang has argued,
however, simply permitting media coverage of courtroom proceedings may result in little
added transparency. He notes that, were China's media simply to report on what they see
in court, they would have little of substance to report, given the limited role courtroom
hearings play in deciding most cases. He Weifang, Dui Dianshi Zhibo Tingshen Guocheng
De Yiyi [Differing Thoughts Regarding Live Broadcast of the Court Proceedings], 1998
Zhongguo Lfishi [Chinese Lawyer] No. 8, available at http://www.jc.gov.cn/personal/
ysxs/fnsx3/fnsx2O37.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Zan, supra note
414.
Russia has similarly confronted questions regarding whether the media should be
restricted so as to prevent biased coverage of criminal proceedings. See Igor Yeremin, On
the Application of the Principle of Presumption of Innocence in Journalists' Activity (Dec.
24, 1997), reprinted in Russian Media Law and Policy in the Yeltsin Decade, supra note
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The strongest argument in favor of regulating media coverage of the
courts comes from those who argue that imposing restrictions will result,
in time, in greater freedom for the media. 66 4 According to this analysis,
the lack of media self-regulation is largely to blame for the problems they
confront. Excessive media intervention and sensationalism have resulted
in courts either blocking the media from covering cases or appealing to
propaganda authorities to restrict the media. Imposing limits on media
coverage would make courts feel less threatened and thus would increase
the transparency of courts by reducing their need to block media reports.
Implicit in this argument is the hope that using laws or regulations would
also reduce the role of propaganda departments; the lack of clear ground
665
rules today results in propaganda department discretion.
There are three reasons to be skeptical that restricting the media will
over time lead to greater openness. First, there is little reason to believe
that increased restrictions on the media would fundamentally shift the
role of propaganda departments. Party oversight of the media is not
based on law or regulation (defined as laws or regulations enacted by the
National People's Congress or the State Council), and new regulations or
legislation regarding the media are likely to be used to limit the media
without replacing the role of propaganda departments. Indeed, one
complaint of journalists is that many of the existing rules that protect
their right to report are ignored by local authorities or subverted by prop6 66
aganda department instructions.
Second, such arguments are based on the belief that court restrictions on media coverage stem from a desire to protect the fairness of
proceedings. If court restrictions are largely derived from court self-interest in not being exposed to outside scrutiny, or from a culture of court
secrecy, restricting the media is unlikely to result in further openness.
Current regulations requiring courts to be open to the public are often
ignored; lack of implementation to date appears to stem more from
courts' failure to see openness as in their self-interest than from concerns
that such openness will jeopardize the fairness of proceedings.
Third, such arguments may mistake the causal relationship between
the lack of ethical standards or self-regulation and media freedom. The
lack of self-regulation and tendency of the media to pursue extremeseither not reporting on a subject at all or reporting on a subject without
643, at 358, 358-59 (notice from Russian Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes
stating that media reports regarding criminal conduct cannot be found to violate
presumption of innocence in Russian constitution, and that doing so would be an
unjustified attempt to restrict freedom of expression).
664. Cf. Xu, Checks, supra note 31 (discussing arguments for restrictions on media
coverage of courts).
665. Interview 2003-164.
666. See, e.g., Wang, Only Law, supra note 221 (noting onerous obligations and
restrictions imposed on reporters); Wang, Beaten, supra note 223 (discussing violence
against journalists); Wu & Li, Sealing Off, supra note 223 (discussing use of police,
procuratorate, and propaganda department to obstruct reporting).
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limits-may be a direct consequence of the significant controls the media
face. Weak professional standards and absence of self-regulation reflect a
system in which journalists often do not conceive of themselves as members of an independent profession, have loyalties to a range of personal
and institutional interests, and have obligations to the Party-state. As with
the legal profession, top-down imposition of such standards is unlikely to
result in greater professionalism in the short term. Developing professionalism will be a long-term project, one that requires both a longer period of development in the media and the further separation of the media from the state.
Whether media coverage of the courts should be subject to restrictions is not solely a question of balancing interests in transparency with
interests in protecting the authority of courts or the fairness of individual
proceedings. Permitting the media to evolve without additional restrictions to protect courts may be more important than any benefits derived
from restricting media coverage of the courts. Commercialization has
brought the media greater autonomy, but such autonomy is fragile.
Competition remains limited to Party-approved publications and is limited to certain topics. In many cases in which the media are said to exert
excessive influence, the problem may be too little media coverage. In the
black whistle scandal, for example, the media's one-sided effect stemmed
in part from the fact that, as the trial approached, the media were appar667
ently ordered to stop reporting on the case.

One-sided media reports are a manifestation of a media-control system that permits reports on an increasingly wide range of topics but remains suspicious of the value of public debate or the existence of alternative voices. Traditionally, "popular opinion" in China has referred to the
portion of public views that the Party has acknowledged, and propaganda
authorities maintain the right to regulate which public views the media
voice. The range of public views that the Party is willing to permit to be
acknowledged has expanded, and the public views that the media reflect
or create may now include views distinct from those of the Party. Nevertheless, Party propaganda authorities continue to maintain the power to
shut down debate in the press, as they did in the black whistle case and
the Sun Zhigang case, and to prevent the media from reflecting or stirring-up public opinion on certain topics.
The central Party-state seeks some of the checking value on official
misdeeds that comes from lively media, without allowing the free speech
that is generally regarded as being important to making these checks effective in the West. 668 As a result, although public opinion is increasingly
667. See supra Part II.A.2.
668. See Blasi, supra note 602, at 527. Experiences in other countries suggest that
loosening of control over the media may indeed lead to political challenges. See, e.g.,
Sallie Hughes, From the Inside Out: How Institutional Entrepreneurs Transformed
Mexican Journalism, 8 Harv. Int'l J. Press/Pol. 87, 88 (2003) (noting that in Mexico, the
development of "[c]ivic-oriented newspapers" legitimized opposition to authoritarian
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finding voice, it is carefully managed. The media are not, and do not
generally claim to be, neutral observers. As one scholar commented, "In
China, we fear disagreement, and we do not trust common people to use
their own judgment."6 69 Thus although there is widespread debate regarding legal matters in specialist publications and newspapers and on
the internet, there is virtually none on popular television programs such
as Law Today and Focus. The discomfort with alternative voices is not
merely a question of political control; as discussed above, it also reflects
Party-state concern that permitting debate might undermine confidence
both in legal institutions and in law itself. The expanding autonomy
China's media enjoy does not represent a shift in the state's instrumentalist view of the media: Media autonomy is valued for the role it serves in
furthering state interests, be it economic development, the checking of
abuses, or regime legitimization, but not for any intrinsic value of media
autonomy.670 In this respect, the development of the media parallels the
growth of civil society. China has permitted, and at times encouraged, a
range of NGOs to emerge. But NGO development has largely been limited to groups pursuing policy goals consistent with those of the central
Party-state, which remains wary of such developments even as it encour67 1
ages them.
If lack of-and lack of comfort with-alternative voices partly explains both media restrictions and the tendency of media coverage of
cases to be one sided, then the value of increased transparency is not
merely in exposing malfeasance and wrongdoing. Media coverage, even
given the limits in place, may facilitate greater comfort with rival views, in
particular regarding law and the legal system. Protecting the limited areas of freedom enjoyed by China's media is, over the long run, more
important than protecting China's courts from media pressure. The risk
of formalizing restrictions on the media is not just that such restrictions
will be used for a pretext for greater control of the media; it is that the
resulting decrease in reports will also reduce discussion and debate regarding law and legal institutions more generally. China's media may be
one sided in much of their coverage, but they have in many instances
transformed individual cases into issues of popular concern. In doing so,
they may also legitimize discussions by those seeking reform. Thus, in the
rule); Silvio Waisbord, The Narrative of Exposes in South American Journalism, 59 Gazette
3, at 189, 190 (1997) (discussing role of media exposes in political change in Central and
South America).
669. Interview 2003-130.
670. Cf. Blasi, supra note 602, at 528, 545 (stating that in the United States, "checking
value" of free speech is a "supplement to, not a substitute for," other values).
671. See Elizabeth C. Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge
to China's Future 131-34 (2004) (discussing state encouragement of environmental NGOs
to fill government roles, but also continued state vigilance about restricting range of NGO
activity); Zhang Ye, China's Emerging Civil Society 19-20 (June 2003), available at http://
www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/ye2003.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing NGO evolution and noting Party-state ambivalence about role of NCOs).
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black whistle scandal, media coverage of the case was restricted, but the
case itself resulted in renewed attention by legal scholars to the question
of whether courts may find defendants guilty of crimes not charged by
the procuratorate. Likewise, the Sun Zhigang case contributed to the
elimination of the custody and repatriation detention system, and also
renewed debate regarding the legality of the reeducation through labor
672
system of administrative detention.
There are steps that may effectively strengthen the courts and lessen
media influence without curtailing the media's ability to report on legal
matters. Eliminating the ability of Party officials to issue written instructions, for example, would more effectively reduce pressure on courts to
comply with media views than would banning coverage. Reforming compensation systems that punish judges for issuing decisions viewed as incorrect by their superiors would reduce pressure on courts to align their
decisions with popular and leadership views of substantive justice. Reducing the role of local governments in court appointments would similarly
reduce the influence of local Party officials. Greater transparency in the
courts may also, over time, boost confidence in the courts and thus court
legitimacy. Courts have sought to promote themselves through positive
media coverage, but more significant steps toward transparency are necessary if courts are significantly to increase popular confidence. Increasing the popular legitimacy of the courts may do more to reduce external
influences on court decisionmaking than restricting media coverage.
Excessive media influence in China primarily stems not from lack of
media accountability, but from weak courts and a system that imposes a
range of external pressures on court decisionmaking. Restricting media
coverage of the courts without addressing the range of influences that
affect court decisions is likely to do little to strengthen the position of the
courts or the fairness of proceedings. Yet it is not surprising that debates
regarding media coverage of the courts exist in isolation from discussions
regarding Party-state influence on the courts or realignment of institutional positions. Although discussions regarding the Party's role in the
legal system have become increasingly widespread in recent years, it remains easier to discuss media influence than Party influence. 673 Similarly, courts resist media influence because they can do so more easily
than they can other forms of pressure. Increasing court power, or insulating courts from external influence, touches more directly on core questions of political reform than does commercializing the media.
Arguments in favor of protecting the courts from media scrutiny may
reflect a hope that courts will one day assume a position that deserves
672. Although propaganda authorities quieted an initial wave of discussion of reforms
to the reeducation through labor system, discussion of such reforms resurfaced in early
2004. See, e.g., Wu, New Round, supra note 599.
673. The existence of tension between the courts and the media, and the prevalence
of debate on the topic, is itself a manifestation of a loosening of Party control over both
institutions.
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special treatment and respect from the media, rather than a belief that
they play such a role today. Similarly, arguments that restricting the media will strengthen the courts may presuppose that the Chinese media
play roles akin to those played by Western media. Understanding that
neither courts nor the media in China play such roles suggests both that
addressing court-media tensions may require different solutions, and also
that any such solution cannot be divorced from questions regarding the
potential role for courts and the media within the current system.
D. Superised Independence
Understanding that media supervision of the courts is intertwined
with Party-state oversight of political and legal institutions reveals the difficulty of defining 'judicial independence" in China. Media intervention
isjust one example of the many external pressures courts andjudges face.
At the same time, however, court-media interactions suggest the possibility that courts may develop, or may already be developing, spheres of autonomy and institutional identity that permit them to expand their own
authority and to act largely free of external influence. The ability of
courts to develop institutional identity and autonomy is likely to prove
more important to court attempts to define a distinct role within the system-and perhaps to improve the fairness of courts-than are attempts
to increase the profile or image of courts by restricting or manipulating
media coverage.
There has been significant recent attention to judicial independence
in China, both from academic commentators and from Party-state officials. Judicial independence has become a focus of many in China advocating reform, with some liberal academics expressly calling for courts to
operate free of Party oversight. 674 Likewise, Western commentators have
pointed to the lack of such independence as a symbol of what is wrong in
the Chinese system. Implicit in these discussions is the assumption that
granting courts more formal powers, or insulating courts from external
influences, will strengthen their ability to issue fair decisions.
There has been, however, relatively little discussion of what "independence" would mean in the Chinese context. This is not surprising; as
Martin Shapiro noted in his comparative study of courts, the "notion of
judicial independence is so ambiguous and misleading that it cannot
serve as a touchstone of 'courtness.' ,675 LikewiseJerome Cohen, writing
about China in the 1960s, observed that foreign commentators on China,
674. See, e.g., Dong Maoyun, Sifa Duli: Sifa Gongzheng De Zhongyao Zhidu
Baozheng Uudicial Independence: An Important Institutional Guarantee for Justice],
2003 Zhongguo Faxue [China Legal Science] No. 1, at 9, 9-10 (arguing that courts should
be free from interference from other Party-state institutions); Li Buyun & Liu Zhiwei, Sifa
Duli De Jige Wenti [Several Issues on Judicial Independence], 2002 Faxue Yanjiu [Legal
Studies Research] No. 3, at 9, 9-10 (stating that it is unconstitutional for Party committees
to instruct courts on proper decision in cases).
675. Shapiro, supra note 608, at 125.
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while often noting "the absence of 'judicial independence,' seldom, if
ever, explain this talismanic phrase." 67 6 Judicial independence has many
different meanings in China today. To some academic commentators in
China, independence means a judiciary not just free of improper influence, but also staffed by well-trained judges who are formally invested
with the power to invalidate acts of other branches of the Party-state. To
central Party officials, independence means judging free of corruption
and improper influence, but under the leadership of the Communist
Party and with the Party defining the contours of improper influence.
For some judges, "independence" has become a rhetorical weapon, used
to defend courts from charges of local protectionism and to oppose influence that judges and courts see as counter to their own institutional or
personal interests.
Separate from questions of definition, discussing independence is
difficult in a system in which the goals of the formal legal system are ambiguous and questions of capacity, interference, and competence touch
on issues of Party control. Discussions regarding judicial independence
can easily become, or be construed as, demands for broader political
change. Likewise, arguments for expanded judicial independence that
do not recognize the connection to broader questions of political reform
may avoid the most difficult problems that courts face. Nevertheless, understanding the media's role in the Chinese legal system raises three
questions that may give content to debates concerning the role of courts
in China. These questions suggest steps that must be taken in order to
develop a meaningful conception of judicial independence in China.
They also suggest that courts, like the media, may be beginning to assert
institutional autonomy in ways that challenge traditional assumptions regarding their position in the Chinese system.
First, can discussions of "independence" be extended to include the
range of influences, and range of mechanisms for exerting such influences, that affect court decisions? This Article has argued that the Chinese media should be understood as one of a number of Party-state actors
participating in the legal system. As a result, comparative inquiries that
examine the evolving roles of the Chinese media in the context of Western court-media experiences without attention to how legal systems regulate interactions among various state actors fail fully to appreciate developments in China. Likewise, discussions of the potential for judicial
independence must account for the range of actors and mechanisms that
influence dispute resolution in China. 67 7 Efforts to strengthen the role
676. Cohen, Judicial Independence, supra note 609, at 971. As Cohen noted, there
was significant discussion and appreciation of "the virtues of functional specialization,
professionalization, and judicial autonomy" in China in the 1950s. Id. at 1001, 1006.
677. The situation in China thus contrasts with other countries where the media's
external role may help to police judicial independence within the political system. Cf.
Office of Democracy and Governance, supra note 603, at 35-36 (commenting that
"[e]xternal monitoring of courts can be a powerful tool for enhancing the independence
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of courts that do not take account of the range of influences on court
decisionmaking are likely to fail. 6 78 In China, distinctions between oversight and independence are even more blurred than in many liberal democratic systems: Attempting to insulate oneself from the scrutiny of other
Party-state actors may also be an assertion of independence.
The array of factors and actors with the potential to influence
China's courts is extensive, and includes superior courts, Party politicallegal committees, individual Party officials, the media, procuratorates,
party discipline committees, local governments, and corruption by parties
to disputes. The legitimacy of such influence is contested; judges may see
written instructions from Party officials concerning individual cases as interference, but the official who issues such an instruction is likely to perceive this as a proper function of his or her post. Identifying the range of
interests and their legitimacy in the current system is a necessary first step
to conceptualizing the appropriate and potential role of courts in China.
Second, do discussions regarding judicial independence presuppose
that courts occupy a position different from that which they currently
occupy? This Article has argued that criticism of the media's influence
on the courts may presume that courts have assumed a role as a fundamental forum for dispute resolution, when in fact courts remain only one
of a number of mechanisms for resolving disputes and often lack the
power to decide or enforce matters brought before them. The growth of
litigation may suggest a transformation of the role of the courts; research
into explanations for China's litigation explosion is a promising avenue
for future study. Nevertheless, there are reasons to be skeptical that such
a shift is occurring. If so, discussions of independence based heavily on
the presumption that courts differ fundamentally from other institutions
may be undermined by their failure to take account of the actual role
6 79
courts continue to play today.
Similarly, discussions regarding the role of the courts may assume
that courts have the competence to undertake expanded roles. In analyzing the role of court adjudication committees, Zhu Suli has suggested
that oversight that interferes with the independence of individual judges
may be justified in a system in which judges may lack legal competence
680
and are subject to a range of external pressures, including corruption.
China's judiciary has improved significantly in recent years; it may be that
forms of oversight and influence on court decisionmaking that were justiof the judiciary," but noting also that efforts to rely on investigative journalism are not
always successful).
678. This observation is, of course, not unique to China. See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer
& Eric B. Rasmusen, MeasuringJudicial Independence: The Political Economy ofJudging
in Japan 166 (2003) (noting that 'Judicial independence is not primarily a matter of
constitutional text").
679. Discussions that blame the media for undermining popular confidence in the
courts, see supra note 612, assume that courts deserve a higher level of popular confidence
than they currently enjoy.
680. Zhu, Sending Law, supra note 660, at 110-14.
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fiable in the past are no longer warranted. If so, such changes may provide important arguments in favor of greater judicial authority.
Third, are courts developing spheres of autonomy where they are
able to make decisions relatively unencumbered by external Party-state
influences? Despite this Article's emphasis on continued Party-state oversight of, and intervention in, the courts, there are also signs that this situation is evolving. Courts may increasingly be able to make decisions without being subject to significant pressure from other Party-state actors.
Judges interviewed in the course of this study repeatedly emphasized that
the frequency with which external persons or individuals intervene in in68 1
dividual cases is decreasing.
Parallels to the evolution of the Chinese media suggest multiple explanations for a reduction in interference. Decreasing interference in
the courts may reflect Party-state commitment to strengthening the
courts and making the legal system more efficient and effective. Yet
judges may also be developing a more sophisticated understanding of the
types of cases that are likely to be of interest to their superiors inside and
outside the courts. As with the media, direct intervention by Party-state
officials may not be necessary where the courts understand the parameters within which they operate. Likewise, increased court autonomy may
reflect the rapid growth of litigation. An increased volume of cases may
make it more difficult for connected institutions or individuals to intervene in every case that concerns them, just as propaganda department
officials find it increasingly difficult to monitor the rapid proliferation of
news stories appearing in increasingly diverse news media. Any evaluation of courts' independence will turn on whether independence is meacases touchsured by the frequency of intervention, or by intervention in
68 2
ing on core concerns to Party-state institutions or officials.
The Chinese legal system may be developing toward an arrangement
in which courts, like the media, enjoy areas of significant autonomy. Routine cases, or cases that do not affect powerful interests, may be left
largely to the discretion of the courts. Cases that affect powerful interests
may continue to be subject to significant oversight by other arms of the
Party-state. Such a situation would be akin to other countries where
courts are generally independent but where there are areas in which such
independence disappears. 6 83 Areas of nonintervention could be under681. Other Western academics report similar findings. Cf. Peerenboom, China's
Long March, supra note 25, at 7 (noting that Party interference in court decisions is the
"rare exception").
682. One's assessment of independence will turn on whether one views the ability to
exert power over other state institutions or the ability to resist influence from such
institutions as the primary component of independence.
683. See, e.g., Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 678, at 126 (discussing political
influence of judges in Japan); Shapiro, supra note 608, at 32 ("In a great many nations,
judicial independence is conceived not in terms of a tripartite constitution with checks and
balances but simply in terms of a professional judiciary sufficiently insulated from other
governmental influences to operate within its own sphere under the law."); see also
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stood as serving Party interests in developing a court system that serves
the goal of delivering efficient justice. Cases in which court autonomy is
curtailed are likely to be cases that directly impact on regime legitimacy,
social control, or the economic interests of the Party-state.
Areas of Party-state concern in China are broad, however. They encompass not just matters that are politically sensitive, but also a range of
cases touching on the economic interests of various levels of the Partystate as well as cases of importance to influential individuals or entities,
for economic or personal reasons. The Party-state also intervenes in cases
that attract popular attention, such as the BMW case and the Zhang
Jinzhu case, as well as in cases that touch on questions of popular or official morality. 68 4 In some cases, it appears that Party intervention is motivated by the fact that the case has resulted in popular attention, rather
than the substance of the dispute. The Party is concerned with ensuring
that the case is resolved in a way that comports with popular perceptions
ofjustice. In these situations, Party intervention reflects both discomfort
with courts resolving questions that have attracted popular attention and
also a continuation of the imperial tradition of leaders serving as "father
and mother officials" responsible for maintaining order and morality and
preventing discontent.
Complaints that courts have excessive power also suggest thatjudicial
autonomy may be increasing. Lawyers, academics, and journalists contend that in cases where other Party-state actors do not intervene, courts
Cohen,Judicial Independence, supra note 609, at 1006 (predicting, in 1969, the possibility
for development of some form of "judicial independence" in China, noting that "a
totalitarian Communist regime that operates at an advanced level is under pressure to
make concessions to its judges' occupational commitment to impartial decision making").
This argument also resembles discussions regarding the potential impact of WTO
accession on China, and in particular whether WTO accession may encourage changes
only to China's economic laws or broader changes to the legal system. See WTO: Will
China Keep Its Promises? Can It?: Hearing Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm'n on China,
107th Cong. 74 (2002) (statement of Donald C. Clarke) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting that "there is no general obligation under the WTO agreements to have a
fair and well functioning legal system" and that "[t] hat obligation applies only to specific
actions in specific sectors"); Leila Choukroune, Rule of Law Through Internationalisation:
The Objective of the Reforms?, China Persp., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 7, 17-18 (noting that
WTO accession is aimed at fostering "economic rule of law" and that "[t]he rationalization
of business law or of economic law ...

does not ... signify the installation of the rule of

law").
684. See, e.g., Sun Chaofang et al., Yu Duozhan 300 Wan Gongyou Caichan, Huaxin
Zhangfu NiezaoJuzhai Xiang Kenqi [Licentious Husband Forges Huge Debts to Cheat His
Wife in Order to Own Three Million in Jointly Held Assets], Yangcheng Wanbao
[Yangcheng Evening News], Aug. 29, 2002, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/s/200208-29/1013696195.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing instructions by
Party officials regarding the handling of cases of individuals who take mistresses); "Bao Er
Nai" Anjian Ying Ruhe Chuli? [How to Deal with the "Concubine" Cases?], at http://
www.hanjilawyer.com.cn/lilun/xingshu/xingl-3.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2003) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (same).
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often have broad power to decide cases. 685 Indeed, some complain that
courts are not subject to sufficient external supervision; like the media,
courts have either very limited power or virtually unchecked discretion.
In other cases, courts may be increasingly willing to challenge other institutions: Hence in the black whistle case, the court rejected the
procuratorate's interpretation of the criminal law when it found Gong
Jianping guilty of a more serious crime than that with which he had been
charged. Courts appear to be pushing their autonomy outwards, gradually challenging other party and institutional interests, rather than waiting for systemic reforms to grant them more power. Increased discussion
ofjudicial independence in China may be facilitating this gradual expansion ofjudicial power by legitimizing courts' efforts to resist pressures and
expand their autonomy.
This possible bifurcation of court authority carries important implications for prescriptive steps to address court-media relations in China
and highlights the difficulty of devising measures that govern the full
range of court-media interactions. Media oversight of the courts may play
a very different role in areas in which courts operate relatively free of
external Party-state intervention 68 6 than it does when the media are acting on behalf of Party-state interests. Regulation devised to limit external
interference may undermine media attempts to monitor the courts in
cases of less concern to powerful interests. Likewise, regulation aimed at
ensuring that the media do not affect outcomes in cases in which the
courts should operate autonomously might limit the ability of the media
to affect outcomes in cases of particular concern to Party-state
institutions.
While at times limiting courts' authority, the media may also provide
courts with a model for institutional development. The media remain
subject to significant and often shifting Party oversight. The media have,
however, preserved and strengthened their position in the Chinese legal
system by taking advantage of their historical importance, new legitimacy
derived from commercialization and popular appeal, and the Party-state's
interest in allowing greater media autonomy. By contrast, courts lack
both the historical importance of the media and the ability to appeal directly for popular support. Yet they appear increasingly adept at using
claims of independence and Party declarations of the importance of law
to assert institutional identity and resist some forms of external pressure.
Like the media, courts' abilities to use the autonomy they are permitted
in innovative ways may prove an important mechanism for increasing
their authority, and thus for strengthening their ability to resist a range of
external pressures.
685. See, e.g., Interview 2003-49; Interview 2003-73; Interview 2003-168.
686. The existence of discrete zones of autonomy does not equate to zones ofjudicial
fairness; courts may act unfairly even when their actions are not being dictated by external
intervention.
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CONCLUSION

The media's role in the legal system is the result of numerous factors
rather than explicit design. Commercialization of the media, the media's
links to the Communist Party, a growing attention to and interest in law,
Party-state attempts to curb official corruption and malfeasance, the interests and ideals of individual journalists, and the weak institutional position of China's courts have combined to position the media as influential
actors. The media have benefited from a system that provides significant
incentives to explore new territory even as they continue to face extensive
constraints. Some of the incentives granted to the media may have been
unintended, but the Party-state tolerates these incentives so long as the
media remain within certain boundaries and do not directly challenge
fundamental norms.
Many of the same factors that have permitted the media to assert
their influence may also be encouraging judicial development, and evolution of both the media and the courts. Indeed, the most important factor
leading the media to be more circumspect in their coverage of the
courts-in the view of some, to become more respectful of court procedures-has been the ability of courts to retaliate against the media.
Whether such constraints are understood as a sign of legalization or
merely as retribution, they suggest that courts are increasingly able to
make use of their own institutional power and expanding range of
competence.
There are also signs that courts are developing an institutional identity that distinguishes them from other state actors. Courts are increasingly adept at using both the rhetoric of 'Judicial independence" and
their own powers to assert their own interests and to resist external influence. The degree to which such actions reflect judicial ability to assert
and define autonomy from other state actors remains to be seen, but the
growing judicial willingness to challenge media influence may be a sign
that over time courts will become more willing to challenge the legitimacy of other forms of interference. As with the media, the ability of
courts to assert their own role and make use of autonomy granted to
them may be as important as decisions central authorities make regarding the parameters of court independence and authority.
The media may play a role in pushing courts toward becoming impartial, fair, and popularly legitimate institutions. Doing so, however, will
require media that are both able and willing to criticize not only the
courts, but also those who pressure the courts, as well as media that tolerate court decisions that do not comport with popular views of justice.
Such evolution may also require changes in Party views of the courts, in
particular greater trust of the courts by Party-state officials.
The media have expanded their influence not only by using their
institutional roles in new ways, but also by relying on their ability to reflect and create public opinion-public opinion that is often beyond direct Party control. Influence on public opinion may not always equate
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with increased autonomy, as the high degree of propaganda department
scrutiny of popular programs such as Focus and Law Today demonstrates.
But the ability of the media to assert legitimacy and influence based on
public opinion also raises the question of whether courts may also be able
to seek authority, legitimacy, and influence from sources other than their
formal position in the Party-state.
The role of the media reflects the Party's twin goals of maintaining
control and legitimacy by appearing to be responsive to popular views
and grievances. Other Party-state institutions are also increasingly using
claims to represent public opinion to pursue institutional interests. Rival
claims to represent public opinion have come to characterize debates in
the National People's Congress, for example, suggesting a loosening 68of7
the conceptual link between the Party and uniform popular opinion.
Such developments underscore the growing salience of public opinion,
of claims to represent public opinion, and of the degree to which Partystate rule has come to be largely reactive.
The continuing role of the Party in serving as a referee for the various Party and government actors suggests the need to be cautious in assuming that an increased role for public opinion, or increased willingness
to tolerate criticism of official actions, necessarily represents a loosening
of control. Public opinion may be a tool of competing Party interests as
often as it is a check on abuses in the system. Likewise, recognizing that
increasingly aggressive media may serve state interests shows the need to
be cautious in assuming that limited marketization will lead the media to
push China toward a liberal democratic system or to become independent of the state. 688 Indeed, the encouragement of such new roles for
the media suggests that measuring the Chinese media in terms of their
independence of nonindependence from the state may present a false
dichotomy.
This Article has shown that expanded media coverage of the courts
does not necessarily equal increased transparency and may undermine
court autonomy. Those looking to increased media scrutiny to result in
dramatic improvements in the legal system are likely to be disappointed.
Yet restricting the media may simply lead other state institutions to step
687. See William P. Alford & Benjamin L. Liebman, Clean Air, Clean Process? The
Struggle over Air Pollution in the People's Republic of China, 52 Hastings L.J. 703, 742
(2001) (discussing use of claims to represent public opinion by advocates of stricter air
pollution regulation).
688. Commentators on Western systems also challenge the relationship between
marketized media and media that serve as effective checks on government. See, e.g., U.S.
Office of Democracy and Governance, Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence
and Impartiality 35-36 (rev. ed. 2002) (noting that independence from government
control does not necessarily ensure media autonomy, as owners, "with their own biases and
connections, often control content"); Curran, supra note 165, at 120, 123-24 (arguing that
traditional liberal theory holding that only a free market can guarantee media
independence from government "fails to take into account ...the way in which the market
is now a source of corruption that can subdue critical oversight of government").
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into the media's role as "supervisor," and may undercut efforts to make
courts fairer and more accessible. The media operate in tension with
other state actors, not just the courts. Addressing media influence without examining, for example, the influence of people's congresses or individual Party officials may lead to both less transparency in the courts and
greater interference in court decisionmaking. Media scrutiny, even that
by Party-linked media, may be particularly necessary in a system in which
numerous Party-state entities seek to influence court decisionmaking.
Strengthening the courts requires both reducing and delegitimizing the
range of external pressures that the courts confront.
Tolerance of media coverage that at times exerts excessive influence
on courts thus may be one cost of accepting media that will expose, or
threaten to expose, cases of corruption or injustice. Acceptance of continued media links to the Party may be, at least in the short term, a cost of
encouraging media to play this role. Although media with fewer Partystate links might be subject to reduced Party oversight, such media might
also be less willing or able to report, less trusted by Party officials, and
thus less effective in assisting individuals seeking redress. Whether such a
model of institutional checks on misbehavior is sustainable over the long
term remains to be determined. Institutional positions are not static, and
they will continue to be influenced by the range of incentives and factors
that inform day-to-day interactions among actors. Some of these are apparent; others may be little noticed. Such institutions are likely to continue to play roles that differ in important respects from their Western
counterparts, and the outcome of such institutional development thus
remains difficult to predict.
Oversight of some form is crucial to addressing the numerous
problems that currently undermine the effectiveness of law and governance in China. The central Party-state is relying on a model that uses a
range of state institutions, including the media, to serve as checks on
abuses. This approach reflects the fact that such institutions, and in particular the media, play roles that differ significantly from those played by
similarly named institutions in the West. One legacy of these differences
is that such institutions are unlikely to serve as solutions to these
problems in ways that experiences elsewhere, or Western models of institutional development, might suggest.
Increasing media autonomy is unlikely to be a panacea for the Chinese legal system's problems. One reason that media effectiveness in
bringing systemic change may not match media influence in individual
cases is that the media continue to be subject to numerous constraints.
But the lesson from recent court-media interactions in China is deeper:
Evaluating the media and the courts primarily in terms of their independence from the Party-state risks missing much of the complexity that explains institutional development in China today. As this Article has
shown, increasing the autonomy of the courts and the media may serve
Party-state goals in important ways. Moreover, it is increasingly difficult
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to speak of uniform Party-state goals. The media and the courts are both
Party-state institutions, attempting to assert and redefine themselves on a
rapidly evolving playing field.
It is not surprising that the media's role as a significant institution in
the evolution of law and dispute resolution in China has been largely
overlooked. We lack a basis for answering many fundamental questions
regarding the functioning of the Chinese legal system, including the reasoning behind court decisions, the range and importance of Party oversight, the makeup of court dockets and causes behind the growth of litigation, and the role and impact of the range of actors participating in the
system. Greater attention to legal issues in China suggests that answers to
many of these questions may be found in the Chinese media. The expanded role of the media means that understanding their role is crucial
to understanding the evolution of the Chinese legal and political systems.

